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Abstract
The first chapter of this dissertation evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by
coal- and natural gas-fired electricity generating plants in the United States following
state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation. I construct a detailed dataset
that links confidential, shipment-level data on the price of virtually all of the fuel delivered
to coal- and gas-fired electricity plants in the United States from 1990-2009, with plant-
level data on operations and regulatory status. I find the price of coal drops by 12% at
deregulated plants relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory
change, whereas there was no relative drop in the price of gas. I show how my results
lend support to theories of asymmetric information between generators and regulators,
regulatory capture, and capital-bias as important sources of distortion under cost-of-
service regulation.
The second chapter analyses changes in the cost of generating electricity following
the introduction of regional wholesale electricity markets. I use proxy methods based on
Olley and Pakes (1996); Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to estimate fuel-specific production
functions, and construct the Olley-Pakes productivity index to decompose costs in to
within-plant productivity and allocative efficiency changes. I then apply a potential
outcomes framework to the derived productivity estimates, allowing the construction of
counterfactual costs that explicitly account for permanent differences between market
iii
and non-market areas and common transitory shocks. I find that the introduction of
market-based dispatch methods has reduced fossil-fuel production costs by upwards of
15%.
The third chapter is based on joint work with Roland Fryer and Jorg Spenkuch. We
develop a Roy model in which individuals sort into peer groups based on comparative
advantage. Two key results emerge: First, when comparative advantage is the guiding
principle of peer group organization, the effect of moving a student into an environment
with higher-achieving peers depends on where in the ability distribution she falls and the
effective wages that clear the social market. As a result, linear in means estimates of peer
effects are not identified. We show that the model’s testable prediction in the presence of
this confounding issue is borne out in two data sets.
iv
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Chapter 1
When Does Regulation Distort Costs?
Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US
Electricity Generation
1.1 Introduction
What determines whether government policy intended to correct a market failure improves social
welfare, or ultimately causes more harm than the problem it was intended to ameliorate? In
this paper I identify three leading potential mechanisms from the theoretical literature seeking
to answer this question, and measure their importance in contributing to distortions in fuel
procurement arising from cost-of-service regulation of U.S. electricity generation.
To do so, I develop a model of a regulated monopolist who may reduce the price paid for fuel
by exerting costly effort (more intensive search, negotiation, etc.) that is not directly observed by
the regulator. The regulator has discretion to allow “prudently incurred” costs to be recovered,
and the fixed cost of effort is covered by receiving a rate of return on the capital value of the
plant that exceeds the cost of capital. The “Averch-Johnson Effect” (Averch and Johnson (1962))
predicts that this compensation scheme leads firms to adopt economically inefficient production
techniques that are capital-biased. It also becomes impossible to induce efficient cost-reducing
effort when the regulator is unable to observe both effort and the cost of this effort (Laffont and
1
Tirole (1986, 1993)). Finally, fuel prices are predicted to exceed those prevailing under competition
when special interest groups (such as coal producers) influence the regulator’s decision on which
costs to allow (Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976); Grossman and Helpman (2002)).
I compare the importance of the mechanisms hypothesized by these theories at natural gas-
and coal-fired electricity generating facilities following the end of cost-of-service regulation in
states that passed electricity industry restructuring legislation. By virtue of the need to transmit
via public thoroughfares, the production and sale of electricity has historically been regulated
by state or municipal governments in the United States (Stigler and Friedland (1962); Jarrell
(1978)). When not owned by the government, electricity providers have typically taken the form
of vertically-integrated Investor-Owned Utilities (“Utilities” or IOUs). IOUs own the generating
plants, the transmission network, and exclusive licenses to sell electricity in their respective
service areas. In the mid to late 1990’s, state-level initiatives sought to restructure the electricity
industry by transforming the rate-regulated IOUs in to participants in a competitive market
guided by private investment, procurement, and production decisions. This required breaking
up utilities so that owners of the transmission network could not favor their own plants in the
face of lower-cost competition. This was often accomplished through divestiture, in which IOUs
sold off their generating assets or transferred them to unregulated affiliates. Once divested, power
plant operators’ costs are no longer subject to oversight by the state Public Utility Commission.
Although all states had at least held hearings to consider restructuring reforms by 2000, the
California energy crisis put a halt to any legislation that had not already passed. As a result,
the regulation of electricity generators varies dramatically across states, with over half of states
virtually untouched by any reform.
To measure changes induced by this deregulation, I construct a panel on the operations, fuel
costs, and regulatory status of all gas- and coal-fired electricity generating facilities in the lower
48 states, responsible for roughly two-thirds of U.S. electricity generation.1 Although many plants
initially ceased reporting costs following divestiture–as is standard when cost-of-service rules
end–the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration asserted its jurisdiction
to collect data on fuel prices at deregulated plants beginning in 2002. This is the first study
1“Gas” and “Natural Gas” both refer to a gaseous mixture of hydrocarbons (mostly methane) extracted from
underground deposits, are used interchangeably.
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to evaluate the impact of deregulation on costs using detailed, restricted-access data from the
post-divestiture period in U.S. electricity generation.
I employ a matched Differences-in-Differences (DID) estimator in the spirit of Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) to compare fuel prices and sulfur regulation compliance
strategies at similar divested and non-divested plants in close geographical proximity. The
estimation strategy relies on the assumption that fuel purchasing opportunities are identical
between “treatment” and “control” facilities. Close proximity is therefore a critical element of
the estimation strategy because coal transportation costs are substantial, and have changed over
time. I find that divested plants reduce the price paid for coal by 12% relative to a counterfactual
scenario in which their operations had continued under cost-of-service regulation.
A small fraction of this gain may attributed to the fact that divested generating units have
been far more likely to have switched to cheaper, low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal.2 The opposite
is true of regulated generating units, which have disproportionately installed “scrubbers” as a
means of compliance with sulfur emission regulations. Since scrubbers are enormously expensive
pieces of equipment (∼$400/kW of capacity), the fact that rate-regulated units would opt for more
capital-intensive methods to achieve compliance with environmental regulations is consistent with
the hypothesis of Averch and Johnson (1962).
The drop in the cost of coal following divestiture does not reflect the universal inefficiency of
regulation. Instead, I find that divestiture had no impact on the price of fuel paid by gas-fired
generators. These plants were commonly owned with coal-fired units by monopolistic IOUs,
and were subject to the same change in regulatory oversight. Differences in the markets for
natural gas and coal lend support to agency-based theories that emphasize the role of asymmetric
information between firms and regulators as a source of distortion under regulation. While gas is
a homogeneous commodity traded in regional markets with transparent prices, the market for
coal is dominated by confidential bilateral contracts. In addition, shipping from mines is costly
and plants must be specifically tuned to the heterogeneous characteristics of the coal being burned.
Regulators therefore have less information on a coal-fired plant’s purchasing opportunities, and
2Coal is classified by ’rank’, which refers to the purity of energy concentrated over millions of years of exposure to
heat and pressure. In decreasing order of energy content, they are: Anthracite (mostly in PA), Bituminous (Central
Appalachia), Sub-bituminous (WY, CO, UT), and Lignite (TX). About 90% of coal burned for electricity generation in
the United States is Bituminous or Sub-bituminous.
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operators may justify expenses based on idiosyncrasies of their location and equipment. It is clear,
however, that these justifications become less important when generators become the residual
claimants of cost savings through divestiture.
To evaluate the importance of regulatory capture on distorting procurement decisions, I confine
my analysis to the set of plants that were burning coal sourced in-state during the pre-divestiture
period. Coal producers are hypothesized to have greater influence over regulators in the states in
which their mines (and jobs) are located. I find that divested facilities in these areas increase their
out-of-state purchases by about 25% relative to matched non-divested facilities in coal-producing
states, suggesting that regulation was an impediment to efficient procurement. I also find evidence
suggesting that local coal has had some success in protecting their operations, as price reductions
in these areas are mostly confined to plants that switched to burning low-sulfur coal.
I then connect my data on coal purchases to detailed data on mining cost determinants in the
counties of origin. This allows me to decompose the extent to which these changes are driven
by a reallocation of rents between mines and utilities, as opposed to real social welfare gains. I
find that divested plants buy coal from mines with substantially lower extraction cost profiles: the
mined coal seams are about 30% thicker and 50% closer to the surface than coal purchased by
matched facilities. In total, divested plants purchase coal that requires ∼ 25% less labor to extract
from the ground at mines that pay 5% higher wages.
Aside from any conclusions that may be drawn regarding the wider debates on the merits of
government intervention in the economy,3 the sheer scale of the coal-fired electricity sector makes
these results of independent interest. Over 40% of electricity in the United States is derived from
coal, and fuel accounts for about 80% of variable costs (Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007)). A
12% reduction in fuel prices at the coal-fired facilities that have already been divested amounts
to about one billion dollars per year. These facilities account for roughly one quarter of U.S.
coal-fired generating capacity; the remaining facilities have not undergone any major changes in
regulatory structure.
3A form of cost-of-service has recently been implemented in health care under the “80/20 rule” of the Affordable
Care Act. This rule requires that insurance companies reimburse their customers for any revenues exceeding a set
percentage above medical expenditures. As opposed to regulation in the electricity sector, in which variable costs are
simply passed through, this rule means that insurance companies can only raise their profits by spending more on
medical care. My results suggest the notorious opacity of costs and political activity in this sector does not bode well
for the anticipated cost-savings from recent health care reform legislation.
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The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section I describe the process of divestiture
in the United States, and the institutional details that will facilitate estimation. The third section
frames the potential sources of regulatory inefficiency with a model of regulatory oversight that
captures the hypothesized mechanisms in a unified framework. The fourth section details the
estimation strategy, and the fifth section describes the data that I will bring to bear on the question.
The sixth and seventh sections discuss the results and the associated welfare gains. The final
section concludes.
1.2 Background on the U.S. Electricity Industry
Operations under Cost of Service Regulation
The market for electricity was chaotic and competitive in its early years due to duplicative, non-
exclusive franchises granted by municipalities (Jarrell (1978)). At the turn of the 20th century,
improvements in economies of scale of generation and transmission led to widespread consolida-
tion in the industry. State governments responded to this consolidation by asserting themselves
over municipalities to regulate the operations of electricity companies in their respective states.
Under the subsequent form of regulation, utilities have been granted exclusive licenses to sell
electricity in their service territories in exchange for being subject to oversight of their operations
and the rates they are permitted to charge customers. IOUs are guaranteed recovery of ‘prudent’
costs incurred, as well as a pre-determined rate of return on the value of the utility’s capital base.
All major investments (such as building new generation assets or installing major abatement
equipment for use with existing units) can only be undertaken with the approval of the state’s
Public Utility Commission. The prices an IOU is permitted to charge are determined during
‘rate hearings’. These costly, politically charged affairs entail an intensive audit of the utility’s
costs, operations, and demand projections in order to justify a change in the pricing formula for
electricity. Rate hearings may be requested by the utility, or may be automatically triggered when
profits exceed a predetermined threshold.
Kahn (1971) argues that the regulatory lag induced by a rate hearing leads many utilities to
reduce costs between adjustments so as to reap profits during periods of fixed output price. After
oil price spikes in the 1970’s, many state commissions allowed IOUs to implement automatic
5
pass-through clauses for fuel costs since intermittent rate cases could not keep up with the rise
in the IOU outlays.4 Once the adjustment formula is set, IOUs are guaranteed recovery of their
fuel costs without further oversight. Since IOUs operate exclusively in their service territory, it is
not possible for consumers to punish inferior procurement practices by switching to a lower cost
producer.
There are two additional types of facilities that deserve mention. An early effort to reduce the
cost of electricity during the Carter Administration led to the Public Utility Regulatory Policy
Act of 1978 (PURPA). PURPA made it easier for non-utility generating facilities to sell power to
regulated entities in an attempt to remove barriers to entry in the industry. This was followed by
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which sought to remove some of the obstacles non-utilities faced
when seeking transmission service from the IOUs who owned the wires. These reforms stimulated
limited entry from non-utility generators, mostly co-generating facilities that also provided steam
for industrial purposes (Joskow (2005)).5
The final class of operators are federal, municipal, and cooperative organizations. These
organizations produce about 20% of the nation’s electricity (mostly in rural areas), and have made
up about 20% of U.S. coal-fired capacity since at least 1990. Public Utility Commissions do not
have jurisdiction to regulate these entities since they are owned either by the government or their
members. Facilities owned by either non-utilities or not-for-profits were not subject to divestiture,
and therefore do not experience operational or regulatory changes during the period of study.
Restructuring and Divestiture
In spite of the successful deregulation of U.S. telecommunications (Olley and Pakes (1996)),
airlines (Kahn (1987, 1988); Ng and Seabright (2001)), railroads (McFarland (1989); Ellig (2002)),
and trucking (Rose (1987)), electricity was thought to be different. The fact that vertically integrated
utilities owned both the generation assets and the wires meant that a deregulated firm would be
4Gollop and Karlson (1978), and Baron and Bondt (1979) provided early theoretical analysis on how these changes
are likely to distort IOU procurement decisions by reducing the incentive to lower costs, as well as make utilities
less likely to switch to lower cost fuels when switching costs require commission approval, but continuing to burn
uneconomical fuel is costless to the utility. Kaserman and Tepel (1982) find evidence in favor of these hypotheses.
5Less than 2% of coal-fired capacity belong to this class of power plants. The mid-2000’s saw more substantial
entry in the form of gas-fired non-utility generators.
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able to shut out competition from other producers. Markets in electricity could also be vulnerable
to the exercise of market power since electricity production must match demand in every moment
in time–the impossibility of storage means that a firm can unilaterally withhold capacity to drive
up prices with impunity in a free market with high fixed costs of entry.
Joskow and Schmalensee (1988) was groundbreaking in that their evaluation of the electricity
industry confronted these challenges directly, and suggested a set of policy options that would
facilitate the transition to a restructured market. Among these policies was that vertically-
integrated IOUs divest their generation assets to prevent owners of transmission networks from
favoring their own plants. Instead, generators would be required to bid their capacity in day-
ahead and real-time auctions, and would only be dispatched if their bid was below that of the
marginal unit required to meet demand. This change transferred control of transmission networks
to independent system operators in order to become participants in regional markets. Once
divested, plant operators bear the full cost of their procurement decisions. Units that purchase
relatively expensive fuel would be forced to raise their bids to break even in wholesale markets,
and therefore become less likely to be called upon to operate.
Figure 1.1 shows the geographic distribution of these reforms with respect to coal-fired
electricity stations in the United States that report fuel deliveries between 1990 and 2009.6
Although divestitures were required of all IOU generating assets in states passing legislation, it is
clear that neither coal-fired plants nor restructuring reforms were randomly spread across the
country. Almost all coal production and consumption occurs to the east of the Rocky Mountains.
At the time many coal-fired plants were built, most coal consumed by electric facilities in the
United States was the high-sulfur, bituminous variety from the central Appalachian mountains
and Illinois basin. In spite of the high cost of shipping coal relative to transmitting the derived
power by wire, the establishment of exclusive service areas by IOUs ensured local utilities would
not be competed out of the market by producers in the Ohio River Valley. This is one source of
the price differential in electricity across areas that motivated restructuring legislation. Another
major driver of restructuring legislation was the gap between retail and industrial electricity prices
6States that restructured, but do not have coal-fired generating assets reporting cost data include California,
Washington, DC, Maine, and Rhode Island. New Hampshire introduced retail choice, but did not require divestiture
of generating assets. A more detailed discussion of the state-by-state history of divestitures can be found in Data
Appendix A.
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Figure 1.1: Coal-Fired Plants in The United States, 1990-2009
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(White (1996) and Joskow (1996)). States with larger gaps were more likely to restructure due to
the perception that retail consumers were getting a raw deal relative to industrial buyers.
Restructuring legislation was first passed in the Northeastern states and California in the
mid-1990s. The movement had gained sufficient momentum by 1998 that every state in the
union had at least held hearings on the prospective gains from deregulation (Fabrizio, Rose, and
Wolfram (2007)). This momentum dissipated quickly in the wake of the California electricity
crisis of 2000-2001, leading several states who had made significant progress in the direction of
restructuring to delay or cancel planned reforms (Joskow (2005)). No state has passed restructuring
legislation since this time: fairly or not, restructuring is popularly associated with the spectacular
failure in California, and a lack of significant offsetting benefits to consumers (Kwoka (2008)).7
As noted by Joskow (2006), “Even the Cato Institute has lost patience with competitive reforms
in electricity and appears to see merit in returning to the good old days of regulated vertically
integrated utilities (Van Doren and Taylor (2004)).”
That said, the states that had already restructured before the California crisis have not returned
to the model of vertically-integrated IOUs. The perils of liberalized electricity markets have
received significant scrutiny in the wake of the California electricity crisis (Borenstein, Bushnell,
and Wolak (2002); Borenstein (2002); Bushnell, Mansur, and Savaria (2007); Mansur (2001, 2008)),
and adjustments have been made to promote wholesale electricity markets that function reasonably
well (Mansur and White (2012)). Recent work has also shown that restructuring is associated with
more productive nuclear generating facilities (Davis and Wolfram (2012)), and declines in labor
and non-fuel costs (Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007)).8 The market for electricity in the United
States is therefore characterized by a patchwork of regulatory structures that are separated by
state borders and/or historical service area boundaries.
7Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) find that the price of electricity would have tripled between 1998 and 2000
based on rising input costs alone. Although there were a number of factors that contributed to the crisis (including the
exercise of market power), it was most certainly exacerbated by the fact that retail prices were fixed while wholesale
prices were skyrocketing. This led generators to withhold capacity due to doubts of receiving compensation, not the
exercise of market power. See Joskow (2001) for a detailed discussion of the history of the California electricity crisis.
8Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007) as well as concurrent work by Chan, Fell, Lange, and Li (2012) define treatment
as the time between law passage and divestiture because post-divestiture data on costs has not been utilized prior to
this study. For work on incentives to invest in new capacity in restructured markets, see Bushnell and Ishii (2007), Ishii
and Yan (2004), and Ishii and Yan (2007).
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1.3 Sources of Regulatory Imperfection
To explore the possible mechanisms that can explain changes in the price of inputs following
deregulation, it is helpful to consider the main hypotheses posed in the theoretical literature on
regulatory imperfection. To do so I consider a setting in which a firm can reduce the price paid
for inputs by exerting cost-reducing effort. After deriving the optimal behavior in the absence of
regulation, I introduce standard rate-of-return (or “cost-plus”) regulation, in which the regulator
has discretion to approve capital investments and “prudent” variable costs. In a key departure
from the agency literature, I leave the regulator’s objective function unspecified. Rather than
derive the optimal policy for the regulator, I am instead interested with how regulation affects the
set of feasible policies. The reason for this approach is two-fold: it is sufficiently flexible to allow
for consideration of different theories of regulatory inefficiency in a common framework, and
it results in a set of hypotheses that can be taken to the data on firm behavior without having
already assumed the nature of the regulator’s objective.
Suppose generating facilities produce electricity by combining fuel (F) and capital (K) according
to the quasiconcave production function G(F,K)–labor is a small share of generation costs and is
ignored. Let p denote the per-unit compensation received by plant operators, whose determination
will depend upon the regulatory environment. Given this price, plants face the inverse demand
function p = p[G(F,K)]. For simplicity, assume a constant elasticity of demand, and denote the
inverse price elasticity of demand η = − G(F,K)
p[G(F,K)]
dp
dG , with 0 ≤ η < 1.
9 Suppose plants must exert
managerial effort to solicit bids, negotiate contracts, etc. and that this effort reduces the price paid
for coal according to c = β− e where e ∈ [0, β]. Effort is itself costly, and reduces profits according
to a convex function ψ(e), ψ′(e) > 0, ψ′′(e) > 0.
First, consider the behavior of the plant in the absence of regulation. Let R = p[G(F,K)]G(F,K)
denote total revenues when the manager considers the effect of output on price. The plant manager
takes the rental rate of capital, r as given, and chooses effort and inputs to maximize
max
e,F,K
R− (β− e)F− rK− ψ(e) (1.1)
9Sufficient conditions for a maximum will hold so long as the demand function is not so convex as to reverse the
quasiconcavity of revenues with respect to inputs.
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Assuming that price is sufficiently high to cover the fixed costs of effort, we have the standard
first order conditions
[e] : ψ′(e) = F
[F] : (1− η)pGF = (β− e)
[K] : (1− η)pGK = r
The optimal effort equates the marginal cost of effort to the marginal benefit: a reduction in
the cost of every unit of coal purchased. When the plant takes price as given, marginal revenue
is equal to price (i.e. η = 0 from the firm’s perspective), and standard optimality conditions for
inputs equate marginal cost to value marginal product. It is worth noting the effect that market
power has on input costs in this scenario. Since a monopolist will restrict output to raise price,
the reduced demand for inputs implies less effort will be exerted to reduce input costs than in
a competitive market.10 Input costs in a deregulated market therefore depend on the ability of
firms to exert market power. Let the triple (e∗, F∗,K∗) denote the effort and input demand in a
competitive, deregulated market.
Next, suppose the firm is regulated on a cost-of-service basis known as “cost-plus.” This
does not imply that firms are (directly) rewarded for higher coal prices. Instead, variable costs
are reimbursed only if the regulator deems them “prudent” and the plant receives a rate of
return s > r on its capital stock, or “rate base” that exceeds the cost of capital. The regulator is
unable to directly observe cost-reducing effort, and instead decides whether or not to allow fuel
expenditures based only on the reported price, c. Let θ(β− e) denote the probability that the
regulator allows recovery of costs c. The firm therefore maximizes profits subject to the constraint
that revenues are no greater than allowed costs:11
R ≤ θ(β− e)[β− e]F+ sK
10Following Hicks (1935), the tendency for monopolists to have costs that exceed those prevailing under competition
has been referred to as “the quiet life of the monopolist.”
11Joskow (1974) argues that while regulators may use this constraint for setting nominal prices at formal rate
hearings, firms are actually able to earn any rate of return so long as prices are not rising during intermediate periods.
Jha (2012) extends this intuition in a model in which excess profits are confiscated, but imprudent expenditures are
punished, inducing a form of risk aversion among regulated utilities. The widespread adoption of automatic fuel
adjustment clauses in the late 1970’s effectively re-coupled revenues and costs in the manner implied by the rate of
return constraint. Imprudent costs may be rejected in the spirit of Jha (2012) through θ(β− e).
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Thus the term “cost-plus”: the revenues the firm can raise are equal to its prudently incurred
variable costs, plus a guaranteed “fair rate of return” paid to capital. To focus attention on cost
reduction, it is assumed that the regulator is perfectly able to observe and dictate quantities
conditional upon costs.12 This yields the Lagrangian and first order conditions
L = max
e,F,K
R− (β− e)F− rK− ψ(e) + λ{θ(β− e)[β− e]F+ sK− R} (1.2)
[e] : ψ′(e) = F{1− λ[θ(β− e) + [β− e]θ′(β− e)}
[F] : (1− η)pGF =
[1− λθ(β− e)]
(1− λ)
(β− e)
[K] : (1− η)pGK = r−
λ
(1− λ)
[s− r]
The binding revenue constraint and sufficient second order condition for a maximum imply
0 < λ < 1.13 Capital-bias is expressed clearly by assuming for a moment that the regulator
approves all variables costs (θ(c) = 1 ∀ c). Instead of equating the relative marginal product of
capital to the relative price, cost-plus recovery implies
GK
GF
=
r
(β− e)
−
λ
(1− λ)
s− r
β− e
<
r
(β− e)
This is the seminal hypothesis of Averch and Johnson (1962): cost-plus regulation leads to
economically inefficient capital-biased production, also called “gold-plating” and “rate-base
padding”14. When cost recovery is guaranteed regardless of c, it is also clear that fuel prices
are inefficiently high. This is because allowed revenues are directly tied to costs through the
revenue constraint. While the plant bears the full cost of search effort, it only reaps benefits at rate
(1− λ).15 One strategy is to decouple revenues from costs via “yardstick competition” (Shleifer
12This is equivalent to defining the analogous probabilities of approval for fuel and capital as unity at the quantities
desired by the regulator, and zero otherwise.
13The determinant of the bordered Hessian of (1.2) is positive when λ < 1 and revenues are not too concave.
14See Baumol and Klevorick (1970) for a more complete treatment, and Berg and Tschirhart (1988) (chapter 9) for a
discussion of the subsequent literature on the “Averch-Johnson effect.”
15If we instead assumed that the regulator could fully compensate the firm for effort, effort would be efficient
conditional upon quantities, but quantity would still inefficiently low because the plant anticipates the effect of output
on price.
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(1985)). Under yardstick competition, the allowed output price is tied to the realized costs of other
producers–thereby effectively setting λ and η to zero.
In the agency-theoretic approach, the regulator removes the unconditional guarantee of
recovered costs in order to induce the plant to undertake the desired level of cost reduction effort
and production. This is a relatively straightforward task when there is no uncertainty on intrinsic
costs, β (i.e. the cost of fuel when no effort is exerted): the regulator approves the costs that
maximize her objective function, and denies compensation otherwise.16 The plant’s best response
is to comply with the regulator’s wishes so long as the resulting profits are non-negative.
Of course, potential costs are often unobserved by the regulator, who makes decisions in the
context of political pressure. Thus the interaction between regulators and firms has become a key
area of interest in principal-agent theory (Baron and Myerson (1982); Laffont and Tirole (1986)
and meticulously detailed in Laffont and Tirole (1993)). The workhorse model of modern political
economy (Grossman and Helpman (2002)) adopts the principal-agent framework, and considers
the influence of special interest groups as an argument in the regulator’s objective function. From
the plant’s perspective, the common theme of these models is that the probability of recovering
expenses depends in some way on reported costs. In choosing a profit-maximizing level of effort,
the firm trades off the direct reduction of allowed revenue due to lower costs, and the increased
probability of having costs allowed.
In the case of asymmetric information, the regulator must adopt a strategy of approving costs
without observing effort or intrinsic costs. Suppose β can take on any value on the interval [β, β]
with some positive probability. Let c denote the costs realized when firms with intrinsic costs
β exert optimal effort e∗(β), and similarly for c. While it is possible for the regulator to induce
efficient outcomes over some range of β, this becomes infeasible as the unobserved heterogeneity
grows sufficiently large so that it is no longer possible to punish higher costs while preserving
solvency.
To see this, first note that the efficient level of effort in the first-best world is decreasing in
16If we consider only differentiable strategies, the first best outcomes of (1.1) are achieved when the regulator
approves effort e∗ with certainty, and the probability of cost allowance at the optimum changes according to θ′(β− e∗) =
−
θ(β−e∗)
(β−e∗)
. This neutralizes the effect of the rate of return constraint by increasing the probability of allowed costs
one-for-one with cost-reducing effort–a zero net revenue effect.
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intrinsic costs, that is de
∗
dβ < 0.
17 As a result, optimal costs are increasing with intrinsic costs,
dc∗
dβ > 0. This makes sense, for otherwise we would have the perverse scenario in which firms with
higher costs are producing more than those with lower costs. Similarly, applying the envelope
theorem to (1.2) when differentiating profits with respect to β implies that profits of an operating
plant are strictly declining as intrinsic costs rise.
Suppose the regulator approves θ(c) = 1 for c ≤ c, with θ′(c) = − θ(c)c for c ≥ c. This is a
feasible strategy to induce efficient search so long as profits remain non-negative. However, for
fixed β, as β grows large, there will eventually be a region of β in which the optimal policy does
not allow the plant to cover its costs, and is forced to shut down. It is important to note that this
is due to the variance of unobserved heterogeneity, not the levels of costs. When intrinsic costs are
high, but observed, it is perfectly possible for the regulator to approve costs at the efficient level of
effort. This is a classic result in principal-agent theory, typically proven in circumstances in which
the regulator aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and profits. The point here is that
efficient effort is impossible to induce under any regulator objective function when unobserved
heterogeneity is sufficiently large.
The inefficiency associated with regulatory capture is also straightforward to demonstrate.
Suppose the local coal mines exert some influence over the regulator’s decision-making. In this
case, the regulator approves fuel costs according to θ(c, b) where b represents the influence of the
mines, perhaps via campaign contributions as in Grossman and Helpman (2002). In this case we
can express the effect of this influence on allowed costs as ∂θ∂b > 0;
∂2θ
∂b∂c ≥ 0 – contributions raise
the probability of allowing high fuel costs, and reduce the punishment for marginally reducing
effort.18 To show how increased mining influence affects the cost-minimizing effort exerted by
plants, suppose the regulator is initially inducing optimal effort with ∂θ∂c = −
θ(β−e∗,b)
(β−e∗)
and consider
the effect of a marginal rise in influence on search effort. Accounting for political influence via
17This is shown by differentiating the first order conditions of (1.1) with respect to β while noting input demand
is a function of fuel price. The input demand conditions yields the standard ∂F∂c =
RKK
RKKRFF−R2FK
< 0, by the assumed
quasiconcavity of revenue. Differentiating the optimal effort condition yields de
∗
dβ =
∂F
∂c
∂F
∂c +ψ
′′(e∗)
. This implies optimal
effort is decreasing in intrinsic costs so long as the convexity of the effort function is greater than the drop in fuel
demand arising from higher fuel prices. This follows from the assumption that the revenue function is not too concave
in order for the solution to (1.1) to be a maximum.
18In fact, the necessary assumption is that ∂
2θ
∂b∂c not be so negative as to reverse the direct effect of
∂θ
∂b .
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θ(c, b) in (1.2), differentiation of the analogous first order condition for effort with respect to b
and substituting in for the initial policy yields
de∗
db
= −
Fλ[ ∂θ∂b + (β− e
∗) ∂
2θ
∂c∂b ]
ψ′′(e∗) + ∂F∂c
The denominator is positive by the same condition that implies de
∗
dβ < 0. Thus an increase in
political influence leads to a decrease in cost-reducing effort, and higher fuel prices.
We have therefore derived a core set of predictions to test against the data. The price of fuel is
expected to remain constant after divestiture when determinants of cost are readily observable by
the regulator–who is operating relatively freely of political constraints imposed by fuel suppliers.
Conversely, both opacity of the procurement process and political influence tend to raise input
prices above levels observed by plants operating in a competitive market. Finally, divested plants
are anticipated to favor less capital-intensive production methods than when they are compensated
based on their capital stock.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
To estimate the impact of plant divestiture on coal procurement practices, one would ideally like
to randomly assign treatment (divestiture) to observationally equivalent plants in close proximity.
The control plants would continue operating under cost-of-service. With random assignment,
these plants would serve as a clean counterfactual for the operations of the divested plants,
allowing causal inference to be made. Forced divestitures triggered by state-level restructuring
legislation has ensured that probability of treatment within state is uncorrelated with potential
confounders. Complete divestiture of all generating assets guaranteed regulated utilities were not
left operating the least desirable plants in their portfolio, for example. However, it is clear from
Figure 1.1 that restructuring legislation was not randomly assigned across states.
With a panel of data on costs and plant characteristics, one could potentially account for the
differences between treatment and control groups with a Differences-In-Differences estimator (DID,
Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985)). This is the approach taken by Bushnell and
Wolfram (2005), Davis and Wolfram (2012), and Chan, Fell, Lange, and Li (2012) when studying the
effect of divestiture on plant efficiency. A DID framework with plant-level fixed effects assumes
15
Figure 1.2: Estimated Shipping Costs per MMBTU of Coal
0
.
5
1
1.
5
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
hi
pp
in
g 
Co
st
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Distance to Mine (mi.)
95% CI 1990
95% CI 1997
95% CI 2009
Note: Estimated shipping costs are derived from a regression of delivered costs on a polynomial of coal characteristics,
distance to the mine, and dummies for time, place of origin, and site of delivery. The relationship between estimated
shipping cost and distance is then fit with a local polynomial expansion of shipping distance.
that once permanent, plant-specific determinants of cost have been removed, coal prices at control
facilities track the counterfactual prices at treatment facilities. This assumption is problematic in
settings where unobserved or endogenous time-varying determinants of the outcome variable
differ between treatment and control groups. In the case of coal procurement, the combination
of substantial shipping costs and wide geographic dispersion of plants between treatment and
control groups suggests that a straightforward DID estimation would be inappropriate.
For example, Figure 1.2 shows the estimated relationship between plant distance from mine
and shipping costs during three of the past twenty years (1997 is year before divestitures begin).19
Fluctuations in the price of oil, and their subsequent effect on freight rates will disproportionately
influence prices at facilities farther from their supplier because shipping rates are tightly connected
to oil prices. However, simply controlling for distance from the mine is unsatisfactory—part of the
goal of this paper is to test whether firms differentially respond to cost shocks. If a divested firm
19While shipping is charged per ton of coal, not per unit of heat, all coal data in this paper is denominated in
Millions of British Thermal Units (MMBTU). This is because heat energy is fundamentally what is being converted to
electricity, and the heat content per ton of coal varies.
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is more likely to change their supplier in response to cost spikes, the savings from the change
itself will be lost when limiting to estimation conditional upon distance.
Another possible approach would be to use the synthetic control group approach of Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), who match on pre-
treatment outcome variables. Again, the potential confounders in this setting render such an
approach problematic. This is because in the pre-treatment years, a facility in Chicago may be
matched with a facility in Atlanta that receives its coal from West Virginia, roughly equal distance
between the two. The plant in Atlanta, however, is a poor counterfactual for the relative prices of
coal ranks in Chicago, which is much closer to the Powder River Basin in Wyoming. They may
have identical prices at baseline, but face different choice sets unrelated to treatment status.
Instead, I compare facilities in close proximity that burned the same rank of coal in 1997,
before divestitures began.20 More formally, suppose we have N plants indexed i ∈ {1, ...,N} so
that plants i ∈ {1, ...,N0}, N0 < N are never divested, but those with i ∈ {N0 + 1, ...,N} eventually
are. There are T time periods indexed t ∈ {1, ..., T}, and T0 pre-treatment time periods with
1 < T0 < T. Using the ‘Potential Outcomes’ framework of Fisher (1935), Roy (1951), and Rubin
(1974), let Yit(0) denote the price of coal per MMBTU paid by a non-divested facility i in period t.
Similarly, let Yit(1) denote a facility that has been divested. Suppose fuel costs at non-divested
facilities are
Yit(0) = γi + δt + ct(Xi, 0) + νit
where ct(Xi, 0) represents a time-varying procurement cost function that depends on facility
i’s location Xi (a richer set of pre-treatment covariates is possible), and regulatory status. Suppose
that divestiture induces procurement cost ct(Xi, 1), but that time invariant costs γi are unaffected
by regulatory status (an example would be “last mile” costs that are idiosyncratic to the plant).
Then coal prices at divested facilities can be written as
Yit(1) = Yit(0) + [ct(Xi, 1)− ct(Xi, 0)]
= Yit(0) + τt(Xi)
20The variance in heat, sulfur, and ash content across rank is much greater than within rank, so switching across
ranks requires more costly adjustments than the tuning needed to switch suppliers within rank. The procurement
options available to two plants in close proximity are likely to overlap when they burn the same rank of coal.
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where τt(Xi) represents the relative procurement cost between being divested and regulated at
location Xi in period t. The observed fuel price at plant i in period t is therefore
Yit = Yit(0) + τt(Xi)Dit
where
Dit =

1 if i > N0and t > T0
0 otherwise.
The difficulty in estimation is that only control facilities in close proximity to Xi are suitable to
serve as counterfactuals for the price Yit(0), and only after permanent facility-specific differences
and common transitory shocks have been taken into account. The estimation strategy employed
is similar to the conditional DID estimator of Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), but
matches on geographic proximity and binary baseline characteristics (rank of coal burned), rather
than the propensity score.
As in the matching literature (Abadie and Imbens (2006); Dehejia and Wahba (1999); Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997)), let 1 {} denote an indicator function that evaluates to one if the
statement in braces is true, and let Di ≡ max{Dit} denote treatment group, and lm(i) be the index
of facilities with Dl 6= Di and
∑
j|Dj 6=Di
1
{
‖Xj − Xi‖ 6 ‖Xl − Xi‖
}
= m (1.3)
Equation (1.3) identifies the m closest facilities of the opposite treatment group according to the
norm metric ‖  ‖. I match exactly on the most common rank of coal (bituminous, sub-bituminous,
or other) burned at baseline, then based on geographic proximity. An alternative approach is
to match all facilities j with a caliper on distance, ‖Xj − Xi‖ < d, rather than based on a fixed
number of matches. Results will be shown to be robust to the choice of matching metric. With
a (possibly unbalanced) panel, it is possible to estimate τt(Xi) with a DID estimator applied to
facilities i and the m facilities whose distance from Xi satisfies (1.3):
Yit = γi + δt + τt(Xi)Dit + ε it
The average treatment effect on the treated, τ = E[τt(Xi)|D = 1] can be estimated by taking
18
Figure 1.3: Distance Between Divested and Matched Facilities
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the average over the divested facilities of the derived τˆt(Xi), or more efficiently, by pooling the
data of the divested facilities and their nearest neighbors in a single fixed-effects DID estimation
(Angrist and Krueger (2000)), that weighs each matched control facility by the inverse of the
number of matches to facility i in period t, then clusters standard errors at the facility level.
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of distance between divested and matched facilities under
three potential thresholds. All facilities are matched exactly on the predominant rank of coal
burned at the facility in 1997, the final common pre-divestiture year. All facilities but one have at
least a single match within 200 miles. All results based on matching the m closest non-divested
facilities constrain the search radius to 200 miles–beyond this point diminishes the quality of
the counterfactual without much gain in terms of broadening the sample. Estimates based on
various search radii show that the results are not particularly sensitive to this choice of cut-off.
Constraining the sample to these matches yields the set of facilities shown in Figure 1.4. It is clear
that this estimation strategy is not well suited to estimating an average treatment effect for all U.S.
plants, as the facilities in South-East, Upper Mid-West, and South-West are all hundreds of miles
from the nearest divested facility. It is therefore not possible to estimate a credible counterfactual
of how these non-divested plants would have operated if they had been subject to divestiture with
19
Figure 1.4: Divested and Control Coal-Fired Plants within 200 miles
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this framework.
1.5 Data
This study utilizes a detailed and comprehensive panel dataset I have constructed from a com-
bination of publicly-available and restricted-access data on the operations of the U.S. electricity
sector from 1990-2009. Data on fuel expenditures, generating unit configurations, plant operations
and regulatory status are from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration
(EIA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Data on the mines from which coal is
sourced is from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Appendix A describes each of the constituent
elements in greater detail. Instead, this section focuses on describing the data in the context of
potential threats to the validity of the proposed estimation strategy.
Plant-Level Characteristics
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of plant characteristics by treatment group.21 Panel A
includes all facilities that report coal receipts in 1997, the common baseline year before divestitures
begin. While divested plants are a few years older, the only substantial difference between the two
groups is the likelihood of being subject to an Incentive Regulation program, a common precursor
to restructuring. Panel B weights the data from non-divested plants in proportion to the number
of divested plants matched for m = 10, subject to the constraint that plants be within 200 miles.
Matching removes two-thirds of the non-divested plants from the sample, but only one divested
facility is without any matches meeting this criteria. The high degree of balance between the two
groups is consistent with the history of power plant construction. Generating capacity is closely
related to economic activity, which is spatially correlated. It therefore makes sense that areas that
grew together in the middle of the 20th century made similar decisions to expand their generation
capacity. Again, the exception is exposure to Incentive Regulation, which is consistent with the
relationship with eventual restructuring. The fact that divested plants were disproportionately
21The data series upon which this table is based is described in Appendix A.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Divested and Non-Divested Plants in 1997
A. All Facilities
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 799.79 797.48 2.32
[671.86] [730.74] (82.63)
Annual Capacity 0.59 0.57 0.02
Factor [0.19] [0.18] (0.02)
Plant Vintage 1961.99 1964.72 –2.73*
[10.92] [13.53] (1.39)
% Scrubbers 0.25 0.32 –0.07
Installed [0.44] [0.47] (0.05)
Incentive 0.44 0.15 0.29***
Regulation Util. [0.50] [0.36] (0.06)
Facilities 88 309 397
B. Matched Facilities
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 803.95 648.72 155.23
[674.61] [657.66] (119.86)
Annual Capacity 0.59 0.55 0.04
Factor [0.19] [0.22] (0.05)
Plant Vintage 1962.14 1962.91 –0.78
[10.90] [14.04] (2.20)
% Scrubbers 0.25 0.26 –0.01
Installed [0.44] [0.44] (0.08)
Incentive 0.45 0.07 0.38***
Regulation Util. [0.50] [0.25] (0.06)
Facilities 87 101 188
Note: Non-Divested facilities in Panel B receive weight 1/mj for each matched divested
facility j. Matching criterion: m = 10 burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the
constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Standard errors clustered by facility in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
already attempting to reduce costs suggest findings may be somewhat biased against subsequent
cost reductions.
It is important to note that entry and attrition of coal-fired plants was rare during the sample
period, and are unlikely to be sources of bias. Stringent environmental regulations on new boilers
combined with high capital costs have made new coal plant construction largely uneconomical.
In total, 96% of coal heat in 2009 was delivered to plants reporting in 1990 (slightly more after
accounting for the non-reporting of permanent non-utilities prior to 2002). As a fraction of plants,
92% of plants reporting in 2009 also reported in 1990. For attrition, the combination of high
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entry costs with the high option value from operating during periods of peak demand justifies
maintenance costs at most aging facilities. 94% of plants operating in 1990 continued to report
fuel deliveries in 2009. The plants that closed tended to be small and rarely used–as a group they
accounted for less than 2% of the heat delivered in 1990.
Data on The Cost and Quality of Coal
Figure 1.5 shows how nominal delivered and mine-mouth prices of bituminous and sub-bituminous
coal have evolved over time. This figure again emphasizes the importance of shipping costs,
as the price of bituminous coal is nearly 50% higher upon delivery than at the mine, and sub-
bituminous prices more than double. This figure also shows a reason for the increasing popularity
of sub-bituminous coal, as the average delivered price has fallen below the mine-mouth price
for bituminous. While the delivered price depends on the spatial distribution of selected plants,
the crossing in the early 2000’s means that for plants that switched, sub-bituminous was cheaper
on average than bituminous coal, even for plants located at a bituminous mine-mouth. After
flat or declining prices through much of the nineties, the delivered price of coal has roughly
doubled for bituminous and increased by about 50% for sub-bituminous coal over the last decade.
Increases in mine-mouth prices only account for about half of the rise in sub-bituminous prices,
the rest is due to increased shipping costs (both in terms of shipping rates and expanded delivery
areas). Increases in bituminous prices since 2003 are largely due to increased mining costs and
international demand.22 All told, expenditures on coal for generating electricity averaged about
$23B through most of the nineties, and has increased rapidly since 2002 to about $40B in 2009
(detailed figures are presented in Appendix A). Expenditures among divested facilities since
reporting commenced in 2002 is about $8B per year on average.
Figure 1.6 breaks down average delivered coal prices by regulatory category. The vertical
lines in the figure denote the year that divestitures began (1998), and the year that the EIA began
collecting data from non-utility plants (2002). There is therefore a gap in reporting for any plant
that was divested prior to 2002. It should be kept in mind that between these lines there are
22Crippling weather events in Chinese and Australian coal fields in 2007 led to a spike in demand for U.S. bituminous
coal, causing the price to rise nearly 50% (intra-year spikes were even higher).
23
Figure 1.5: Price per MMBTU by Coal Type, 1990-2009
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Note: Mine-mouth prices from EIA Annual Energy Review (2011), Table 7.9 and converted to heat units
using average heat content by year and rank as reported in Forms EIA-423,923 and FERC 423.
Figure 1.6: Coal Price per MMBTU by Divestiture Class, 1990-2009
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Note: Vertical lines denote the year in which divestitures begin (1998), and when reporting for non-utilities
commences (2002). Source: Forms EIA-423,923 and FERC 423.
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Figure 1.7: Matching Estimates of Delivered Coal Price at IOU and Gov/Muni/Coop Plants within 100 miles,
1990-2009
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Note: Gov/Muni/Coop facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria:
m = 10, burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles.
Confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by facility.
compositional changes in the data.23 Prior to 1998, the facilities that were ultimately divested
operated as IOUs, and had somewhat higher prices than IOUs that did not face restructuring.
Divested plants are at parity with their IOU counterparts shortly after reporting commences, and
by the end of the sample period they have reduced the average cost paid for coal to the levels
achieved by Gov/Muni/Coop plants.
Although Gov/Muni/Coop plants do not face any changes in regulatory oversight during
this period of time, it is not obvious that the incentives facing operators of these plants would
parallel those of IOUs, a necessary condition to use these facilities to form a counterfactual for
23See Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
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divested plants. This is a testable assumption, and Figure 1.6 provides informal evidence of
its validity: IOU and Gov/Muni/Coop price paths are parallel throughout the period of study.
Figure 1.7 tests this hypothesis more formally using the matching methodology developed in
Section 1.4 with m = 10. IOU plants not subject to divestiture are matched to Gov/Muni/Coop
facilities that burned a common rank of coal in 1997, and are within 200 miles of the matched
facility. Since some facilities are not within 200 miles of 10 members of the opposite group,
matched observations are weighted by 1mj , the number of matches for facility j within 200 miles.
The matched data is then pooled, and regressed against a set of group-month dummies, with
95% confidence intervals formed by clustering standard errors at the facility level. Once this
re-weighting is performed, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant for one
month over twenty years, and they follow nearly identical paths aside from a brief convergence in
2002. This suggests that Gov/Muni/Coop plants nearby divested facilities perform equally well
as IOU facilities to estimate the counterfactual prices that would have prevailed in the absence of
divestiture.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of Coal Deliveries to Divested and Non-Divested Plants in 1997
A. All Facilities
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Millions MMBTU 44.76 44.18 0.58
Delivered [42.78] [43.01] (5.16)
Price($/MMBTU) 1.42 1.20 0.21***
[0.37] [0.37] (0.04)
% Spot Market 0.24 0.27 –0.03
[0.29] [0.32] (0.04)
Yrs to Contract 5.37 7.95 –2.58***
Expiry [6.19] [7.21] (0.88)
% Sourced 0.41 0.30 0.12**
In-State [0.46] [0.44] (0.05)
% Bituminous 0.76 0.62 0.13**
[0.42] [0.46] (0.05)
Sulfur Content 1.19 1.02 0.17*
(lbs/mmbtu) [0.72] [0.81] (0.09)
Ash Content 8.67 8.03 0.64
(lbs/mmbtu) [4.83] [4.15] (0.56)
Mine Distance 318.10 364.92 –46.82
(mi.) [330.64] [312.52] (39.38)
Facilities 88 309 397
B. Matched Facilities
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Millions MMBTU 44.93 37.36 7.57
Delivered [43.00] [37.48] (7.19)
Price($/MMBTU) 1.42 1.30 0.12
[0.37] [0.34] (0.08)
% Spot Market 0.23 0.27 –0.04
[0.28] [0.36] (0.06)
Yrs to Contract 5.42 7.42 –2.00
Expiry [6.23] [7.92] (1.28)
% Sourced 0.41 0.40 0.01
In-State [0.46] [0.45] (0.08)
% Bituminous 0.76 0.76 –0.00
[0.42] [0.42] (0.07)
Sulfur Content 1.19 1.34 –0.16
(lbs/mmbtu) [0.73] [0.87] (0.14)
Ash Content 8.56 9.45 –0.89
(lbs/mmbtu) [4.75] [7.74] (1.38)
Mine Distance 321.01 264.58 56.43
(mi.) [331.42] [299.16] (47.52)
Facilities 87 101 188
Note: Non-Divested facilities in Panel B receive weight 1/mj for each matched divested
facility j. Matching criterion: m = 10 burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the
constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Standard errors clustered by facility in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.2 presents summary statistics on the characteristics of coal deliveries reported to
FERC/EIA in 1997, the final year before divestitures began. As detailed in Joskow (1985, 1987,
1988), the market for coal is largely conducted through long-term bilateral contracts, with sup-
plemental demand procured on the “spot market,” which are short-term bilateral contracts in
practice.24
At baseline there are substantial differences in the characteristics of coal delivered, though
quantities are similar. Divested facilities pay substantially more for coal, both through contracts
and on the spot market. They buy 12% more of their coal from within their home state, and are 13
percentage points more likely to be burning bituminous coal. Differences in sulfur content stem
from the bias toward bituminous coal among divested facilities. Divested facilities tended to have
about two and a half fewer years remaining on their coal purchasing contracts in 1997.
Many of the differences in the characteristics of coal purchases between divested and non-
divested facilities are due to geographical dispersion, and are eliminated through matching. In
fact, there are no statistically significant differences between coal delivered to divested plants and
their matched counterparts.
Since the estimation strategy relies on comparing changes over time, it is also important
to ensure that pre-existing trends are not responsible for the subsequent differences between
treatment and control units. This does not appear to be the case using the complete, unweighted
sample in Figure 1.6. Figure 1.8 examines the common pre-treatment period employing the
methodology described above to compare non-divested IOU and Gov/Muni/Coop in Figure 1.7.
It provides encouraging evidence that both treatment and control groups were following parallel
paths throughout the ’90s.25 It appears that the 12 cent premium paid in 1997 by IOU facilities that
would later be divested was a relatively constant feature of coal deliveries. It would be difficult to
attribute the decline in prices paid by divested facilities in subsequent periods to mean-reversion,
as there is no evidence that prices were moving in different directions before divestiture.
24These contracts typically take the form of “base plus escalation”: initial prices are set to reflect current market
conditions, and the price subsequently rises or falls based on a producer price index for coal production.
25If one squints, there might be a slight narrowing of the gap around 1993, perhaps due to the introduction of
incentive regulation programs.
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Figure 1.8: Pre-Trend Test: Matching Estimates of Delivered Coal Price, 1990-1997
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Note: Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria:
m = 10, burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles.
Confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by facility.
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Unit-Level Characteristics
Although coal deliveries are reported at the facility level, the decision to switch the rank of
coal burned or install a scrubber is unit-specific (a coal-fired “unit” typically consists of a boiler
connected to a generator, cooling and pollution abatement equipment). On average, there are two
to three coal-fired units operating per facility.
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics on coal-fired unit characteristics, both nation-wide and
in the matched sample. The number of facilities here and those in the plant-level analysis are
slightly different due to reporting requirements at the unit-level. In addition, the matching criteria
at the unit-level also includes the presence of a scrubber. This is important when estimating
the differential probability of adding a scrubber after divestiture. This additional matching
requirement eliminates a handful of divested facilities, and about 25% of non-divested facilities.
As with the plant-level data, matching removes any statistically-significant differences between
divested and non-divested units.
1.6 Results
This section evaluates the conditions under which divestiture led to a change in behavior by power
plant operators, and relates these results to the hypotheses of theories of regulatory inefficiency. I
begin with coal prices, and show the robustness of the estimation strategy to various assumptions
and specifications. I then contrast the results for coal with those of natural gas as evidence of
the importance of asymmetric information in distorting procurement decisions under regulation.
I then look at sulfur regulation compliance decisions in the context of capital-bias hypotheses,
and show that the disproportionate switch to low-sulfur coal among divested plants does not
explain much of the observed drop in relative price. Finally, I constrain my analysis to plants that
were initially burning in-state coal, and relate their change in procurement behavior to theories of
regulatory capture by politically-active coal mines.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Divested and Non-Divested Generating Units in 1997
A. All Units
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Boiler Vintage 1962.97 1965.25 –2.28***
[10.65] [12.43] (0.84)
Connected 328.53 290.81 37.73*
Nameplate (MW) [265.07] [268.24] (20.27)
Capacity Factor 0.77 0.79 –0.02
[0.22] [0.19] (0.02)
Bituminous 0.80 0.79 0.01
[0.40] [0.41] (0.03)
Potential Sulfur 11.43 8.61 2.82***
Emissions (1000 tons/yr) [14.26] [13.55] (1.08)
% Scrubbers 0.16 0.20 –0.04
[0.37] [0.40] (0.03)
Facilities 88 310 398
Generating Units 215 849 1064
A. Matched Units
Divested Not Divested Difference of Means
Boiler Vintage 1962.41 1963.95 –1.54
[10.24] [11.88] (1.35)
Connected 325.91 281.13 44.78
Nameplate (MW) [268.49] [275.55] (33.25)
Capacity Factor 0.77 0.76 0.01
[0.22] [0.25] (0.04)
Bituminous 0.84 0.84 –0.00
[0.37] [0.37] (0.04)
Potential Sulfur 11.35 11.54 –0.19
Emissions (1000 tons/yr) [14.69] [18.30] (1.98)
% Scrubbers 0.13 0.13 0.00
[0.34] [0.34] (0.04)
Facilities 79 76 155
Generating Units 197 197 394
Note: Non-Divested facilities in Panel B are weighted based on the number of divested facilities
matched for m = 10 burning the same rank of coal and common scrubber status in 1997, subject
to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Standard errors clustered by unit in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.4: Coal: Matched DID Estimates of Log(Price) and Divestiture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Divest –0.124*** –0.188*** –0.152* –0.124*** –0.128*** –0.136**
(0.044) (0.058) (0.077) (0.045) (0.046) (0.064)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.721 0.712 0.668 0.723 0.726 0.738
Facilities 230 146 69 198 166 121
Divested Facilities 87 74 39 87 87 87
Obs. 47024 28449 12682 37495 32958 23336
Note: Dependent variable is Log(Price) of Coal per MMBTU, including shipping costs. Non-Divested
facilities receive weight 1m_j for each matched divested facility j burning the same rank of coal in
1997, subject to the indicated matching criterion. Standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Deregulation and the Price of Coal
Table 1.4 shows the percent change in price associated with plant divestiture using the matched
DID estimator. To evaluate the robustness of the estimates to matching criteria, the first three
columns use a caliper on distance, while the last three vary the number of matches. One
shortcoming of the distance caliper approach is that the number of divested facilities with any
matches within the specified distance drops off as the criteria becomes more stringent. Thus
the composition of divested plants changes between columns (1) and (3). This caveat aside, all
matching specifications show large and statistically significant drops in the relative price paid for
coal following divestiture. The results using a fixed number of matches rather than a distance
threshold are stable and significant regardless of the number of matches included. Taken together,
these estimates show a 12-13% drop in the price that divested facilities have paid for coal relative
to nearby generation stations that were similar both on the characteristics of the facility, coal,
and trends before divestiture occurred. When using levels rather than logs, this is about 25 cents
per MMBTU of coal heat delivered. Based on the post-divestiture period average annual coal
expenditure at divested facilities (about eight billion dollars per year), the treatment on the treated
estimate amounts to one billion fewer dollars per year being spent on coal, holding quantities
constant.
One can see the effect that the weighting scheme employed by the matched DID estimator
has by comparing the results from Table 1.4 with those of Table 1.5, which uses a standard
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Table 1.5: Coal: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Log(Price) and Divestiture
A. All Facilities:
(1) (2) (3)
Post-Divest –0.051 –0.054 –0.131***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041)
Divest 0.145***
Facilities (0.030)
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes
Division-Year FE Yes
Divest States Only
R2 0.252 0.772 0.803
Facilities 397 397 397
Divested Facilities 88 88 88
Obs. 86225 86225 86225
B. By Distance:
(1) (2) (3)
Post-Divest –0.055 –0.069* –0.137**
(0.036) (0.040) (0.055)
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.733 0.700 0.712
Facilities 333 221 123
Divested Facilities 88 78 47
Obs. 71569 47324 26483
Note: Dependent variable is Log(Price) of Coal per MMBTU, including shipping costs.
Panel B contains all divested facilities, and any non-divested facilities within the specified
distance of a divested plant. Standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
33
difference-in-difference estimator. Panel A is based on the full sample of coal plants in the United
States. Consistent with the mean price trends in Figure 1.6, divested plants as a group buy
coal that is about 14% more expensive pre-treatment. The first two specifications rely on the
assumption that divested and non-divested facilities would have followed parallel paths in the
absence of restructuring–there are no time-varying differences between the two groups. Under
this assumption, divestiture is associated with a modest, but statistically insignificant drop in
purchased coal price.
The third specification of Panel A relaxes the common-trend assumption by allowing the price
of coal to vary by census division-year. As a result, the post-divestiture coefficient measures the
percent change in coal prices at divested facilities compared to non-divested facilities within the
same census division, which has a similar flavor to the approach proposed in Section 1.4. The drop
in prices paid by divested coal plants is quite close to those of Table 1.4 using this specification.
Panel B of Table 1.5 is also based on a standard difference-in-difference estimator, but it limits
the sample based on proximity to divested plants. This is an unweighted analog to columns (1)–(3)
of Table 1.4, except that baseline rank of coal is not considered. Panel B shows that while estimates
of the effect on coal prices remain negative, the magnitude is sensitive to the threshold distance
for inclusion in the sample. At 100 miles, the coefficient is 7% and is only marginally statistically
significant. However, the loss in precision from limiting the sample to closer facilities is more
than offset by the substantial increase in the coefficient estimates for the other specifications. The
weighting procedure used in Table 1.4 puts greater emphasis on non-divested plants in close
proximity to multiple divested plants, and therefore stabilizes estimates somewhat in comparison
to the unweighted approach.
To evaluate the time path of the effect of divestiture, I interact an indicator variable for
treatment facilities with a dummies indicating the time relative to year of divestiture in Figure 1.9.
The omitted coefficient is the year prior to divestiture. Figure 1.9a is analogous to the average effect
in column (2) of Table 1.4, and Figure 1.9b breaks out the results of column (4). Both panels show
a flat relative price profile prior to divestiture that is close to, and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. The corresponding figures at different thresholds share this characteristic (not shown).
It appears that any changes that occurred after divestiture are not part of a continuation of a
pre-existing trend. Again, one unfortunate characteristic of the data is plants divested prior to 2002
34
Figure 1.9: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Log(Price)
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drop out of the data immediately following sale. Since it took until 2002 for EIA to re-establish
this reporting requirement under their authority, there is a gap in reporting for most facilities of
the first couple years operating without utility commission oversight. The vertical line in year
three represents the point where the majority of divested facilities resume reporting. If divestiture
lead to an immediate change in operations, there would be a jump in the first year after sale.
Instead, it appears the gains achieved by divested plants took a few years to settle in to a new,
permanent level. This may be due to staggered expiration of contracts written before divestiture,
but again it is difficult to draw conclusions based on the handful of plants for which data is
available for the first two years after sale. The pattern of reductions for the other specifications are
nearly indistinguishable from those in Figure1.9: a relatively stable period starting at year 3 at
over 10% less than their regulated counterparts.
Before examining these results in the light of theories of regulatory inefficiency, it is important
to rule out a rather simple hypothesis: that the relative change in price is due to changes in
quantities demanded at coal-fired facilities. Figure 1.10 shows this is not the case: there has been
no differential change in production between divested and non-divested plants. This may be
explained by the fact that coal-fired units tend to be used for “baseload” generation–that is, they
run at full capacity at all times except during maintenance periods.
Importance of Asymmetric Information: Comparison with Natural Gas
We have shown that coal burned for electricity is heterogeneous, and often sold via bilateral
contracts. Furthermore, prices are location-specific due to high transportation costs. This makes it
difficult for a regulator to know what purchasing opportunities are available to an operator, and
whether the operator is exerting sufficient effort to keep costs low. By contrast, natural gas is a
homogenous product (methane, mostly), traded on a transparent market.26 Since it is delivered
by a national network of pipelines that maintain pressure throughout the grid, transportation
costs are essentially zero. This is evidenced by the fact that the price of gas at the Henry Hub in
Louisiana rarely deviates from the price in New York. Since IOUs typically own the complete
portfolio of generating plants, gas- and coal-fired facilities were subject to an identical change
26A set of year-month dummies explains half of the variation in gas prices, but only one quarter of the variation in
the delivered price of coal.
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Figure 1.10: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Log(Net Generation), 10 nearest neighbors
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
Lo
g(N
et 
Ge
ne
rat
ion
)
−10 −5 0 5 10
Years since Divestiture
95% CI Ave. Pre−Treatment on the Treated
95% CI Ave. Treatment on the Treated
Note: Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria:
m = 10, burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles.
Confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by facility.
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Figure 1.11: Divested and Control Gas-Fired Plants, 1990-1997
(
(
(
(
(
(
((
(
( (
(
(
( (
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
((
(
(
(
(
((
(
(
(
(
((
(
(
(
(
((( (
(
(
(
(
((
(
(
(
(
(
((
((
(
(
((
( (
( ((
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(((
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
((
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(((
(
(
((
(
( ((
(
(
(
((
((
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
((
((
(
(
(
(
(
(
((
(
( ((
(
((
(
((
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !! !
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
! !
!
!
!!!
!!!
!
!
!! !
!
! !
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
! !
!
!
!
Legend
! Divested Plants
( Gov/Muni/Coop Plants
in regulatory structure. The importance of the interaction of information asymmetry and local
capture can therefore be demonstrated by comparing the results for coal prices with those of
natural gas.
Figure 1.11 shows the analogous map of divested gas-fired plants in the United States as of
1997. It is important to use this baseline because the recent drop in natural gas has lead to a boom
in gas-fired generating capacity, much of which was never owned by an IOU, and therefore only
began reporting costs in 2002. The key distinction between geographic distributions of gas- and
coal-fired plants is that we now include the divestitures of California, which relies primarily on
gas and hydro-powered generators.
Figure 1.12 shows the pre-treatment trends of prices paid by matched divested and non-
divested plants. While gas prices are clearly more volatile than coal prices, divested and non-
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Figure 1.12: Pre-Trend Test: Matching Estimates of Delivered Gas Price, 1990-1997
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Note: Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria:
m = 10, subject to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Confidence intervals based on
standard errors clustered by facility.
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Table 1.6: Gas: Matched DID Estimates of Log(Price) and Divestiture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Divest 0.012 0.027 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.038
(0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.853 0.852 0.861 0.855 0.857 0.854
Facilities 276 198 111 254 224 165
Divested Facilities 109 99 59 109 109 109
Obs. 46828 33465 17631 41089 36727 26510
Note: Dependent variable is Log(Price) of Gas per MMBTU. Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for
each matched divested facility j subject to the indicated matching criterion. Standard errors clustered by
facility in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
divested prices co-move; there is no indication of a pre-existing differential trend between the
groups.
Table 1.6 shows that divestiture has had essentially zero effect on the price generators pay
for gas. This is true regardless of the matching criteria, and is relatively precisely estimated.
In the case of gas, regulation was not distorting input price. It is important to point out that
regulated IOUs operating coal-fired plants also tend to own gas-fired plants in order to meet
changes in demand throughout the day. Thus the exact same operators whose coal prices changed
substantially following divestiture were apparently making their gas procurement decisions
efficiently. This implies that differences in the markets for coal and gas play a critical role in
determining the potential for cost reductions following divestiture. The defining characteristics
that differentiate these markets is price transparency and the room for discretion allowed by
commodity heterogeneity, suggesting the importance of asymmetric information in creating the
conditions that yield distortions under regulation.
Sulfur Emissions Compliance Decisions
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 capped the total emissions of sulfur oxides
(which contribute to acid rain) allowed from major sources (i.e. coal-fired power plants), and
created a market so that plants with high abatement costs could buy allowances instead of install
abatement equipment. The market began in 1996 for the largest plants, with the remainder of
coal-fired plants following soon after. Aside from buying allowances, plant operators had two
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Table 1.7: Matching DID Estimates of Sulfur Compliance Strategy
(1) (2) (3)
Scrubber Low Sulfur Uncontrolled
Post-Divest –0.072*** 0.100*** –0.032
(0.024) (0.031) (0.038)
Divested Unit 0.014 0.010 –0.023
(0.040) (0.034) (0.047)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10 10
R2 0.017 0.049 0.056
Units 384 384 384
Divested Units 197 197 197
Obs. 7145 7145 7145
Note: Sample includes all units without a scrubber and burning bituminous coal
in 1997. Non-Divested units receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j
within 200 miles. Matching criterion: m = 10. Standard errors clustered by unit in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
main options to comply with the new regulations: buy a flue-gas desulfurization system (called a
“scrubber”), or switch to burning low-sulfur coal, typically from the Powder River Basin (PRB)
in Wyoming. The Averch-Johnson hypothesis predicts that regulated plants will prefer to install
capital-intensive scrubbers, which will add to their rate base.
Since scrubber installation is a permanent, binary outcome, it does not make sense to employ
the matched DID approach described above. The behavior of managers that already have a
scrubber installed is also uninteresting. I therefore perform a straightforward matching of divested
and non-divested facilities that burned a common rank of coal, but did not have scrubbers
installed in 1997. In recent work, Fowlie (2010) finds evidence consistent with the Averch-Johnson
hypothesis in the context of compliance decisions for regional nitrogen oxide markets using a
random-coefficients logit model. By contrast, the approach taken here is nonparametric. The
benefit of this approach is that the results are free of the distributional assumptions that may cost
more complex estimators some credibility. The main cost is that the structural approach identifies
behavioral parameters that can be used to make out-of-sample predictions.
With this caveat in mind, Table 1.7 compares compliance decisions among generating units
that were burning high-sulfur coal in 1997 without a scrubber installed. While divested units are
clearly less likely to install scrubber, the seven percentage point difference masks the magnitude
of how big this effect really is. Instead consider Figure 1.13a, which shows the differential rate of
scrubber adoption. It is quite striking that only 3 of roughly 200 divested units install a scrubber
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Figure 1.13: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Sulfur Compliance Strategies , 10 nearest neighbors
(a) Pr(Add Scrubber)
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Table 1.8: Matching DID Estimates of Log(Price) and Divestiture, by Coal Rank Switching and Import Status
A. By Low-Sulfur Switching:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Divest –0.109** –0.176*** –0.166* –0.109** –0.114** –0.121*
(0.050) (0.067) (0.091) (0.051) (0.052) (0.068)
Post-Divest x –0.053 –0.038 0.046 –0.052 –0.052 –0.053
Switching Plant (0.048) (0.057) (0.092) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.721 0.712 0.668 0.724 0.727 0.738
Facilities 230 146 69 198 166 121
Divested Facilities 87 74 39 87 87 87
Obs. 47024 28449 12682 37495 32958 23336
B. By Import Status in 1997:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Divest –0.157** –0.244*** –0.250** –0.157** –0.161** –0.169**
(0.067) (0.083) (0.107) (0.068) (0.069) (0.082)
Post-Divest x 0.066 0.115 0.210* 0.066 0.066 0.066
Initially In-State (0.068) (0.081) (0.113) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.722 0.715 0.679 0.724 0.727 0.739
Facilities 230 146 69 198 166 121
Divested Facilities 87 74 39 87 87 87
Obs. 47024 28449 12682 37495 32958 23336
Note: Dependent variable is Log(Price) of Coal per MMBTU, including shipping costs. The treatment indicator in
Panel A is interacted with dummies indicating whether the facility changes the predominant rank of coal burned after
1997. The treatment indicator in Panel B is interacted with dummies indicating whether the facility sourced its coal
from within its home state in 1997. Main effects are absorbed in plant-level fixed effects. Non-Divested facilities receive
weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the indicated matching
criterion. Standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
up to six years after divestiture. It is only at the end of the sample that scrubber installation begins
to pick up at divested units, so that they are about half as likely to install a scrubber by the end
of the sample period. This result is relatively consistent across threshold specifications, with the
difference being slightly larger when using a distance caliper rather than number of matches.
Instead, divested plants disproportionately chose to comply with sulfur emissions regulations
by switching to sub-bituminous coal, as shown in Figure 1.13b. Since sub-bituminous coal has
become relatively cheap in the past decade,27 it may be that Averch-Johnson-type motives are the
27This may be surprising in light of the finding of Busse and Keohane (2007) that railroads exerted market power in
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source of the observed drop in the price of coal among divested plants. One method of accounting
for the role of fuel switching in cost savings estimates is to allow the treatment effect to differ
between facilities that have switched the rank of coal they burn, and those who are still burning
the same rank of coal as at baseline. Panel A of Table 1.8 reproduces the baseline estimates of Table
1.4, allowing for this heterogeneous treatment effect. The overall average price difference among
plants that eventually switch is absorbed in the plant fixed-effects. It shows that facilities do in
fact realize larger gains after having switched fuels–the total effect among switchers is obtained
by adding the coefficients–though the difference is not statistically significant. This is not due to
compositional differences between switchers and non-switchers: all but three facilities report at
least one month of post-divestiture fuel purchases using the same rank of coal that was burned in
the baseline year 1997. These post-divestiture purchases contribute to the non-switching estimate
until the actual switch is made. Perhaps most important is the fact that around 90% of the gains
seen overall are from facilities that have not switched to low-sulfur coal. While switching yields a
larger drop, it accounts for a relatively small fraction of the overall treatment effect. This means
that divested facilities were able to find and negotiate for cheaper coal, regardless of any motives
to use low-capital methods to comply with sulfur emission regulations. The cost reductions
found here are largely not an ancillary benefit of more fundamental motives to distort abatement
techniques to more capital-intensive options among regulated utilities.
Regulatory Capture by Local Coal Producers
A distortion in the spirit of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) would exist if coal suppliers lobby
the state regulator to force generators to buy from local coal mines. However, it is ambiguous a
priori whether such a distortion would lead to larger or smaller gains in coal-producing states
following divestiture. While there may be larger potential gains in these states, there is also
likely to be greater resistance to keep them from being realized. Lile and Burtraw (1998), for
example, document efforts undertaken by state legislatures to promote the purchase of local
coal, ranging from subsidies to blatant mandates on the percent of coal that must come from
within the state. While efforts to legislate such policies were voided by the courts under the
the face of greater demand for low-sulfur coal. However, increases in productivity over this period have more than
offset demand shocks and markups. See Appendix A for a discussion of these trends.
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Figure 1.14: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Fraction of Coal Sourced In-State, 10 nearest neighbors
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Note: Sample is based on plants that sourced the majority of their coal from in-state in 1997. Non-Divested
facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria: m = 10, burning the
same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Confidence
intervals based on standard errors clustered by facility.
Commerce Clause, it was still possible to make life for generators difficult via state oversight of
environmental regulations. Panel B of Table 1.8 provides evidence suggesting that local coal may
have been an impediment to fully realizing the potential gains from divestiture. It allows the
effect of divestiture on log(price) to vary between facilities that bought the majority of their coal
from within their home state in 1997, and those who mostly imported. Although facilities that
initially imported their coal consistently realized gains across specifications that are about 50%
greater than plants that bought from within-state, the difference between the coefficients is not
statistically significant. Furthermore, this can only be interpreted as suggestive evidence since
geographic distance between these groups could also cause differences in realized cost reductions.
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Table 1.9: Matching DID Estimates of Percent of In-State Coal Among Plants Burning In-State Coal in 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Divest –0.093 –0.114 –0.111 –0.102 –0.107 –0.160***
(0.058) (0.073) (0.072) (0.065) (0.065) (0.055)
Post-Divest x –0.374*** –0.351*** –0.342*** –0.374*** –0.373*** –0.377***
Switching Plant (0.059) (0.057) (0.092) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.687 0.667 0.689 0.682 0.679 0.718
Facilities 82 68 30 81 74 57
Divested Facilities 40 33 15 40 40 40
Obs. 17433 13745 5858 16802 14707 10820
Note: Dependent variable is % of Coal sourced from in-state. All plants in the sample sourced from in-state in 1997.
Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for each matched divested facility j burning the same rank of coal in 1997,
subject to the indicated matching criterion. Standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
More definitive evidence of inefficient procurement practices under cost-of-service regulation
in coal-producing states can be seen by examining changes in sourcing after divestiture. Recall
that at baseline divested and non-divested plants are relatively balanced on the percent of coal
sourced in-state. Table 1.9 limits the sample to divested and control plants that burned in-state
coal in 1997. It measures the change in the fraction of coal sourced from in-state associated with
divestiture. Since any plants that switch to sub-bituminous coal will mechanically increase their
out-of-state purchases, it allows for heterogeneous effects between plants that switch, and those
who do not. The goal here is to separate off switching motives from efforts to find lower cost
producers that are not protected by state governments. If sourcing practices under regulation were
efficient, one might see price drops as generators negotiated for larger fractions of the surplus,
but there would be no reallocation of business to different mines. Table 1.9 shows this was not the
case. Instead, divested facilities that initially sourced their coal in-state increased their out-of-state
purchases, unconditional upon switching status.28 While the biggest changes are among those
who switch, there is also some evidence that plants in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois were able
to find lower cost bituminous coal after divestiture (likely from Kentucky and West Virginia),
although this effect is only statistically significant in one of the matching specifications.
28The coefficients are not minus one for switchers because this estimate is relative to the matched control facilities,
who also switched ranks of coal, albeit at a lower rate.
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Figure 1.14 breaks down the differential fraction of coal burned from in-state mines by year
from divestiture. As with the price results, there is no evidence that the post-treatment coefficient
is spuriously due to pre-existing trends. Instead, a flat pre-trend around zero is followed by a
precipitous fall shortly after divestiture. In total, the relative fraction of coal sourced locally falls
by about 25% during the post-divestiture period. While local coal lobbies may have prevented
divested facilities from fully realizing the price reductions achieved in areas without coal deposits,
they were not completely successful at mitigating the impact of divestiture on demand for their
product.
Among the plants that switch to burning low-sulfur coal, it is not possible to distinguish
between the importance of Averch-Johnson and regulatory capture with the current evidence:
both theories predict that deregulated plants will be more likely to switch sub-bituminous coal,
which is both lower in cost and capital-intensity. In fact, it is likely that the two forces are
mutually-enforcing: eastern coal producers and regulated IOUs both stand to benefit from the
installation of a scrubber. It is also not possible to identify the separate effects of asymmetric
information and regulatory capture in coal-producing regions. However, the fact that there is no
relative price drop for gas suggests that opacity in the market for coal creates the room needed for
special interests to exert influence.29
1.7 Transfers versus Efficiency Gains
The large drop in price observed at divested coal-fired plants says little about the social welfare
gains derived from restructuring. Even the substantial reallocation to out-of-state mines is
consistent with minimal mining cost reductions. Suppose, for example, that out-of-state mines
are only marginally more productive than in-state mines, the latter of which have been receiving
regulatory rents. Prices fall and output shifts following divestiture, but to little effect in terms of
the resources required to produce electricity.30
Fortunately the EIA data on coal deliveries includes information on the supplier and county
29For a theoretical treatment along these lines, see Coate and Morris (1995).
30The success of special interest groups that advocate for transfers with minimal welfare costs is predicted by Becker
(1983, 1985).
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of origin. I have linked these deliveries to characteristics of the mines from which the coal is
derived. This includes quarterly data on the labor hours per ton (converted to hours per MMBTU
to preserve consistency) from the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the associated wage bill
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and data on the depth and thickness of coal seams from the
U.S. Geological Survey. Seam depth measures how many feet underground must be dug before
reaching the coal, and seam thickness measures how much coal per foot of horizontal digging can
be recovered once the seam has been reached.
Figure 1.15 shows the effect of divestiture on the mining labor embodied in coal purchases.
The difference between divested and matched plants prior to divestiture is relatively flat and
insignificantly different from zero in both panels. The hours of labor required to mine coal
then drops by about 25% for coal that is subsequently sold to divested plants, and this persists
throughout the post-divestiture period. While hours drop, wages rise by about 5%–suggesting
relative labor productivity gains at mines that sell to divested plants. Results are similar when
considering the characteristics of the mines from which the coal is being sourced. Figure 1.16
shows that coal delivered to divested plants comes from seams that are about 30% thicker, and
nearly 50% closer to the surface following divestiture. These results indicate that the shift in
procurement following divestiture lead to substantial reductions in the cost of mining coal for
electricity generation.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper uses two decades of detailed procurement data at gas- and coal-fired power plants to
characterize the major determinants of regulatory inefficiency in U.S. electricity generation. I find
evidence that asymmetric information, regulatory capture, and capital-bias all lead to substantial
distortions in procurement decisions. I find the price of coal drops by 12% at deregulated plants
relative to similar, nearby coal-fired facilities that were not subject to any regulatory change.
Deregulated plants disproportionately switch to burning low-sulfur coal rather than install a
capital-intensive abatement equipment to comply with environmental regulations, and expand
imports from out of state by 25% if they were initially burning in-state coal. In addition, I find that
the reallocation of procurement following divestiture is toward mines that are substantially more
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Figure 1.15: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Mine Labor, 10 nearest neighbors
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Note: Hours per MMBTU is the number of hours of labor required to extract 1MMBTU worth of coal at
the mines from which matched plants purchase coal. Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for each
matched divested facility j. Matching criteria: m = 10, burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject to the
constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by
facility. The vertical line denotes the third year post-divestiture, the point at which most divested facilities
resumed reporting fuel costs.
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Figure 1.16: Matching by Year from Divestiture: Source Mine Characteristics, 10 nearest neighbors
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Note: Seam Thickness is the thickness and Seam Depth is the estimated depth below the surface of coal
seams at the mines from which matched plants purchase coal. Non-Divested facilities receive weight 1mj for
each matched divested facility j. Matching criteria: m = 10, burning the same rank of coal in 1997, subject
to the constraint that distance be less than 200 miles. Confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered by facility. The vertical line denotes the third year post-divestiture, the point at which most
divested facilities resumed reporting fuel costs.
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productive than those who supply regulated facilities. In total, operators of divested coal-fired
plants spend about $1B less per year on coal due to deregulation. These plants make up only 25%
of coal-fired capacity, while the rest have continued operating without any change in regulation.
My results do not imply the universal failure of regulators to induce efficient behavior in the
regulated community: I find that generators pay the same price for natural gas regardless of
their regulatory status. Instead, this indicates that regulation may work well when the regulated
community is unable to shroud its inefficient behavior from oversight.
After thirty years of deregulation, the pendulum is swinging back toward greater government
oversight in order to correct market failures in critical sectors of the American economy such as
finance, banking, and health care. In addition, the deregulatory momentum of the 1990’s has
stalled in the electricity sector following the 2000-2001 crisis in California. Although regulation
may appear at first to be the solution to imperfect markets, as eloquently described by Bastiat
(1850), this is not the end of the story.
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Chapter 2
Productive Versus Allocative Efficiency
Gains from Market-Based Electricity
Generation: A Potential Outcomes
Approach
2.1 Introduction
How do the losses inflicted by imperfect markets compare with the losses due to imperfect
regulations enacted to curb the exertion of market power? In this paper, I evaluate this question
in the context of U.S. wholesale electricity markets, which have replaced command-and-control
operations in some areas. Following recent market failures (in the finance sector, in particular)
Stiglitz (2009) has proposed a “General Theory of Regulation” that posits “the diasters associated
with unfettered markets at least provide a prima facie case for the desirability of some regulation.”
There is, however, no reason to suppose that the existence of a market failure is a sufficient
condition to guantee that any amount of regulation will improve social welfare.
Instead, optimal policy is determined by comparing the distortions under potential regulatory
regimes, and minimizing the sum of market and regulatory losses. On this point, Stiglitz asserts
that there has been, “no persuasive ’counterfactual’ analysis constrasting what a world without
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regulation might look like as compared to the current regime.” This paper undertakes such an
evaluation in a major U.S. industry whose rocky relationship with deregulation has left even the
Cato Institute waxing nostalgic about cost-of-service regulation (Van Doren and Taylor (2004)).
I construct a detailed monthly panel on the operations of U.S. generating facilities from 1990-
2009. I connect this data to information on the mechanism through which plants are chosen to
operate to meet demand. Because storage of electricity is largely impossible, generating capacity
must exceed peak demand in order to avoid black-outs. System operators must therefore choose
among the available plants (whose costs are heterogeneous) to meet the demand for electricity.
Historically, these decisions have been made by the vertically-integrated Investor-Owned Utility
(IOU) who has an exclusive license to operate in a given service territory. This has resulted in
roughly 150 “Power Control Areas” (PCA) that largely rely on the generating assets within the
service territory to satisfy local demand. In contrast to such command-and-control dispatch,
regional wholesale electricity markets require generators to submit bids in auctions in order to
produce.
To evaluate how the introduction of market-based dispatch has changed overall production
costs, I use plant-month-fuel level data to estimate electricity production functions using the
proxy methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This allows
me to decompose fuel costs in to productivity and allocative efficiency components using the
Olley-Pakes index. I then perform a differences-in-differences analysis on the derived productivity
estimates. I also estimate how the relationship between output and average marginal fuel costs
has changed since the introduction of market dispatch in a similar framework. I can therefore
reconstruct the components of the Olley-Pakes index, except that my estimates explictly account
for permanent differences between market and non-market areas, as well as common transitory
shocks in order to isolate the causal effect of market dispatch on each of these components of
overall average fuel costs. I find that while within-plant productivity changes have been minimal,
the improved allocative performance of markets has lowered the average fossil-fuel production
cost by over 15%. Inferences based on the Olley-Pakes index would overstate these gains.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section I describe the structure of electricity
generation and transmission in the United States, and the institutional details that will facilitate
estimation. The third section describes the methods I use to estimate unobserved productivity,
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and the counterfactual framework that will utilize the derived parameters. The fourth section
describes the data. The fifth section presents the results of my analysis, and the final section
concludes.
2.2 Background on Power Control Areas and Dispatch in the United
States
The U.S. electricity grid developed over the 20th century based on a mix of IOUs, government-
owned utilities (municipal, state, and federal), and non-profit cooperatives. All of these organiza-
tions tended to be vertically integrated, so they owned the power plants, the transmission system,
and the delivery network within their respective, exclusively operated territories. The entity that
determines which power plants operate to meet demand is called a “Balancing Authority.” A
single Balancing Authority controls the transmission system and dispatches power plants within a
“Power Control Area.” When vertically-integrated, the Balancing Authority and Utility have often
been one-in-the-same, as with the service territory and Power Control Area.1 While operating
with relative autonomy, flows across PCAs are facilitated by transmission lines that connect areas.
The national grid consists of three large Interconnections: East, West, and Texas–with relatively
little capacity to transmit power between them. Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of the U.S.
Electricity Grid in 2004.2 The boundaries between Interconnections are denoted by the bowtie-
shaped opposing arrows. The colored areas denote reliability regions who coordinate their
operations (when large plants go down for maintenance, for example) in order to preserve the
stability of the transmission system. The tangle of power control areas reflects the legacy of local
monopolies that have been the principal architects of the U.S. electricity grid.
Although the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) opened the door for
independent power generation (by requiring IOUs to buy their output at “avoided cost”), the
growth of such producers was impeded by discriminatory transmission practices. Because the
1Exceptions include the New York and New England Power Pools, which formed in response to The Great
Northeast Blackout of 1965, as well as smaller utilities that do not control dispatch directly.
2This is the earliest map available from NERC. It already includes the consolidation of Texas PCAs in to ERCOT,
the formation of the PJM, and its expansion to include the former Allegheny PCA.
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Electricity Grid in 2004
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IOUs owned the transmission system, they could effectively shut independent producers out of
wider markets by denying access.3 This began to change with the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which
required the functional separation of transmission system owners and power marketers–they were
no longer allowed to use their wires to prevent or extract the surplus from trades across their
territory. These changes were codified on April 24, 1996 with FERC orders 888 and 889, which
required open-access, non-discriminatory tariffs for wholesale electricity transmission.
Open-access created greater potential for wholesale electricity markets, which were initially
conducted through bilateral contracts for power. In this decentralized setting, contracts would
typically specify the amount of electricity to be generated by one utility under a set of conditions,
transmitted across a particular area, and withdrawn from the system by the purchasing utility.
Mansur and White (2012) given examples showing why the nature of congestion in electricity
transmission networks renders decentralized markets particularly poorly suited for identifying all
of the potential gains from trade. In particular, transmission lines are constrained by net flows,
not gross flows, as is the case in highway congestion, for example. When this is the case, there are
production externalities that may allow otherwise infeasible bilateral trades to occur. Identifying
these potential trades in a decentralized market is a challenge akin to coordinating simultaneous
multilateral exchanges (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004)).
Operationally, balancing authorities have relied on engineering estimates of costs to devise
dispatch algorithms to determine which plants within the power control area operate, and
separately schedule any other operations requested by utilities (for bilateral trades). Centralized
wholesale electricity markets work by integrating dispatch operations in to an auction for electricity.
In day-ahead auctions, for example, generators submit bids to produce electricity, and only those
below the price needed to meet projected demand are called on to operate. These auction
incorporate feasibility constraints, so calling on higher-priced units to operate due to transmission
congestion allows for the direct revelation of the cost of shortcomings in the transmission system.4
The transition from command-and-control to market dispatch is related to, but distinct from the
3Examples of IOUs exercising market dominace can be found in Appendix C of FERC Order 888.
4In particular, auctions using the “Standard Market Design” yield “Locational Marginal Prices” (LMPs) which
denote the market-clearing price at each of the points of withdrawal from the system. When LMPs are identical
everywhere, the system is said to be uncongested.
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movement toward restructured electricity markets in the United States. In particular, the changes
to dispatch and transmission described thus far were undertaken by the Federal government.5
The end of cost-of-service regulation of vertically-integrated IOUs was initiated by states. It
is important to distinguish between these developments, for although all states that adopted
restructuring legislation eventually began participation in regional wholesale electricity markets,
many areas began participating in these markets while preserving their traditional regulatory
framework.6
The California Energy Crisis struck essentially in the middle of state-level restructuring efforts.
Although every state in the Union had adopted or was considering restructuring legislation at
the time, no state has restructured their electricity industry since the crisis, and a few states
have repealed their legislation. The California crisis also slowed, but did not completely cease
the formation of regional wholesale electricity markets. As a result, many areas in the United
States currently operate in the same manner as they ever have, virtually untouched by the recent
reforms. This sort of ‘natural experiment’ forms the basis of my empirical strategy by allowing
me to compare changes in productive efficiency of otherwise identical generation facilities across
regulatory regimes, as well as changes in the allocative efficiency of similar balancing authorities
after ceding authority to a centralized market.
A handful of existing studies on electricity restructuring have focused on operational efficiency
gains holding a given plant’s level of output fixed (see, for example, Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram
(2007); Bushnell and Wolfram (2005); Davis and Wolfram (2012); Cropper, Limonov, Kabir, and
Anoop (2011); Cicala (2012)). Results on productive efficiency changes have been disappointing:
it appears restructuring has had minimal impact on facility heat rates, for example. Research
on allocative efficiency has focused primarily on loses due to the exercise of market power (see
Mansur (2001, 2008); Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002); Wolak (2012); Bushnell, Mansur, and
Savaria (2007); Joskow, Kahn, and Economics (2002)). A notable exception is Mansur and White
5The ERCOT system in Texas is the exception because this Interconnection does not cross state lines, and is therefore
not subject to FERC jurisdiction on many matters. However, Texas does participates in the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), which has been designated by FERC as the electricity reliability organization for the
United States. Separating ERCOT from FERC rules yields distinctions without a difference.
6Examples include Indiana, West Virgina, and parts of Kentucky in the Pennsyvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
Interconnection, most of the Midwest ISO (MISO), and all of the Southwest Power Pool (SPP).
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(2012), who compare the allocative efficiency of bilateral to centralized electricity markets, finding
large welfare gains associated with one of the PJM expansions.
While market imperfections are certainly cause for concern, evidence of their existence is not
proof of their inferiority. The relevant question for policymakers considering what to do about the
current regulatory stalemate is: do markets (including all of their flaws) outperform the alternative
methods for deciding which plants should operate in order to satisfy demand for electricity?
2.3 Methodology
To produce a given level of output industry-wide, cost reductions can come from two sources:
productivity improvements that hold the distribution of output across facilities constant, or a
shift of output between facilities that differ in their productivity. Prior studies on US electricity
restructuring have focused on the former of these types of cost reduction (Fabrizio, Rose, and
Wolfram (2007), Davis and Wolfram (2012), Bushnell and Wolfram (2005), Cropper, Limonov,
Kabir, and Anoop (2011)). Estimating the distinction between these two sources of improvements
in the telecommunications industry was the primary motivation that gave us the now widely
used methodology for production function estimation in Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP).
The reallocation of output to more productive firms within industries has been recognized as
a fundamental source of gains from opening up to international trade (see Melitz (2003) and
subsequent literature, and Pavcnik (2002) for an application of the OP estimator to the international
trade setting).
To facilitate the decomposition of costs in the electricity sector, I assume the production
function of electricity generating units that is similar to that of Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007).
Output is Leontief in fuel, complemented with labor and materials, while the production frontier
is Cobb-Douglas in each of these inputs for a given level of output7. In logs,
yit = β0 +min{βhhit, βl lit}+ βkkit + βaait +ωit + ε it, (2.1)
where yit denotes the (log) output of generating unit i in month t. h, k, a, l, and m stand for
7For similar specifications, see Benkard (2000) for an application to learning in wide-body aircraft production, and
Van Biesebroeck (2003) for automobile assembly.
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fuel input in MMBTU (heat), characteristics of the capital stock (firing type, generator capacity,
etc.), unit age, labor and materials, respectively. ε it and νit are mean-zero transitory shocks to
productivity that are orthogonal to the inputs and unobserved to both the econometrician and
the plant manager when making production decisions. For expositional convenience I assume
ωit is a time-varying Hicks-neutral producitivity variable common to both Leontief arguments,
though in fact our interpretation when studying fuel demand in the absence of data on labor or
materials is that ωit is the sum of a Hicks-neutral and fuel-biased productivity index that cannot
be separately identified. This production function allows for the conversion of fuel to electricity to
depend upon the capital stock at the plant (for example, the presence of abatement equipment
(time-varying), or differing boiler specifications (fixed)), but rules out the substitutability of labor
and materials for fuel.
2.3.1 Structural Estimation of Electricity Production Functions
Since at least Marschak and Andrews Jr (1944), econometricians have recognized the potential
for simultaneity bias in production function estimation when plant managers make production
decisions based on productivity that is unobserved to the econometrician: a positive shock to
productivity is likely to be met with expanded input demand and production, which biases
the factor demand coefficients. Estimation may also suffer from selection bias when plant
managers make entry/exit decisions based on unobserved productivity. While permanent exit
from electricity generation is rare, seasonal fluctuations in demand cause many units to go months
on ‘cold standby’. Estimating a logarithmic production function causes idle months to drop out of
the data. The fact that less productive facilities are more likely to spend time off-line creates the
potential for selection bias.
Instruments that are correlated with input demand, but are outside the production function
and uncorrelated with unobserved productivity may help address simultaneity bias, but require
meaningful variation across plants and over time. Such variation is rare in settings with national
input and output markets. Instrumental variables also fail to account for selection bias. If firm
heterogeneity is time-invariant, fixed effects may help solve the selection problem, but soak up
much of the variance needed to identify coefficients on relatively fixed inputs. Selection bias will
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continue to cause problems if unobserved productivity varies over time.8
To account for time-varying heterogeneity and simultaneity in a single procedure, Olley and
Pakes (1996) (OP) develop a semiparametric estimation algorithm embedded in a structural
framework of firm behavior. In order to decompose the productive and allocative efficiency
changes in electrical generation, I estimate a production function for electricity generation using
an algorithm that extends recent work in the OP tradition, developed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), and summarized in Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and
Pakes (2007) (ABBP).
The operating environment for generating facilities is similar to that of OP, and follows the
notation of ABBP: plant managers are assumed to make production decisions on a per-period
basis (monthly) in order to maximize current and expected discounted value of profits.9 Given
the need to schedule staff and order fuel for delivery, managers are assumed to make entry/exit
decisions in advance of actual production. Per-period profits depend on a vector of unit-specific
state variables: (kit, ait,ωit,∆t), where ∆t refers to a measure of the market environment, including
demand, factor prices, and state variables of all firms in the market.
In each period plant managers must decide whether to produce electricity or shutdown and
receive payoff value Φ(kit, ait,ωit,∆t). Shutting down may simply entail going on "cold standby",
and is not necessarily permanent.10 For our purposes, entry and exit will refer to the decision to
start up or shut down production contingent upon the plant’s existence. If a unit is operational,
the manager decides on levels of variable inputs, including labor, materials, and fuel, based on the
realized state variables to maximize profits. While most capital inputs are fixed upon construction
of the generating unit (only 0.5% of plant-month observations record a change in generating
capacity after birth), investment decisions for capital such as the addition of abatement equipment
8See Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) for a more complete discussion.
9Defining a general profit function allows specific payoffs to differ between regulated and unregulated plants. The
key restriction, as explained below, is that the profit function of Investor-Owned Utilities to not deviate so drastically
from standard cost-minimizing behavior as to reverse the typically positive relationship between productivity and
optimum factor demands.
10See Cullen (2011) for a dynamic model of generating unit production designed to measure start-up and operating
costs based on high-frequency (15 minute) production decisions. Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007) and the literature cited in ABBP develop models that focus on entry/exit decisions to measure
sunk costs and sell-off values in dynamic, multi-agent settings. For our purposes, start up and shut down decisions
conditional upon plant construction are sufficient to identify unobserved productivity for production function estimates.
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are made after revelation of period t state variables, and the associated changes to the capital stock
appear in period t+ 1. State variables observed by the econometrician therefore evolve according
to
kit+1 = (1− δ)kit + it
at+1 = at + 1
Productivity (ωit) is assumed to be observed by the plant manager before making production
and investment decisions, but is unobserved by the econometrician. It is assumed to evolve
according to a first-order Markov process:
p(ωit+1|{ωiτ}
t
τ=0, Iit) = p(ωit+1|ωit) (2.2)
As emphasized in the modern production function literature, this is both an econometric and
an economic assumption. It states that the distribution of next period’s productivity given the
information available to the plant manager at time t (denoted Iit) is completely determined by the
current value of the productivity index. We additionally assume that p(ωit+1|ωit) is stochastically
increasing in current productivity, i.e. ωit+1 is drawn from a more favorable distribution for units
that are currently more productive. This ensures the monotonicity required for a unique solution
to the Bellman equation that describes the plant manager’s maximization problem:
V(kit, ait,ωit,∆t) =
max{
Φ(kit, ait,ωit,∆t), maxiit≥0{π(kit, ait,ωit,∆t)− c(iit,∆t)+
+E[V(kit+1, ait+1,ωit+1,∆t+1)|kit, ait,ωit,∆t, iit]}
} (2.3)
While the assumption that p(ωit+1|ωit) is stochastically increasing in ωit helps increase the
gap between the value of exit and production as productivity rises, the necessary assumption
is that Φ(kit, ait,ωit,∆t) does not rise so quickly as to invalidate the existence of a single lower
bound of productivity that determines the optimal exit rule:
χit = {
1(continue) if ωit ≥ ω¯(kit, ait,∆t)
0(exit) otherwise
} (2.4)
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The solution to the optimization of investment given positive production in equation (2.3)
yields an investment demand curve that plays a critical role in identificating ωit in OP. In the case
of electricity generation, major investments are typically chosen at the time of plant construction.
Subsequent investments such as abatement equipment are usually forced upon the generator,
violating the monotonicity of i(kit, ait,ωit,∆t) required in order to invert the investment function
to infer productivity.11 We therefore have a single variable input (fuel), relatively fixed capital,
and no intermediate input from which to infer productivity as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
As a result, I subsume the constant β0 in to the productivity term ωit, and employ the procedure
suggested by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) to estimate production from fuel and capital
inputs as
yit = βhhit + βkkit + βaait +ωit + ε it (2.5)
The fact that plant managers know their value of ωit when choosing fuel input levels means
that we can write the (log) demand for fuel as a function of the state variables in period t
(subsuming ∆t into t for notational convenience, as in OP):
hit = ft(ωit, kit, ait) (2.6)
The key assumption for identification is that demand for heat inputs is strictly increasing in ωit.
This assumption would be violated if, for example, a utility operating on a cost-plus basis decided
to run its less efficient plants more often as a means of inflating expenses. This is assumption is
unlikely to be violated as long as regulators do not completely abdicate their responsibility to
monitor both the availability and costs of units. As long as they do so, this would be a particularly
transparent means of inflating costs. So long as (2.6) is strictly monotonic in productivity, we can
invert it for substitution in (2.5)
yit = βhhit + βkkit + βaait + f
−1(hit, kit, ait) + ε it (2.7)
While none of the coefficients in (2.7) are identified at this point, it is possible to use a flexible
polynomial approximation to isolate idiosyncratic shocks ε it to form an estimate of the output
11Fowlie (2010) uses a random coefficients logit model to estimate the impact that restructuring has had on
generator’s choice of abatement strategies conditional upon being subject to market-based Ozone regulations.
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anticipated by the plant manager at time t
φt(hit, kit, ait) = βhhit + βkkit + βaait +ωit
In the second stage, we utilize our assumption that unobserved productivity follows a first
order Markov process of to form moment conditions based on the information available to the
plant manager at the time production decisions are made. In particular
ωit = E[ωit|Iit−1] = E[ωit|ωit−1] + ξit (2.8)
= g(ωit−1) + ξit (2.9)
where ξit is uncorrelated with decisions made in period t− 1 by definition. Since current
period capital is determined by period t − 1 investment decisions, and heat demand is not a
dynamic factor across months, we can use kit, ait and hit−1 to form moment conditions with ξit.
Formally,
E
ξit|
kit
ait
hit−1
 = 0,
E
ξit ·
kit
ait
hit−1
 = 0 (2.10)
Estimation in the second stage begins by predicting a value for unobserved productivity given
a candidate parameter vector β = [βh, βk, βa],
ωit(β) = φˆit − βhhit − βkkit − βaait (2.11)
For the unanticipated productivity moment conditions, project ωit(β) on a polynomial of
ωit−1(β) in order to predict E[ωit(β)| ωit−1(β)], and form an estimate for ξit(β) based on the
residual. Following the suggestion of Wooldridge (2009), and extending the moments derived by
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ACF, we now have two moments:
E
 ε it|Iit
ξit|Iit−1
 = E
 yit − βhhit − βkkit − βaait + f−1(hit, kit, ait; β f ,t)|Iit
f−1(hit, kit, ait; β f ,t)it − g( f−1(hit−1, kit−1, ait−1; β f ,t−1); βg)|Iit−1
 = 0
The parameter vector is estimated by minimizing the sample analogue of the moment conditions
(2.10):
argmin
β

1
T − 1
1
N
T
∑
t=2
∑
i
ξit(β) ·
kit
ait
hit−1

2

Standard errors from this two-step procedure can be bootstrapped, or following the suggestion
of Wooldridge (2009), moment conditions from the two steps can be estimated simultaneously,
allowing for analytic standard errors, and increased precision by using the covariances of the
errors across moments in the variance-covariance weight matrix of GMM estimation.
2.3.2 Accounting for Selection
The procedure described to this point does not account for the entry/exit decisions encapsulated
in (2.4). When plant managers decide whether or not to produce based on their evaluation of
ωit, (2.5) will suffer from selection bias, as only units with ωit > ω¯(kit, ait,∆t) will be observed
in the data. The vast majority in 2008 being produced by units commencing operation prior to
1997, one might think selection problems can safely be ignored, or remedied with fixed-effects.
With monthly data, however, selection is potentially a serious concern due to the seasonal nature
of electricity demand combined with the impossibility of storage. High-cost “peaking” units are
generally only used during times of high demand, and the least productive units may only be
used a few days a year, if any. That said, permanent exit is especially rare due to requirements
for reserve capacity, the costly nature of introducing new generating assets, and the potential for
lucrative generation on days of exceptionally high demand.
While Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) prove identification
when the variable input is the basis for the productivity inversion, it has not yet been shown
these results hold in the presence of endogenous selection. When selection is present, the moment
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conditions in (2.10) are no longer valid because survival in period t depends on the realization of
ξit. While OP estimate the coefficients on variable inputs in the first stage, and need only worry
about selection until the second, this is not the case when inputs are the basis of the productivity
inversion. Taking expectations of (2.5) based on information available to plant managers at t− 1,
unobserved productivity (and therefore input demand) suffer from selection bias. State variables
determined at time t− 1 and the idiosyncratic error term are unaffected by the exit decision.
E[yit|Iit−1,χit = 1] = βhhit + βkkit + βaait + E[ωit|Iit−1,χit = 1]
Starting with productivity, OP show we can invoke the exit rule to write expected unobserved
productivity as12
E[ωit|Iit−1,χit = 1] = E[ωit|Iit−1,ωit > ω¯t(kit, ait)]
Employing the Markov transition distribution from (2.2), time t− 1 expectations of ωit condi-
tional upon survival in t can be written as
E[ωit|Iit−1,ωit > ω¯t(kit, ait)] =
ˆ ∞
ω¯t(kit,ait)
ωit
p(ωit|ωit−1)´ ∞
ω¯t(kit,ait)
p(ωit|ωit−1)
dωit
= g˜[ωit−1, ω¯t(kit, ait)] (2.12)
For some function g˜(). Since approximating the exit productivity with a polynomial in the state
variables would interfere with the identification of βa and βk, OP suggest using the probability of
exit conditional upon information available at time t− 1 as a basis for inferring the value of the
exit productivity. To see this, note the probability of production in period t can be written as a
function of information available in t− 1:
Pr[χit = 1|It−1] = Pr[ωit > ω¯t(kit, ait)|ωit−1, ω¯t(kit, ait)] (2.13)
= ϕ˜t(ωit−1, kit, ait) = ϕt(hit−1, kit−1, ait−1, iit−1) = Pit
Where the penultimate equality follows from the inversion of the fuel demand equation (2.6) in
period t− 1, and the fact that period t state variables are set in period t− 1. Since (2.13) expresses
the probability of continuing as a function of ωit−1 and the exit rule, and the probability of exit is
12To save notation, the economic environment ∆t is encompassed with the subscript on the exit rule ω¯t(kit, ait), as
in OP.
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strictly increasing in ω¯t(kit, ait), it is possible to invert (2.13) to express the ω¯t(kit, ait) as a function
of prior productivity and probability of exit in period t as long as there is positive density in the
neighborhood of exit. We then substitute this expression for the exit productivity into (2.12) to
obtain a function we can estimate with a 3rd or 4th order polynomial approximation :
g˜[ωit−1, ω¯t(kit, ait)] = g˜[ωit−1, f¯ (ωit−1, Pit)]
= gω(ωit−1, Pit)
In practice Pˆit is estimated using a polynomial expansion of ϕt(hit−1, kit−1, ait−1, iit−1) in a
probit model, and ωit−1(β) is identical to that of the second step of the algorithm in the absence
of selection (2.11). While unanticipated productivity changes (ξit) violate the orthogonality
conditions necessary to form moments in the presence of endogenous entry/exit, once this
selection correction is applied it is possible to form moment conditions analogous to (2.10) based
on ζit, the unanticipated productivity shock conditional upon survival:
ωit = E[ωit|Iit−1,ωit > ω¯t(kit, ait)] + ζit
= gω(ωit−1, Pit) + ζit
With this adjustment estimation proceeds based on two moment conditions in unanticipated
shocks
E
 ε it|Iit
ζit|Iit−1
 = 0 (2.14)
The steps of the estimation algorithm follow those outlined in the case without selection, this
time incorporating the probability of survival in the second stage to form the moment conditions.
2.3.3 Causal Estimation of Allocative Efficiency Gains
Structural estimation of the production function is useful for decomposing the components of
cost changes in the electricity industry over the last 20 years. Whether or not market dispatch
caused these changes hinges upon the construction of a counterfactual operating environment
for firms in restructured markets. A structural analysis of this type would require a dynamic
general equilibrium model of firm behavior that accounts for response to the economic/regulatory
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environment. It would also require an assumption on how the profit function differs across
regulatory regimes. For a causal analysis this is self-defeating: the model must assume the
(non)existence of behavior it was intended to test. I therefore focus the remainder of my analysis
on the construction of a credible counterfactual to identify the changes in electricity production
caused by restructuring.
Suppose that the productivity at plant i in month t can be expressed as a function of a plant-
specific, time invariant component, a transitory component, and a value that depends upon how
the plant is called-upon to generate electricity:
ωit = θi I(plant = i)it + αt I(month = t)it + τ I(dispatch = mkt)it + νit (2.15)
Under these assumptions, applying a differences-in-differences framework to the derived
productivity estimates allows for causal inference of the effect of markets based on the relative
change in productivity between market and non-market facilities. This is similar to the work
on heat rates in Bushnell and Wolfram (2005)–the key differences being the analysis of dispatch
rather than regulator regime, and the inclusion of consistent productivity estimates rather than
raw heat rates.
To evaluate the effect of markets on allocative efficiency, I estimate a rudimentary model of
dispatch according to
Yit =
A
∑
a=0
T
∑
t=0
γat I(Areaa,Montht) + β0Cit +
T
∑
t=0
δt I(montht)Cit + (2.16)
+ β1 I(mkt)itCit + β2 I(post ∗mkt)itCit + ǫit
where Yit is the output plant i in area a is called on to produce in month t, and Cit is plant
i’s marginal fuel cost at time t. The area-by-month dummies ensure that the total electricity
dispatched in the area is sufficient to meet demand, whatever the allocation across facilities.
The β’s in equation (2.16) measure the relationship between cost and output–effectively the
residual demand curve facing each plant. The remaining terms impose a differences-in-differences
reallocation of output among plants: β0 measures the average slope of residual demand across
all areas, the δt’s allow this slope to vary over time, and β1 allows for a time-invariant difference
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between the areas that adopted market dispatch, and those that preserved their balancing authority.
β2 measures the change in the relationship between cost and output after market adoption, relative
to areas that did not change.
This model is designed to answer the question: How do markets reallocate output to lower
cost plants? Market power will tend to increaseβ2 as low-cost facilities withhold their output to
drive up the cost of the marginal producer. However, β2 will be negative if markets are superior
at allocating output to low cost plants, even after netting out the distortions of market power.
While Olley and Pakes (1996) simply consider the covariance between productivity and output as
their measure of allocative efficiency (this is identical to the numerator in each of the β’s), this
framework introduces an explicit counterfactual in order to evaluate the effect of the introduction
of markets.
2.4 Data
This paper uses a twenty-year panel of data on operations in the U.S. electricity sector, synthesized
from a number of publicly-available sources. Because fuel prices became subject to non-disclosure
for divested power plants, I also use restricted-access data from the Department of Energy for
these facilities. To calculate the marginal fuel cost of electricity production, I combine data on
fuel prices from Form EIA-423 with monthly facility-level data on heat input and net generation
from 1990-2009 from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) Forms
EIA-759/906/923. This data also serves as the basis for analysis of allocative and productive
efficiency gains, as it reports the output of essentially every source of electricity in the United
States over this period.
I link power plants to market participation status by identifying the power control area in
which the plant is located. This data comes from both EIA-861, as well as the eGRID database
constructed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
To estimate the propensity score for selection correction, I utilize data on the demand for
electricity from Form EIA-826, and local temperature data from NOAA’s Integrated Surface
Database during the sample period.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the summary statistics of fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating
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facilities in the United States from 1990-1996, the year before any market-based dispatch operations
began. Panel B of Table 2.2 summarizes the characteristics of recent entrants among gas-fired
generating units in their initial year of operation, the only substantial capacity additions during
the sample period. Power plants in areas that began market-based dispatch are different from
their non-market counterparts on a number of dimensions. They tend to each have modestly
lower generating capacities (and production) per plant across all fuel types, and continues to
hold for recent gas-fired capacity additions. Capacity factors denote the share of total potential
production if the plant had been operating at full capacity for the entire year. During this period,
coal tends to provide base-load production, a combination of coal and gas “follow” the load over
the course of the day, and the much more expensive oil-fired units are used sparingly. The vintage
of plants reflects the costliness of building new coal-fired capacity since the Clean Air Act, and the
relative expense of oil-derived electricity generation. Although the plants in these areas do differ
from each other, aside from fuel costs (which can be isolated), it is unclear how these differences
invalidate a comparison of changes in the allocation of production following the introduction of
market-based dispatch.
2.5 Results
Production Function Estimates
Tables 2.3-2.5 present estimates of electricity production functions for each type of fossil fuel. The
first two columns of each table present the results of ordinary least squares regressions of (logged)
output on the relevant explanatory variables. The second two columns utilize an instrumental
variables approach in which heat input is instrumented with demand, lagged heat input, and
temperature data. The final two columns present results of the generalized method of moments
strategy described in sub-section 2.3.1. For each estimation approach, the second column includes
a correction for the probability of operating in a given month as described in sub-section 2.3.2.
While production function estimates are mostly stable across specifications, there are a couple
noteworthy features of these results. Simultaneity bias of variable inputs implies the coefficient
on heat should be lower when unobserved productivity is taken in to account. In addition, the
coefficient on capital (the nameplate capacity) should tend to be biased downwards as larger plants
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Coal- and Oil-Fired Facilities 1990-1996
A. Coal-Fired Facilities
Market Areas No Market Areas Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 726.49 920.86 –194.37***
[683.49] [767.66] (29.05)
Annual Net 3625.76 4699.65 –1073.89***
Generation (GWh) [3887.87] [4427.73] (166.06)
Capacity Factor 0.50 0.54 –0.04***
[0.20] [0.19] (0.01)
Plant Vintage 1962.22 1965.82 –3.59***
[13.06] [13.56] (0.55)
Heat Rate 11.45 10.82 0.63***
(MMBTU/MW) [2.05] [2.33] (0.09)
Fuel Price 1.36 1.45 –0.09***
($/MMBTU) [0.42] [0.41] (0.02)
Sulfur Content 1.19 0.99 0.19***
(lbs/mmbtu) [0.87] [0.74] (0.03)
Scrubbers 0.23 0.33 –0.10***
[0.42] [0.47] (0.02)
NOx Abatement 0.20 0.28 –0.08***
[0.40] [0.45] (0.02)
Facilities 343 142 485
B. Oil-Fired Facilities
Market Areas No Market Areas Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 170.63 284.84 –114.20***
[305.98] [412.69] (15.63)
Annual Net 166.66 333.56 –166.90***
Generation (GWh) [595.31] [872.41] (31.35)
Capacity Factor 0.09 0.07 0.02**
[0.19] [0.15] (0.01)
Plant Vintage 1964.76 1966.73 –1.97***
[12.39] [9.44] (0.59)
Heat Rate 14.01 13.34 0.67**
(MMBTU/MW) [5.85] [4.87] (0.26)
Fuel Price 1.59 2.09 –0.50***
($/MMBTU) [1.93] [1.98] (0.09)
NOx Abatement 0.03 0.03 0.00
[0.17] [0.17] (0.01)
Facilities 411 120 531
Note: Unweighted facility-level statistics presented. Standard deviations are in brackets,
and facility-clustered standard errors in parentheses are from a regression on the treatment
variable. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of Gas-Facilities by 1996 Incumbency
A. Incumbent Gas-Fired Facilities
Market Areas No Market Areas Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 316.18 342.71 –26.53
[439.18] [467.63] (17.95)
Annual Net 584.71 618.96 –34.25
Generation (GWh) [1172.46] [1335.76] (48.99)
Capacity Factor 0.10 0.10 0.00
[0.19] [0.17] (0.01)
Plant Vintage 1962.75 1963.70 –0.95*
[12.49] [13.34] (0.54)
Heat Rate 13.92 13.16 0.76***
(MMBTU/MW) [7.47] [3.95] (0.27)
Fuel Price 2.48 2.41 0.06**
($/MMBTU) [0.64] [0.81] (0.03)
Combined Cycle 0.05 0.11 –0.07***
(%) [0.20] [0.27] (0.01)
NOx Abatement 0.06 0.04 0.02**
[0.23] [0.19] (0.01)
Facilities 605 212 817
B. Entrant Gas-Fired Facilities
Market Areas No Market Areas Difference of Means
Capacity (MW) 223.97 404.90 –180.92***
[286.66] [493.07] (62.60)
Annual Net 509.29 664.87 –155.58
Generation (GWh) [960.09] [1015.57] (162.36)
Capacity Factor 0.20 0.23 –0.03
[0.34] [0.35] (0.06)
Plant Vintage 2001.30 2001.80 –0.50
[2.03] [2.33] (0.36)
Heat Rate 11.50 11.10 0.41
(MMBTU/MW) [4.94] [6.62] (0.93)
Fuel Price 5.07 4.75 0.32
($/MMBTU) [1.98] [1.72] (0.31)
Combined Cycle 0.21 0.42 –0.21***
(%) [0.41] [0.50] (0.07)
NOx Abatement 0.70 0.71 –0.01
[0.46] [0.46] (0.08)
Facilities 96 59 155
Note: Unweighted facility-level statistics presented. Standard deviations are in brackets,
and facility-clustered standard errors in parentheses are from a regression on the treatment
variable. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.3: Electricity Production Function Estimates: Coal-Fired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV OP/LP OP/LP
Heat Input 1.046 1.046 1.036 1.026 1.069 1.034
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0374)
Nameplate 0.029 0.061 0.039 0.066 0.047 0.011
Capacity (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Facility Age 0.002 0.020 0.001 0.025 0.015 0.000
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Scrubber –0.020 –0.032 –0.019 –0.033 0.006 –0.021
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
NOx 0.011 –0.001 0.011 –0.001 –0.038 0.007
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0035) (0.0311)
Constant –3.249 –3.514 –3.165 –3.270 –4.233 –3.476
(0.0042) (0.0133) (0.0057) (0.0151) (0.0910) (0.4838)
Selection Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 88432 88432 88432 88432 88432 88432
Note: Continuous independent variables are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
Excluded states: AK,HI.
Table 2.4: Electricity Production Function Estimates: Gas-Fired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV OP/LP OP/LP
Heat Input 1.039 1.030 1.040 1.030 1.028 1.028
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Nameplate 0.034 0.045 0.032 0.045 0.044 0.060
Capacity (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Facility Age –0.081 –0.008 –0.081 –0.008 –0.061 –0.055
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0010)
NOx 0.041 0.028 0.040 0.028 –0.008 –0.041
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0049)
Constant –2.847 –3.028 –2.855 –3.033 –2.894 –2.682
(0.0021) (0.0060) (0.0022) (0.0064) (0.0505) (0.1428)
Selection Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 120867 120867 120867 120867 120867 120867
Note: Continuous independent variables are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
Excluded states: AK,HI.
should be able to survive given lower productivity. These expected biases tend to hold when
comparing OLS results with IV and GMM (and the role of the selection correction on nameplate),
though it also appears as the production processes at generating facilities are sufficiently fixed
that these are not tremendous sources of bias.
72
Table 2.5: Electricity Production Function Estimates: Oil-Fired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV OP/LP OP/LP
Heat Input 0.997 0.989 1.001 1.000 0.994 0.993
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0039)
Nameplate 0.041 0.025 0.039 0.024 0.040 0.027
Capacity (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Facility Age –0.027 –0.044 –0.027 –0.042 –0.024 –0.026
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0019)
NOx –0.039 –0.028 –0.045 –0.027 –0.037 –0.080
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0068) (0.0130)
Constant –2.601 –2.378 –2.626 –2.478 –2.590 –2.610
(0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0061) (0.0408) (0.0273)
Selection Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 82300 82300 82300 82300 82300 82300
Note: Continuous independent variables are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
Excluded states: AK,HI.
Olley-Pakes Decomposition of Production (Fuel) Costs with Heterogeneous Factor
Prices
A common assumption for the analysis of allocative efficiency in papers employing the OP
estimator is that factor prices are uniform across space, though they may vary over time. This
allows one to analyse productivity changes as a sufficient statistic for changes in aggregate
production costs. Heterogeneity of fuel type and transportation costs, however, yields widely
varying heat input prices at any moment in time. An accounting of productivity changes
that ignores heterogeneity of fuel costs is insufficient to make inferences regarding changes in
production cost in this setting. Social gains are understated when output shifts to more productive
firms that also have lower input costs, and will actually have the wrong sign when relative costs
are greater than relative productivities.
I construct an index that converts productivity (in units of output) to fuel costs in order
to account for heterogeneity of fuel prices when evaluating efficiency changes. That is, rather
than studying trends in market-share weighted average industry productivity, ωt ≡ ∑ni=1 sitωit, I
evaluate what I will refer to as the “Inverse Fuel Productivity,” ψit, presented in dollar units:
ψit ≡ pit exp−
1
βh
ωit
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where pit is the price of fuel per MMBTU. The analogous market-share weighted average,
ψt ≡ ∑
n
i=1 sitψit can be decomposed in to an across-facility average, and the covariance between
inverse fuel productivity and market share, as in the OP index:
ψt =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ψit + cov(sit,ψit)
Figures 2.2-2.4 display how inverse fuel productivity has changed over time by fuel type and
eventual market participation. Although these indicies were almost identical through 2000, a gap
has opened up between market and non-market areas, particularly since 2004 (which corresponds
with the introduction of MISO and expansion of PJM). The relative gain for market areas has
been driven almost entirely by changes in coal-fired facility operations, though it is worth noting
the underperformance of gas in 2000-2001, corresponding to the California electricity crisis. The
utility of this type of decomposition is immediately clear by comparing Figures 2.3 and 2.4: there
has been essentially no change in the across-facility averages, while there has been a large shift in
how high-cost plants are punished with reduced output in market areas. It must be kept in mind,
however, that this is simply a decomposition of averages–nothing in this framework allows one to
attribute changes to the introduction of markets, as no counterfactual has been posed.
Within-Facility Productivity Changes
As discussed earlier, a number of studies have evaluated the impact that restructuring of the
electricity sector has had on productive efficiency. Here I apply the methods used in many of
these studies to evaluate how the introduction of market-based dispatch has affected changes in
within-plant productive efficiency. There are two components of average fuel cost to produce an
additional megawatt-hour of electricity: the heat rate, and the price of fuel. Table 2.6 presents
the results of applying a differences-in-differences framework on the productivity parameters
estimated earlier, as in Pavcnik (2002), and on fuel prices themselves. Because transportation costs
introduce geographic-specific, time-varying unobservables that might bias results, all estimates
include Census Division-by-Year fixed effects. These have been shown in Cicala (2012) to give
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Figure 2.2: Inverse Fuel Productivity by Dispatch Method, Weighted by Quantity
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Figure 2.3: Across-Plant Inverse Fuel Productivity by Dispatch Method, Unweighted
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Figure 2.4: Covariance Between Inverse Fuel Productivity and Production Share by Dispatch Method
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Market Dispatch on Plant Productivity
A. Fuel Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
Coal Gas Oil
Post x Market –0.002 –0.007* –0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Mean 0.51 –0.23 0.11
R2 0.615 0.592 0.686
Facilities 414 1160 1032
Obs. 89984 133789 99422
B. Fuel Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Post x Market –0.068** 0.198 0.604***
(0.028) (0.136) (0.149)
Mean 1.79 7.31 13.21
R2 0.751 0.476 0.829
Facilities 407 935 694
Obs. 82917 94347 50014
Note: All specifications include Facility and Census
Division-Year. Panel B only includes months in which
fuel was delivered. Mean of the dependent variable is
presented for the post-treatment observations. Stan-
dard errors clustered by facility in parentheses. Ex-
cluded states: AK,HI. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
results similar to a more sophisticated geographic matching estimator.13
Table 2.6 presents the results of this analysis. As in Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007);
Bushnell and Wolfram (2005), I do not find much flexibility in terms of heat rates at generating
facilities. For prices, there is a small decrease in the price of coal, no change for natural gas, and
an anomalous increase in the price of oil at market-dispatched facilities. It is unclear what could
give rise to such an increase, but is worth looking in to in future work.
Counterfactual Production Costs Using a Differences-in-Differences Dispatch Model
Table 2.7 presents the results of estimating the relationship between output and marginal costs in
the difference-in-difference framework of equation (2.16). As discussed in sub-section 2.3.3, this
13It is worth noting that the results here do not contradict those in Cicala (2012) because many areas that adopted
market dispatch remain rate-regulated. It is therefore important to distinguish between the incentives of plants based
on the regulatory framework they face.
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Marginal Fuel Cost on Plant Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Fossil Coal Gas Oil
Post x Market –0.142* –4.953*** –0.082** –0.097***
(0.0771) (0.5692) (0.0413) (0.0153)
Market 0.895*** 10.438*** 0.579*** 0.097***
(0.0800) (0.9056) (0.0687) (0.0258)
Marginal Cost –10.242*** –54.363*** –3.993** –0.508**
(1.1236) (5.9399) (1.5574) (0.2524)
R2 0.293 0.348 0.319 0.324
Obs. 323195 89984 133789 99422
Note: Dependent Variable is monthly net-generation in GWh. Coefficients are
interacted with average marginal fuel cost. Standard errors clustered at Power
Control Area-Month in parentheses.
framework includes the flavor of the OP index because the numerator of the coefficient of output
on marginal costs is exactly the allocative efficiency component of the index. The value-added here
is that equation (2.16) is explicity about the counterfactual: it allows time-invariant differences
in the relationship between costs and output to exist (due to transmission infrastructure, for
example), while also exploiting the staggered timing of market introductions to remove common
transitory shocks to be separated out from the impact of markets.
There is a strong negative overall relationship between average marginal costs and output
(which is reassuring). Interestingly, market areas have historically not punished higher costs with
less output quite as much as in non-market areas. However, there is a common shift across fossil
fuels that further penalizes increased fuel costs with reduced output after the introduction of
market dispatch.
We have estimated the components of average marginal fuel costs necessary to predict what
costs would have prevailed in the absence of market dispatch. Counterfactual heat rates are
predicted by plugging ωt(0) in for the estimated productivity of plants subject to market dispatch,
ωit(1). Counterfactual fuel prices are similarly computed by subtracting the estimated effect of
markets from the price of deliveries to plants under market dispatch. The product of these two
yields the counterfactual unweighted across-plant average component of the OP index, with the
critical distinction that the interpretation of the difference between observed market costs and
predicted costs is causal.
The full counterfactual estimate of what overall costs would have prevailed in the absence
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Figure 2.5: Observed Average Fuel Costs versus Estimated Counterfactual in Absence of Market Dispatch
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of markets is computed by weighting the counterfactual marginal fuel costs by the quantities
predicted by equation (2.16).14 Figure 2.5 plots the production-weighted average fossil fuel costs
by dispatch method, but now also includes the predicted costs that would have prevailed in
the market areas if not for the change in dispatch mechanism. It shows that an inference of the
benefits of market dispatch based on a simple comparison of market and non-market areas would
often lead to an overstatement. The estimated counterfactual suggests that fossil fuel costs are
15-20% lower due to the superior allocation of production under market dispatch. While it is
possible to separate out the components of productivity and allocative efficiency (using either
observed or counterfactual quantities), in this setting the productivity results are so small as to
essentially duplicate the lines at each allocation.
14In practice, I estimate (2.16) allowing for heterogeneous coefficients for fuel type and bins for nameplate generating
capacity. This allows for dispatch consideration of ramping, and helps the counterfactual predictions obey production
capacity constraints.
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2.6 Conclusion
How has the introduction of market-based dispatch affected the cost meeting the demand for
electricity? Although the dangers of market power have been well-studied in this setting, a
complete accounting has been missing. In this paper, I use the recent introduction of wholesale
electricity markets in some areas as a natural experiment to evaluate the performance of markets
relative to the policy-relevant counterfactual: centralized dispatch by a regulated local monopolist.
I construct a twenty-year panel of data on US electricity generation costs and the mechanisms used
to allocate production to plants. I use proxy methods based on Olley and Pakes (1996); Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) to estimate fuel-specific production functions, and construct the Olley-Pakes
index of productivity to decompose costs in to within-plant productivity changes and allocative
efficiency changes.
I then apply a potential outcomes framework to the derived productivity estimates, allowing
the construction of counterfactual costs that explicitly accounts for permanent differences between
market and non-market areas and common transitory shocks. I find that the introduction of
market-based dispatch methods has reduced fossil-fuel production costs by upwards of 15%, and
that a simple comparison based on the Olley-Pakes decomposition would overstate these gains.
Roughly half of electricity in the United States continues to be generated by plants called upon
to operate by the local monopolist operating under cost-of-service regulation. Policymakers are
therefore faced with the question of whether markets should be expanded or scaled-back. The
answer depends on the balance between market failures and regulatory shortcomings. While
market power is certainly a concern for market monitors, my results suggest that these concerns are
far outweighed by the benefits realized by more efficient allocation of output though market-based
dispatch.
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Chapter 3
A Roy Model of Social Interactions
"To show him the world before he knows men is not to form him but to corrupt him;
not to instruct him but to deceive him." Rousseau (1979) [789]
3.1 Introduction
The influence of one’s peers in shaping the educational environment has been a central concern
throughout the history of educational discourse. Striking examples abound: Gans (1965) describes
an insidious form of social interactions in which Italian immigrant communities in Boston’s West
End impose costs on individuals who “act mobile.” Wilson (1987) provides qualitative evidence
that the development of an “underclass” of black city dwellers on Chicago’s South Side was due
to the emigration of working families and the resulting decrease in role models and neighborhood
quality.1
To better understand these phenomena, economists have developed models of social inter-
actions by putting environmental variables, such as the mean behavior of one’s social group or
1Many ethnographers describe similar phenomena around the globe: the Buraku Outcastes of Japan (De Vos and
Wagatsuma (1966)); Blacks in America (Fordham and Ogbu (1986)), the Maori of New Zealand (Chapple, Jeffries, and
Walker (1997)), Blacks on Chicago’s south side circa 1930 (Drake and Cayton (1993)), the working class in Britain (Willis
(1981)), among others.
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the mean educational attainment in one’s neighborhood, into agents’ utility functions.2,3 In this
class of models, peers are a source of monotonic externalities; unruly peers cause more trouble
and smarter peers encourage higher academic achievement ( Becker and Stigler (1974), Becker
(1996), Benabou (1993), Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1997)). Becker and Murphy (2000) call this
sort of complementarity between individual actions and those of one’s peers "the fundamental
assumption in analyzing the influence of social capital...on closely related behavior" (p.9)
Empirical evidence in favor of models which predict that an enhanced social environment
leads to positive individual outcomes has been ambivalent.4 While many authors confirm the
hypothesis using data sets ranging from primary and secondary students in Texas to freshmen in
the US Air Force Academy (Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009); Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and
Rivkin (2003); Hoxby (2000); Hoxby and Weingarth (2005); Duflo and Saez (2003); Duflo, Dupas,
and Kremer (2008); Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote (2009); Goux and Maurin (2007), Hanushek,
Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003); Hoxby (2000); Hoxby and Weingarth (2005)), others find no
evidence of peer effects or occasional negative effects from increases in mean achievement or
socioeconomics status of one’s peer group (Sanbonmatsu, Kling, Duncan, and Brooks-Gunn (2006);
Kang (2007); Angrist and Lang (2004); Carrell, Davis, Sacerdote, and West (2010)).
To reconcile the general consensus that peers matter, with the elusive nature of measuring
exactly how, in this paper we take a primitive view of social interactions using insights from
neoclassical economics. Modelling the endogneity of contacts within narrowly defined social
settings we posit the existence of a ‘market for peers’ analogous to a traditional labor market. In
the spirit of Becker (1965), agents derive utility from final goods produced by combining time and
market inputs. Production of final goods, however, occurs in peer groups, which we cast as firms
in a two sector Roy model (Roy (1951)). Our focus is on equilibria in which the effect of peers is
2Manski (1993) partitions the space of social interactions into three categories: endogenous effects, exogenous
effects, and correlated effects. Endogenous effects occur when an individual’s behavior is directly influenced by that of
her peers. Exogenous (or contextual) effects occur when individual behavior is influenced by group composition or
neighborhood characteristics. Correlated effects are present when individual and group behavior are related because
peers share similar traits. We will not attempt to distinguish these important channels. In what follows, all of these
categories interact to determine behavior through an equilibrium mechanism.
3Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Berman (2000), and Iannaccone (1992) are notable exceptions.
4See Durlauf (2004) for a careful review of the literature on peer effects in education, crime, welfare participation,
and health.
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mediated through an implicit price mechanism akin to Becker (1973); an agent’s contribution to
group production determines the share of output she receives.
With the emergence of distinct sectors within social markets, heterogeneity in ability leads
individuals to select sectors based on comparative advantage. We characterize equilibria under
two different assumptions: (i) industry production functions are concave in labor inputs, (ii)
production functions are convex. Since the number of complexities to generalize the model is only
bounded by one’s ability to reinterpret variables from classical price theory, we limit the model
to these basic characteristics. It would be relatively straightforward to extend the basic model to
allow for many sectors and n-dimensional skill (Heckman and Scheinkman (1987)), as well as
hierarchies and endogenous group size (Rosen (1982)), and apply the results from those papers
to the study of social interactions through our approach.5 It is important to emphasize at the
outset that there are no intrinsic externalities built into the model. While we show the same basic
results hold when the selection problem is introduced to a standard ‘social multiplier’ model in
B.3, in the main text we focus attention on how endogenous sorting alone can also reconcile the
conflicting empirical evidence aluded to above.
When comparative advantage is the guiding principle of peer group organization, the effect
of moving a student to an environment with higher-achieving peers is an equilibrium sorting
outcome. An individual’s behavior depends on where in the new distribution she lands, and
on the effective ‘wages’ that clear the social market. Put differently, selection into peer group
roles is determined by the intersection of supply and demand for various skills; and peer effects
are obtained through market prices. Thus, peer quality might be a source of linear or non-
linear, positive, or even negative influences. If the demand function is approximately linear, for
instance, the model predicts mean peer quality to exhibit positive and linear effects. Conversely,
if production is subject to diminishing marginal returns, the model predicts estimates of peer
effects to differ in size and magnitude depending on the location of the initial equilibrium, and
the nature of the ability distribution. In this sense, the model can rationalize the widely varying
5Other possible extensions would allow individuals to invest in human capital (see Becker (1964); Ben-Porath
(1967); Rosen (1972)), or to search for a peer group within and across sectors (Jovanovic (1979a,b); Miller (1984); Neal
(1999)). To understand the implications of the sorting of individuals into groups when membership is costly and
benefits depend monotonically on group composition see Cutler and Glaeser (1997).
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results on peer effects found in the empirical literature without appealing to externalities.6
Moreover, our Roy model of social interactions has implications for the identification of peer
effects. Since social wages and a student’s comparative advantage are typically unobserved, key
determinants of individual choice operate through the error term. Moreover, these unobservables
may vary only on the school or neighborhood level and will, even under random assignment,
be correlated with the regressor of interest (e.g., poverty rates, or the mean behavior of other
students). Therefore, identification of neighborhood and peer effects may be more difficult than
Manski (1993) describes—one not only has to solve the reflection problem and deal with the
systematic sorting of individuals into social settings, but one must also account for the presence of
group level unobservables that determine behavior. Even if individual behavior were to depend
directly on the group mean, we show that if contacts within social markets are endogenous, then
the parameters of interest are usually not identified.
Finally, we provide evidence consistent with our model’s key prediction: Since similar indi-
viduals facing the same social wages have a common comparative advantage, all else equal, a
student’s propensity to act-out should be correlated with her ordinal rank in the ability distri-
bution. Using two data sources, New York City Public Schools administrative records (NYCPS)
and the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), we demonstrate that, ceteris paribus,
individuals’ academic rank significantly affects the probability of exhibiting serious problem
behaviors. In the NYCPS data, which contain information on the same students gathered at
multiple points in time, we exploit transitions from elementary school (5th grade) to middle school
(6th grade) to estimate that a fifty percentile decrease as opposed to a fifty percentile increase in
rank among schoolmates (presumably from moving to a different school with more academically
able peers) is associated with roughly a five percentage point increase in the probability of a
serious behavioral incident (over a baseline of about 0.08). In doing so, we are able to control for
student specific determinants of behavior, but not for systematic choice of school. To account for
systematic sorting into schools, we use a student’s hypothetical change in rank if they attended
their zoned school (i.e. the default school based on their physical address) as an instrument for
6Additionally, there is the potential for multiple equilibria when social production exhibits increasing marginal
returns to scale. While increasing marginal returns have formed the basis of a ‘social multiplier’ in settings with a
single activity (Becker and Murphy (2000); Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003)), the selection problem induced
by competing activities means that changes in peer ability may have ambigious effects on individual behavior.
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actual change in rank based on the school they choose to attend. This approach supports our
findings.
Our second dataset is the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS). NELS allows us
to relate a student’s behavior in different classrooms to a proxy for her course specific rank. We
show that a fifty percentile decline in rank across subjects is associated with a ten percentage
points higher probability that the teacher reports behavioral problems in the course for which she
has the lower rank (over a baseline of about 0.40).
While these data are inconsistent with models that predict peer quality to exhibit positive
monotonic externalities, we urge the reader to interpret our findings with two important caveats.
First, as mentioned above, the estimates are not well identified peer effects. Second, models which
predict negative peer externalities (e.g., smarter peers may decrease achievement) might also be
consistent with our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops our formal model,
provides conditions that can explain the widely varying estimates found in the literature, and
explores the implications of the comparative advantage approach for predicting the efficacy of
social programs ex ante. Section 3.3 discusses identification of peer effects in the presence of
comparative advantage, and shows evidence from two large data sets that is consistent with our
model. Section 3.4 concludes. There are two appendices. Appendix B describes the data used
in our analysis and how we construct our samples. Appendix B.3 shows how our approach is
equivalent to a traditional social multiplier framework that allows for multiple social activities.
3.2 The Market for Peers
3.2.1 A Roy Model of Social Interactions
The economic model we propose in this section is a simplified version of the well-known multi-
sector choice problem, and builds upon impressive literatures designed to understand the evo-
lution of earnings, the (hedonic) pricing of skills, and the assignment of workers to firms (e.g.,
Ben-Porath (1967); Heckman and Scheinkman (1987); Heckman and Sedlacek (1985); Murphy
(1986); Rosen (1974, 1982, 1983); Roy (1951); Sattinger (1979, 1993); Tinbergen (1956); Willis and
Rosen (1979)). The novelty in our approach lies in the application of these classic methods to
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develop a theory of social interactions where contacts within a social market are endogenous
and peer quality does not act as a direct externality. The paper most similar to ours is Heckman
and Sedlacek (1985), who develop an equilibrium model of self-selection in the labor market. We
extend Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) by considering the case of increasing returns to scale on
the industry level, but we cannot implement their empirical exercise because we observe neither
‘social wages’ nor individuals’ choices of sectors directly.
A. The Basic Building Blocks
Let there be a continuum of agents with unit mass. Every agent is endowed with one unit of
(non-transferable) time. There are two activities in which agents can engage with their peers:
studying or mischief. These activities are exclusive and undertaken by separate social groups in
one of two sectors: ‘nerds’ and ‘troublemakers’. Each sector, indexed by j ∈ {N, T}, combines
the effective units of its members’ time with another input we label ‘capital’ according to a
general, twice continuously differentiable industry production function Fj
(
Lj,Kj, Aj
)
. Let Aj
denote a technology shifter, such as school or neighborhood quality, or the quantity of policing. Lj
represents the total supply of effective labor units to sector j, and Kj denotes the supply of effective
capital. We allow capital to broadly represent any non-human input into groups’ production (e.g.,
textbooks, sharp scissors, but also labor market conditions, or expectations thereof).
Agents are heterogenous along two dimensions. Their varying size and strength yield differ-
ences in the ability to cause trouble, whereas heterogeneity in cognitive ability implies differences
in their ability to be a true nerd. Let the continuous function σN(i) : [0, 1] → R+ denote the
effective units of ‘nerdiness’ that agent i is capable of contributing to the group (e.g., expertise in
differential geometry). Analogously, agent i’s troublemaking ability is given by σT(i) : [0, 1] → R+.
We assume that agents are solely interested in maximizing their social income
U (i) = max {σN(i)wN , σT (i)wT} , (3.1)
where wN and wT are the market clearing wages for effective units of nerd and troublemaking labor,
respectively. As in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985); Welch (1969); Heckman and Scheinkman (1987),
earnings follow the linear in characteristics approach developed by Gorman (1980); Lancaster
(1966). Note that there are no explicit peer externalities built into agent’s utility. That is, given
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wN and wT, the behavior of one’s peers has no influence on own decisions. In section 3.2.4, we
relax this assumption and allow for more general utility functions. Here, however, we show how
sorting into peer groups alone can produce ‘peer effects’.
Individuals maximize their social income by choosing either the nerd or troublemaking sector
according to a simple cut-off rule (Roy (1951)). Let σ (i) ≡ σN(i)σT(i) denote agent i’s skill as a nerd
relative to that as a troublemaker, and order agents such that σ′(i) ≥ 0. The agent indifferent
between the two sectors, i∗, has a skill ratio of
σ (i∗) =
wT
wN
. (3.2)
All individuals with index i ≥ i∗ join forces with the nerds, and individuals with i < i∗ become
troublemakers. In our price theory of social interactions, comparative (rather than absolute)
advantage determines an individual’s choice of sector.
By individual optimization and market clearing, labor supply to both sectors is given by:
L∗N =
ˆ 1
i∗
σN (s) ds (3.3)
L∗T =
ˆ i∗
0
σT (s) ds. (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) characterize the supply side in the market for peers. Equilibrium,
however, also depends on the demand side, and therefore on the shape of the industry production
functions. Below, we consider cases in which production is concave or convex in labor inputs.
B. Concavity in Labor Inputs
In the theory of the firm, it is typically assumed that labor exhibits diminishing returns to scale on
the firm as well as the industry level. If, for instance, increasing the number of troublemakers does
more to increase the probability of getting caught than of winning a fight, then the production
function in the troublemaking sector will be concave in LT.7 In equilibrium, competition in the
7This holds for effective units, regardless of the number of participants. A brilliant student answering all of the
questions or a talented athlete hogging the ball might be an example of many effective units concentrated in a single
person diminishing the marginal social product for others.
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market for peers ensures that nerd and troublemaking labor are paid their marginal products:
wj =
∂
∂L
Fj
(
L∗j ,Kj, Aj
)
. (3.5)
With free entry into both the nerd and troublemaking sectors, individual peer groups earn zero
profits. That is, all output is divided among group members.8
Substituting (3.5) into (3.2), market clearing yields the equilibrium condition
δ (i∗) ≡
∂
∂LFT(LT(i
∗),KT, AT)
∂
∂LFN(LN (i
∗) ,KN , AN)
= σ (i∗) , (3.6)
where δ (i) : [0, 1] → R+ denotes the ratio of marginal products in both sectors when the threshold
index separating sectors is i. Since δ′ (i) ≤ 0 for all i, the ‘relative demand curve’ in the market for
peers is (weakly) downward sloping.9 To see this, note that equations (3.3) and (3.4) respectively
imply dLNdi < 0 and
dLT
di > 0 ; and concavity of the industry production functions causes the ratio
of marginal products to decrease as labor shifts from the nerd into the troublemaking sector. We
can now describe equilibrium graphically.
Figure 3.1 shows equilibrium in the basic model when production in both sectors is concave
in labor inputs. As described above, it features downward sloping demand and upward sloping
supply. There is a unique equilibrium at i∗ with market clearing relative prices, w
T
wN
∗
, determined
by the intersection of supply and demand. All individuals with i < i∗ select into the troublemaker
sector and individuals with i ≥ i∗ choose to be nerds.
Suppose there is a shift in troublemaking technology—less police surveillance or an increase
in the availability of weapons—holding everything else constant. An increase in troublemaking
technology is represented by an outward shift of the δ-schedule in Figure 3.1, which results in
higher relative wages for troublemakers and fewer nerds. A decrease in troublemaking technology
has the opposite effect: an inward shift of the δ-schedule, a decrease in the relative wages of
troublemakers, and an increase in the number of agents who choose to become nerds.
8Assuming identical peer groups within sectors, the number of groups adjusts such that f j
(
lj, kj, aj
)
= cj, where cj
is the fixed cost of operating in sector j, and lower case symbols denote the group level analog of their upper case
counterparts.
9Technically a demand curve gives the quantity demanded at a particular price, all else equal. δ (i), however,
denotes the marginal individual consistent with a certain wage ratio. Therefore, δ should more appropriately be
thought of as a demand side equilibrium schedule.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium with Diminishing Marginal Product in Both Social Sectors
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Figure 3.2: The Effect of Higher Peer Quality when Marginal Product is Diminishing in Both Sectors
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A) Contraction of Nerd Sector B) Expansion of Nerd Sector
Comparative statics with respect to the skill disribution, however, can be more counterintuitive.
Consider, for instance, an increase in nerd skill among the population holding troublemaking
skills fixed. First, an increase in agents’ nerdiness shifts the supply curve inward (from σ(i) to
σ(i)′). Second, the demand curve shifts outwards (from δ (i) to δ (i)′ ) due to the fact that with
more academically able peers there will be more efficiency units of nerd skill supplied at any i.
While both shifts lead to an unambigous rise in the relative wage of troublemakers, the effect on
quantities in indeterminate.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the situation. In Panel A, the wage from being a nerd drops more rapidly
with effective labor in the sector, leading to a larger outward shift of δ(i)′, which is one factor
contributing to the overall contraction in the nerd sector. The other contributing factor is that the
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increase in nerd skill comes disproportionately from the upper end of the distribution, so that
the expansion in δ is larger at the upper end of the distribution10, and the intersection of the two
curves is therefore further to the right. In Panel B, social wages are less responsive to sector labor
supply, and the increase in skill is more concentrated to the left of the initial equilibrium. While
counterintuitive, an overall increase in the nerd skills actually yields an expansion in the size of
the nerd sector.
C. Convexity in Labor Inputs
As discussed above, the assumption that the marginal utility of a social activity is increasing in
overall participation has been the focus of much of the work on social interactions. Study groups
allow students to benefit from division of labor on a lab project, and ensure individual students
do not waste time stuck on a question to which someone else in the group knows the answer
(Lazear (2001)). More troublemakers at a school can divert teachers’ attention and thereby reduce
others’ probability of punishment (Dipasquale and Glaeser (1998)). We now consider the nature
of equilibria when there are two social sectors characterized by such complementarities.
One way to reconcile increasing returns to scale on the industry level with the existence of
many firms in a competitive market is the concept of external increasing returns to scale pioneered
by Marshall (1890) and formalized by Ethier (1982b,a). The key idea is that individual firms
are price takers and produce subject to diminishing marginal returns, but their activities exhibit
positive externalities strong enough to cause marginal returns on the industry level to increase.
Suppose, for instance, that the size of the market or the cost of production depend on the number
of firms—say, because more firms invest in a new, more efficient technology—and that firms fail
to internalize this spill-over effect. Then, production might exhibit increasing returns to scale
at the industry level, but decreasing marginal returns at the firm level (Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1989)). Another example of external economies, due to Marshall (1890), are advances in
“trade-knowledge” which might be hard to keep secret from firms within the same industry.11
10Note that effective labor in the nerd sector is integrated on [i∗, 1], so that the shift in δ will be larger for any i∗ the
more concentrated a given increase in the distribution of σN is in the upper end of the distribution.
11Starting with Arrow (1962); Ethier (1982b), externalities have often been used to model equilibria in which firms
compete against each other in the presence of increasing returns to scale. Romer (1986, 1987); Lucas (1988); Prescott
and Boyd (1987), for instance, demonstrate the importance of knowledge accumulation and specialization for economic
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In the market for peers we assume that production is concave on the peer group level, but
convex on that of the industry. The activities of one large troublemaker group might be harder to
coordinate than those of a smaller one leading to a higher risk of getting caught for any individual
member. However, more troublemakers at a school can divert teachers’ attention and thereby
reduce others’ probability of punishment. Yet, the inability to coordinate efficiently precludes
individual groups from becoming too large and reaping the full benefits of increasing returns to
scale at the industry level.12 Therefore, there exist multiple independent peer groups within a
sector, each of which takes the size of the industry as well as the prevailing wages as given.
Assuming that the industry production function is convex in labor adds one additional wrinkle.
Since peer groups do not take the positive externalities of their hiring decisions into account, the
marginal product of labor is smaller on the group than on the industry level. Thus, in equilibrium,
wages cannot equal the marginal product of labor for the whole industry. Instead, under free
entry into the market for peers, a zero-profit condition determines equilibrium wages. As in the
case of concave production, we assume that all industry output goes to the agents in the particular
sector.13
Let profits in sector j be given by
πj = Fj
(
Lj,Kj, Aj
)
− wjLj. (3.7)
Assuming Fj
(
0,Kj, Aj
)
= 0 for all Kj and Aj, equation (3.7) directly implies a wage per efficiency
unit equal to
wj =
´ Lj
0
∂
∂LFj
(
s,Kj, Aj
)
ds
Lj
≡
∂
∂L
Fj
(
Lj,Kj, Aj
)
growth. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) argue that increasing retruns in the form of aggregate demand spill-overs
might explain why some countries appear to be stuck in a unindustrialized equilibrium. Krugman (1991) shows how
increasing returns to scale shape economic geography. In the literature on international trade external increasing
returns to scale have, for instance, been used to explain the pattern of trade between developed countries (see Helpman
(1984); Krugman (1991) reviews). For a model of trade in which returns to scale are internal to firms see Krugman
(1979).
12See Becker and Murphy (1992) on the trade-off between returns to scale due to specialization and coordination
costs.
13The following derivations do not depend on the absence of profits in equilibrium. An alternative assumption
leaving our conclusions essentially unaffected would be that labor is compensated with a fixed share of revenues.
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where ∂∂Lj Fj
(
Lj,Kj, Aj
)
denotes the the average marginal product of labor on the industry level.14
Market clearing implies
σ (i∗) =
wT
wN
=
∂
∂LFT(LT(i
∗),KT, AT)
∂
∂LFN (LN (i
∗) ,KN , AN)
≡ δ (i∗) .
Note that δ
′
(i) ≥ 0 for all i. In words, the convexity assumption implies that the ratio of
marginal products increases as labor flows from the nerd to the troublemaking sector. Thus, under
increasing returns to scale in labor, the ‘relative demand’ schedule is upward sloping.
The existence of relative supply and demand curves that are both upwards-sloping creates the
potential for multiple equilibria as follows.
Proposition 1. There exist at least two equilibria with a positive mass of both nerds and troublemakers if:
(i) δ (0) > σ (0) , δ (1) > σ (1) , and δ (i) < σ (i) for any i ∈ (0, 1) ,
or if
(ii) δ (0) < σ (0) , δ (1) < σ (1) , and δ (i) > σ (i) for any i ∈ (0, 1) .
There exists at least one equilibrium with a positive mass of both nerds and troublemakers, and another one
in which all agents become either nerds or troublemakers if
(iii) δ (1) > σ (1) and δ (i) < σ (i) for any i ∈ (0, 1) ,
or if
(iv) δ (0) < σ (0) and δ (i) > σ (i) for any i ∈ (0, 1) .
Proof. By continuity of δ and σ the proof follows immediately from the Intermediate Value
Theorem and by recognizing that if δ (1) ≥ σ (1) or δ (0) ≤ σ (0) a corner solution may obtain.
Figure 3.3 depicts a scenario in which increasing marginal product yields multiple equlibria—
at the origin, i∗, and i∗′. Only equilibria in which the ‘demand curve’ intersects the ‘supply curve’
from above are locally stable. To see this, consider the adjustment process following a small
14Since firms within a sector take wages as given and compete for labor, wages are also equal to the marginal
product of labor on the firm level. In equilibrium the number of firms must adjust such that each of them earns zero
profits.
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Figure 3.3: Multiple Equilibria when Marginal Product is Increasing in Sector Labor Supply
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shock to wages. From the initial equilibrium at i∗, a small decrease in relative wages (along the
δ-schedule) will lead to labor flowing out of the troublemaking and into the nerd sector, which will
cause relative wages to decline further and lead to even more agents switching sectors. The process
continues until the market reaches a new equilibrium at the origin. Conversely, a small increase in
wages (along the δ-schedule) will lead to labor flowing into the troublemaking sector. This causes
relative wages to increase even more, thereby inducing more nerds to become troublemakers until
the market reaches equilibrium at i∗′. Similar reasoning shows that the equilibrium at i∗′ is stable.
Given the existence of multiple equilibria, our model may rationalize starkly different behaviors
of agents in observationally similar markets.15
The case of convex production is closely related to models of a ‘social multiplier’ (Becker and
Murphy (2000); Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003)). In these models, social spillover
effects arise because an individual’s marginal utility from taking a particular action is assumed
to increase in the number of agents in her reference group who behave in the same way. In our
model, an agent’s productivity increases as others join the same sector, which raises her wage and
thereby the net utility gain from choosing this sector. In symbols:
d
dLj
(
wjσj (i)− wj′σj′ (i)
)
=[
∂
∂Lj
(
∂
∂Lj
Fj
(
Lj,Kj, Aj
))
σj (i)−
∂
∂Lj′
(
∂
∂Lj′
Fj′
(
Lj′ ,Kj′ , Aj′
)) dLj′
dLj
σj′ (i)
]
> 0
for j 6= j′. That is, the net utility from choosing sector j over j′ increases in the amount of labor
employed in j. Our theory could thus be interpreted as providing alternative micro-foundations
for the assumption of increasing marginal utility16. Here, however, the ability to sort into social
sectors has the potential to obfuscate the complementarity between individual and group behavior.
3.2.2 Reinterpreting the Peer Effects Literature Through the Lens of a Roy Model
There is a large literature on peer effects in schools, neighborhoods, and other venues in which indi-
viduals interact. Surprisingly, research designs which exploit experimental and quasi-experimental
15When the marginal product for one social sector is increasing while the other is decreasing, the relative demand
schedule may alternate between sloping upwards and downwards.
16In B.3 we show our core results hold when introducing a second social activity to a general social multiplier
model.
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variation often point in conflicting directions with comparable samples. In this section we show
that our Roy model of social interactions is flexible enough to reconcile the seemingly disparate
evidence. Put differently, we show that a model in which ‘peer effects’ are due to the systematic
sorting of individuals within social markets can produce the disparate empirical patterns that
have emerged in spite of (quasi) random assignment to social markets. In our stylized setting,
when we use the term ‘peer effects’, we are referring to the change in individuals’ association with
troublemakers or nerds. In order to discuss their measured academic perfomance it is helpful to
think of the troublemakers as spending substanially less social time studying.
We divide the empirical literature on peer effects into four mutually exclusive categories:
analyses that report no significant peer effects, effects which are homogenous and positive (i.e.
smarter peers increase achievement for everyone to the same extent), effects that are heterogeneous
across the skill distribution, but nonetheless still positive, and analyses that find negative peer
effects.
In what follows we assume that production functions are concave in labor inputs and provide
sufficient conditions for our model to reconcile the findings of various studies.17 We do not
attempt to explain every nuance in the empirical literature on peer effects. For sure, there exist
several competing models all of which can explain some aspect in isolation. Our goal is to show
how our Roy model can reconcile broad but seemingly disparate findings in a parsimonious
fashion.
A. No Peer Effects
One strand of the literature finds evidence of negligible peer effects (Angrist and Lang (2004);
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2005); Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992); Lefgren (2004); Lyle (2007);
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006)). Angrist and Lang (2004) evaluate Boston’s Metco program,
which buses minority students from high poverty neighborhoods in Boston to wealthier suburban
schools. Their results indicate that, although the new Metco students are on average lower
achieving, the change in peer group induced by these students does not affect test scores of
elementary and middle school students in the suburban schools. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2005)
17Conducting a similar analysis for the case of convex production functions yields more ‘degrees of freedom’ due to
the potential for multiple equilibria.
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analyze roughly fifteen thousand students who applied to nineteen schools through the Chicago
Public Schools choice program. Using data from lotteries, their results imply that the academic
impact of attending a new school with higher-performing peers is negligible.
Using solely the lens and language of our model, this implies that the marginal student, i∗,
in these settings remains the same notwithstanding a change in peer group composition. Hence,
the choice of sector for all other individuals does not change as well. To see why this might be
the case in practice, consider Boston’s Metco program (Angrist and Lang (2004)). A potential
explanation for the lack of peer effects in this study is that Metco students are few relative to
non-Metco ones and of lower academic ability. Despite the fact that average ability declines and
both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ curves shift downward, the impact of Metco students on relative
wages is likely small. As the relative ability of their non-Metco peers remains the same, our model
predicts that almost none of them change sectors, leading to negligible peer effects.
Figure 3.4 illustrates this point. Imagine an increase in the number of Metco students, which
shifts the supply curve downward from σ to σ′, and the demand side equilibrium schedule
from δ inward to δ′. Notice, large shifts only occur to the left of the initial equilibrium. More
generally, note that a downward shift in the σ curve induces an inward shift of the δ curve, that
while unambiguously lowering the relative wage for troublemaking, may leave the marginal i∗
unchanged.
B. Homogeneous Positive Effects
Another portion of the peer effects literature finds that individual achievement increases at a
constant rate with respect to mean peer quality. Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003)
show, in a large matched panel data set of third through sixth graders in Texas public schools,
that a one standard deviation increase in mean peer test score results in a .20 standard deviation
increase in own test scores. Hoxby (2000) uses year to year variation in class-level gender and race
composition; finding effects that range from .15 to .40 points for every one point increase in the
class mean reading score.18
Through the lens of our model, this implies that a constant fraction of individuals shift sectors
18Other contributions in this vein include Boozer and Caciola (2001), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Kang (2007), and
Goux and Maurin (2007).
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Figure 3.4: METCO: The Effect of Lowering Academic Quality at the Bottom of the Distribution.
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Figure 3.5: Constant and Positive Effect of Average Ability on Sector Membership
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for every one unit increase in peers’ mean test score. Figure 3.5 shows an example in which peer
effects would operate linearly. In this example, the supply schedule (i.e. the distribution of relative
ability) shifts almost parallel close to the initial equilibrium. Furthermore, the demand curve has
constant negative slope around the initial equilibrium and is relatively unresponsive to shifts labor
supply. Therefore, changes in peer ability lead to relatively small changes in relative wages, and a
constant fraction of individuals switch sectors—resulting in constant linear peer effects.19
An explanation along these lines may partially explain the results of Hoxby (2000). As Hoxby
(2000) identifies peer effects through plausibly random variation in gender and race composition
in classrooms, it may be reasonable to assume that, over the relevant range, the ability distribution
shifts one-to-one with its mean. Moreover, given the limited variation in cohorts’ gender and racial
composition, the demand schedule might be approximately linear in a neighborhood around the
initial equilibrium.
C. Heterogeneous Positive Peer Effects
A third category of the literature describes positive, but non-linear peer effects. Hoxby and
Weingarth (2005), for instance, exploit a desegregation program in Wake County, NC, which
produces exogenous changes in classroom peer groups. They find that based on a linear-in-
means model a student’s test score is expected to increase .25 standard deviations given a 1
standard deviation increase in peers’ mean score. However, when they allow their results to differ
depending on the decile of peer performance, they find that students benefit more from peers
with an achievement level similar to theirs. For example, students in the bottom decile benefit
most from the addition of students in the second and third deciles (a 10% increase in peers at the
15th percentile increases their performance by .19 standard deviations more than an additional
10% of students in the 8th decile).
Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009) investigate peer effects among freshmen at the Air Force
Academy who are randomly assigned to squadrons. They show that a one standard deviation
increase in peers’ average verbal SAT score results in a .565 standard deviation increase in freshman
fall GPA for students in the bottom third of the expected achievement distribution compared to
.361 and .312 for those in the middle and top third.
19We emphasize that the conditions we provide in the text are sufficient, but in no way necessary.
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Figure 3.6: Reconciling Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with the Comparative Advantage Approach
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Using Census data, Crane (1991) shows that the fraction of high-status workers in a neighbor-
hood is negatively related to the likelihood of teen pregnancy and dropping out of school. These
effects are much stronger in areas with the lowest levels of high-status workers.20
Figure 3.6 considers a scenario consistent with the results of Crane (1991) under the auspices
of our model. The left panel depicts the situation in a neighborhood with a large number of high
achievers (e.g., nerds in the language of the previous section). An increase in the presence of
highly skilled individuals (shifting σ to σ′) marginally decreases i∗. The right panel features an
identical inward shift of the supply curve, but a substantially larger increase in the nerd sector.
20Similar non-linear peer effects are found in Burke and Sass (2008), Cooley (2010), Ding and Lehrer (2007), Duflo et
al. (2008), Figlio (2007), Imberman et al. (2009), Zimmer and Toma (2000), and Zimmerman (2003).
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The heterogenous effects for a given change in supply are due to the confluence of a concave
relative demand curve, so that demand is more ‘elastic’ in Panel B, and that the initial size of the
nerd sector is smaller. Thus the shift in relative supply is actually larger in the neighborhood of
the marginal i∗. Taken together, these structural differences in market for peers yields markedly
different behavioral responses to an identical change in skill composition.
D. Heterogeneous, Negative Peer Effects
In stark contrast to the previously mentioned studies, a nascent literature provides credible
evidence of incidents in which achievement declines in peer quality. Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt
(2009) use a sample of over a million students taking British age-14 tests to examine peer effects
in English high schools. Exploiting the fact that students in their sample enter high school, and
thus encounter a peer group that is 87% new on average, they demonstrate that peer effects are
different for boys and girls. Girls are positively affected by peers in the top 5% (.07 standard
deviation for a 10% increase) while boys are negatively affected (-.05 standard deviations). For
boys, the negative effects are strongest among those at the top of the achievement distribution.
Based on the non-linear results in Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009); Carrell, Davis, Sacerdote,
and West (2010) implemented an experiment at the US Air Force Academy aimed at increasing the
GPA of incoming freshmen who were predicted to score in the bottom tercile of the achievement
distribution. To achieve this goal, squadrons in the treatment group were negatively sorted, while
the composition of those in the control group continued to be random. Yet, the experiment did
not have the intended effect: students in the treatment group projected to score in the bottom
tercile of the distribution (the students the experiment was designed to help) experienced a .05
point decline in GPA compared to their counterparts in the control group. At the same time, the
students in the bottom tercile who were randomly assigned to squadrons in the control group
continued to experience GPA gains in squadrons with a higher fraction of academically talented
cadets.
One possible explanation for these perplexing results is illustrated in Figure 3.7. In Panel A, we
consider a candidate relative supply distribution σ′ when a squadron has a high fraction of high
achieving cadets due to random assignment. Compared to the marginal distribution of the cohort
in bold lines, the higher fraction of cadets with high scores is due random assignment comes from
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Figure 3.7: Reconciling Results from Carrell et al. (2010) with the Comparative Advantage Approach
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a reduction in the fraction of students from both the middle and bottom of the distribution. The
resulting equilibrium consists of a higher fraction of nerds in the squadron. The scores of those
at the bottom of the distribution improves due to either some actually associating with nerds,
or due to the fact that that their fellow troublemakers are more academically inclined. When
squadrons are arranged according to negative sorting, on the other hand, there is an increase in
the fraction of students from both the top and bottom tercile, as the distribution becomes S-shaped
when the middle tercile is removed. This mean-preserving spread of the distribution has relative
demands at the boundaries equal to the marginal distribution, but is much flatter in the interior.
Instead of exposing the more academically disadvantaged peers to talented study partners, the
intra-squadron social dynamics result in greater isolation from them.
Another striking example of peer effects in this category comes from the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) experiment which provided housing vouchers for families in high poverty neighborhoods
in Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City to relocate to lower poverty neighborhoods
(Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005); Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2007)). Evaluations of MTO show that
female youth were affected positively by living in an ostensibly better neighborhood. Relative to
the control group, female youth are 6.9% less likely to have ever had anxiety symptoms, are 9.1%
less likely to have consumed alcohol during the past month, and have .08 fewer lifetime arrests
for violent crimes. In contrast, male youth are affected negatively. Relative to the control group,
male youth are 8.7% more likely to have had serious nonsports accidents, are 10.3% more likely to
have smoked during the past month, and have .15 more lifetime arrests for property crimes.
Our model would predict the findings in MTO if relative wages increased (compared to the old
neighborhood) for boys, but decreased for girls. Figure 3.8 depicts shifts of the supply and demand
curves which could produce such a result. The top two panels refer to boys and the bottom two
to girls. The panels on the left illustrate the conditions in the pre-treatment neighborhood and the
panels on the right demonstrate an equilibrium in the treatment neighborhood. The set of students
who switch sectors is bounded by i∗, the marginal individual in the old neighborhood, and by i˜, the
counterfactual marginal individual given the relative wages in the new environment. In moving to
the new neighborhood there are two opposing effects on the relative demand schedule. The nerdier
population tends to shift the δ-schedule outwards, while at the same time greater educational
resources and supervision in the new neighborhood increase the relative returns to studying,
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Figure 3.8: Reconciling Results from Moving To Opportunity with the Comparative Advantage Approach
a) Boys, Old Neighborhood b) Boys, New Neighborhood
c) Girls, Old Neighborhood d) Girls, New Neighborhood
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which would shift the δ-schedule inwards. In contrast to models that predict a positive influence
from the new environment, here the direction of the treatment effect is determined by the net
effect on social wages.
In Figure 3.8 the inward shift in supply by going from one environment to the other is the
same for boys and girls. That is, boys and girls in the experimental group face the same set of
smarter peers after they move. If, however, the relative demand curve for girls shifts sufficiently
far inward to overcome the outward shift in relative supply, then relative equilibrium wages move
in opposite directions. A smaller shift in the demand curve for boys could be caused by multiple
factors. If the nerd production function for girls is less concave with respect to labor, they will
be less likely to be competed out of the group in an environment with greater effective supply.
Conversely, if the troublemaking production function for boys is more concave with respect to
labor, the very force that kept them from making trouble in their old neighborhood will raise the
relative return to doing so in the new neighborhood where such skills are scarce. Alternatively
(not depicted in the figure), it could have been the case that for boys the ability distributions
between the old and new neighborhood differ sufficiently much for the supply shift to dominate,
whereas for girls the inward demand shift might outweigh the change in relative supply.
3.2.3 Predicting the Efficacy of Social Interventions in the Presence of Comparative
Advantage
The fundamental problem our model highlights is that the treatment effect of a social environment
is an endogenous process that is determined after any potentially random assignment to a
neighborhood, classroom, etc. Without observing social wages ex ante, there is no sure way of
determining which of the conditions outlined above will hold before a program commences.
Ultimately, an intervention’s effect depends on production technologies, group specific capital,
skill distributions, and the resulting market clearing prices, all of which are generally unobserved.
Thus, it may seem that our theory has no ex ante predictions. This is only partially correct. Our
model suggests a heuristic that can potentially help policy makers predict outcomes of small scale
interventions that do not change equilibrium prices.
Using the lens of comparative advantage, if a policy maker is interested in predicting the
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behavior of a child after moving to a new neighborhood, a new school, or new classroom, then the
relevant statistic is the behavior of children with the same characteristics in the new environment.
The reason is simple: children with similar characteristics will likely have a common comparative
advantage and can be expected to behave similarly when facing the same social wages.
The challenge is to find a way to compare agents across markets. Let Θj denote the set
of individual characteristics which determine sectoral choice with intervention j. In a school
intervention this may include, for example, test scores or a disciplinary record; in a neighborhood
intervention height, weight, and motivation may be relevant characteristics. If one can identify Θj
before an intervention commences, then students can be matched across social markets and the
heuristic is straightforward.
Consider a few thought experiments. If Θj is test scores, then one can compare individuals
across cities based on their prior scores. If Θj is ‘innate ability’, methods developed in Hansen,
Heckman, and Mullen (2004) to extract measures of ability can be used to match individuals with
the same ability across markets. If Θj involves non-cognitive skills such as those psychologists
often refer to as “The Big Five”—Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and
Emotional Stability (e.g., Digman (1990))—one can develop pre-intervention surveys along these
dimensions and match students on these five measures. Difficulties, however, arise when we have
no theory or empirical evidence to inform Θj. In this case, one might use administrative or survey
data to match on as many variables as possible, recognizing that the prediction will have more
noise.
Assuming Θj is in hand, and that we can calculate a measure of relative skill, σ(i), the
prediction from our heuristic is directly related to traditional program evaluations. Let Y (i) be an
indicator variable equal to one if individual i chooses to be a nerd (and zero otherwise) in the old
environment, and let Y (i)′ denote i’s choice in the new environment. Then the average treatment
effect from manipulating the environment for all i is equal to
ATE = E
[
Y (i)′ −Y (i)
]
= i∗ − i∗′,
where i∗ and i∗′ denote the marginal individual in the old and new environment, respectively. In
words, the average treatment effect is simply the fraction of individuals who switch sectors.
Interpreting our model more loosely, one could also think of outcomes (Y0,Y1) which are
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different from an agent’s actual choice of sector, but nevertheless depend on it. For instance, let
Y1 (i|Ξ) denote i’s test score (conditional on environmental variables Ξ) if i chooses to be a nerd,
whereas Y0 (i|Ξ) is her potential outcome as a troublemaker. In this case, the average treatment
effect from transplanting a population of unit mass into a new environment characterized by Ξ′ is
ATE =
ˆ min{i∗(Ξ),i∗(Ξ′)}
0
(
Y0
(
s|Ξ′
)
−Y0 (s|Ξ)
)
ds
+ 1{i∗(Ξ)<i∗(Ξ′)}
ˆ i∗(Ξ′)
i∗(Ξ)
(
Y0
(
s|Ξ′
)
−Y1 (s|Ξ)
)
ds+ 1{i∗(Ξ)>i∗(Ξ′)}
ˆ i∗(Ξ)
i∗(Ξ′)
(
Y1
(
s|Ξ′
)
−Y0 (s|Ξ)
)
ds
+
ˆ 1
max{i∗(Ξ),i∗(Ξ′)}
(
Y1
(
i|Ξ′
)
−Y1 (i|Ξ)
)
ds,
where i∗ (·) denotes the marginal individual in a given environment, and 1{·} is an indicator
function equal to one if the condition in braces is satisfied. The first and last row in the equation
above give the change in test scores for those individuals who do not switch sectors, whereas the
middle row denotes the change in the outcome for those agents who do switch sectors (e.g., for
nerds who become troublemakers or vice versa). Even if changing the environment from Ξ to Ξ′
is beneficial in the sense that it raises both Y0 and Y1 for every individual, the average treatment
effect could still be negative if the difference between Y0 and Y1 (conditional on the environment)
is sufficiently large compared to the effect of environmental variables.
3.2.4 An Extension to the Basic Model
In this subsection, we outline an extension to the basic model presented above that recognizes the
tradeoff that may exist between social activities and the ancillary costs or benefits of associating
with a social group. In particular, students may value good grades for their own sake, or for the
higher future standard of living that accompanies graduation. This raises the opportunity cost of
associating with troublemakers, and encourages association with nerds even in the presence of
low social wages.
To fix ideas, one can think of θj as the utility-scaled effect that association with sector j ∈ {N, T}
has on educational achievement or expected future income. To make the analysis tractable, we
assume linearity as well as additive separability in the utility derived from social income and that
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incurred from θj. More specifically, agent i’s utility is given by
U(i) = max
j∈{N,T}
{wjσj (i) + θj}. (3.8)
It follows straightforwardly that agent i will choose to become a troublemaker if and only if
wTσT (i)− wNσN (i) ≥ θN − θT.
In words, for i to join forces with the troublemakers it must be the case that the psychic
benefit from joining, (wTσT (i)− wNσN (i)), outweighs the utility loss due to lower achievement,
(θN − θT).21
More generally, however, equilibrium is determined by the condition:
wT (i
∗) σT (i
∗)− wN (i
∗) σN (i
∗) = θN − θT, (3.9)
where wj (i∗) denotes the equilibrium wage in sector j. From our basic model we know that, given
social wages, the net psychic benefit from being a troublemaker, i.e. the left hand side of equation
(3.9), is decreasing in an individual’s index, whereas the right handside is constant from individual
agents’ point of view. Hence, as before, individuals with index i ≤ i∗ become troublemakers, and
those for whom i > i∗ choose the nerd sector. That is, equilibrium labor supply continues to be
given by equations (3.3) and (3.4), and equilibrium wages will be determined as described above.
If we think of θN − θT as the discounted net difference in future wages due to school-age
social associations, it makes sense discount factor and educational attainment would be positively
correlated.
3.3 Empirical Implications
3.3.1 The Empirical Content of a Roy Model of Social Interactions
In the previous section we have outlined a different way of thinking about social interactions using
sorting and comparative advantage as the guiding principle of peer group organization. In this
21Note that if θN(i∗) ≈ θT(i∗), then agents will base their choice of sector (almost) exclusively on differences in
social income, resembling our basic model. If, for instance, achievement is primarily determined by ability, or playing
video games and bullying equally distract from studying, then it might very well be the case that θN and θT are of
similar maginitude.
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section, we consider the implications of the comparative advantage approach for the identification
of peer effects. In doing so, we follow the literature and assume that there might exist other factors
besides social payoffs that determine the utility of being a troublemaker or a nerd, e.g., personal
and neighborhood characteristics, or the even behavior of one’s peers, as has often been assumed.
We then show how subsequent social group selection based on comparative advantage confounds
identification.
To fix ideas, consider a student’s choice of becoming a troublemaker, T, or a nerd, N. Let
Xi be a set of individual level covariates, and let Zm denote factors varying only at the school,
neighborhood, or market level. The fraction of individuals associating with the troublemakers in
market m is given by ym, and νim represents an error term known to the individual, but not the
econometrician. Intuitively, νim captures all unobserved factors influencing the difference in utility
between T and N. Student i chooses to become a troublemaker if and only if22
u (T;Xi,Zm)− u (N;Xi,Zm) = κ + X
′
iβ0 + Z
′
mγ0 + α0ym + νim ≥ 0. (3.10)
Social wages and individual ability are typically not directly observable. Thus, the comparative
advantage approach can be viewed as providing a more explicit theory of the error term. Following
our theoretical model, decompose νim into the net market payoff from being a troublemaker and
some other random variable:
νim = (wTmσTi − wNmσNi) + ǫi. (3.11)
Note that only ǫi and σji, j ∈ {N, T}, are possibly independent and identically distributed across
individuals, whereas wTm and wNm (both of which are measured in utility units) vary only at the
market or group level. Therefore, our theory stipulates the existence of group level unobservables.
Recall that not all parameters in the binary choice model are identified from cross-sectional
data in the presence of group level unobservables (Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2010);
Brock and Durlauf (2007)). While β0 can be consistently estimated without imposing parametric
assumptions (using methods outlined in Heckman 1990), γ0 and α0—the coefficients of interest in
the majority of applied work—cannot. Nonidentification is due to the fact that νim depends on Zm
22To avoid confusion with our earlier assumption that mean behavior does not directly influence sector choice, note
that the mean behavior in market m, y¯m, is irrelevant for an individual’s choice of sector if α0 is zero.
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and ym in an unknown way. Therefore, only the linear combination of market level observables
and unobservables is identified (see Brock and Durlauf (2007) for a formal argument).
It is important to note that nonidentification as a result of group level unobservables is quite
distinct from endogeneity due to systematic sorting of individuals into social markets (such as
neighborhoods and classrooms), or the reflection problem, which poses that α0 cannot be identified
if Zm and ym are linearly dependent (Manski (1993)).
23 While applied researchers have often
found clever strategies to deal with these two problems, group level unobservables have received
much less attention. However, there are several notable exceptions: Cooley (2007) motivates her
instrument in the presence of unobserved differences in teacher quality. Hoxby (2000) uses panel
data to remove the effect of group level unobservables which do not vary over time; and Graham
(2008) shows how conditional variance restrictions can be used to identify endogenous peer effects
when individual and group level unobservables are uncorrelated.
To appreciate the consequences of group level unobservables, denote i’s observed behavior by
yi =
 1 if u (T;Xi,Zm)− u (N;Xi,Zm) ≥ 00 otherwise ,
and consider the case in which mean behavior does not directly affect an individual’s decision, i.e.
α0 = 0. Assuming that Cov (X∗i , νim) = 0, the Frisch-Waugh Theorem states that the probability
limit of the ordinary least squares estimator of α0 (from regressing yi on Xi, Zm, and ym) equals
plim αˆOLS = α0 +
Cov (y∗m, νim)
Var (y∗m)
=
Cov (y∗m, νim)
Var (y∗m)
,
where y∗m denotes the residual from projecting ym onto Xi and Zm. Only if y
∗
m and νim are
uncorrelated, will αˆOLS be consistent.
Yet, our Roy model of social interactions predicts that Cov (y∗m, νim) > 0. To see this condition
on Xi and Zm and note that, according to (3.10), individual i in social market m chooses to become
a troublemaker if and only if
νim ≥ ξ (Xi,Zm) (3.12)
23If Zm exhibits sufficient variation and γ 6= 0, then the binary choice model of social interactions does not suffer
from the reflection problem, as the limited range of the outcome rules out perfect linear dependence (Brock and Durlauf
2007).
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where ξ (Xi,Zm) ≡ − (κ + X′iβ0 + Z
′
mγ0). Now, decompose νim into the market specific mean
social payoff, vm, and deviations around the mean, v˜im, which are distributed according to some
cumulative distribution function Φm (·). That is, let vim = vm + v˜im. With this notation in hand,
yi = 1 if and only if
v˜im ≥ ξ (Xi,Zm)− vm,
and the fraction of individuals who are troublemakers in market m is equal to
ym = EXi{1−Φm (ξ (Xi,Zm)− vm)}.
Unless Xi and Zm fully determine vm (in which case there is no role for endogenous social
interactions) it will be the case that dy
∗
m
dvm
> 0, as dymdvm > 0. With this caveat in mind, it follows that
Cov (y∗m, νim) > 0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Under the assumptions of our model, a
particular behavior will be more prevalent in markets in which the social net payoff to it is
higher.24 It follows that although mean behavior may not be a direct determinant of behavior, i.e.
α0 = 0, linear-in-means estimates will be biased toward finding this form of peer effects—even
under random assignment to social markets and if one resolves the reflection problem.
It is not the case, however, that estimates of peer effects are necessarily upward biased. Suppose,
for instance, that ym denotes mean test scores in social market m. Even if mean test scores were
a sufficient statistics for the whole ability distribution, we would not be able to determine the
covariance between y∗m and νim without imposing further structure on the relationship between
the fraction of troublemakers and residual academic achievement. It is still the case, however, that
α0 and γ0 are not identified due to the presence of group level unobservables.
3.3.2 Evidence Consistent with a Roy Model Approach to Social Interactions
Lack of identification does not imply that the comparative advantage approach has no empirical
content. As the net market payoff to troublemakers is a declining function of nerd ability, even
24Although, as shown in Section 3.2, a given level of mean behavior in a social market is consistent with any level of
relative wages (depending on the intersection of relative supply and demand), the mean net social benefit of becoming
a troublemaker, i.e. vm, combines the supply and and demand side into one statistic that is correlated with mean
behavior.
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purely ordinal information, such as a ranking of individuals, may be useful. For any given set of
equilibrium prices, individuals with low cognitive ability are more likely to become troublemakers
than ones with high nerd ability. If comparative advantage shapes social interactions, then
individual behavior should depend on rank relative to others within the same market, and changes
in rank induced by moves across markets should be systematically related to changes in behavior.
Hence, our model predicts that, all else equal, an individual’s behavior should be related to her
rank within the relevant social market. For instance, children whose rank declines in transitioning
from elementary to middle school (drawn from multiple elementary schools) should be more
likely to develop behavioral problems than those whose rank increases.
The ideal data to test our theory would span multiple markets—say, schools or classrooms—
and contain information on social wages, agents’ choices of sector as well as all of their skills.
With such data in hand we could test directly whether comparative advantage determines behavior
by comparing potential ‘social earnings’ across sectors and relating them to agents’ choices.
Alternatively, data on only a subset of skills, social wages and individuals’ choices of sector
would allow us to follow Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), who combine information on individual
characteristics, wages, sectoral choices, and aggregate wage bills to estimate a structural model of
self-selection in the labor market, as well as the demand for observed and unobserved skill. We
are unaware of such data.
In the absence of any information on social wages, and in lieu of imposing restrictive assump-
tions to ensure identification, we pursue the more modest goal of providing reduced form evidence
which suggests that, within a market, individual behavior depends on one’s rank. We leave the
important question surrounding identification in the presence of group level unobservables for
another occasion. The evidence we present below is purely suggestive, as there exist several
competing models that share the same prediction. A trivial example is a model in which the
intrinsic utility from being a nerd depends on one’s class rank. Therefore, we urge caution when
evaluating the empirical evidence in favor of the comparative advantage approach.
In what follows, we investigate the relationship between a student’s relative academic ranking
and behavioral outcomes in two large data sets: New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) admin-
istrative data from 2003/04 through 2008/09, and the National Education Longitudinal Study
of 1988 (NELS). Since our theory predicts that this relationship can be non-linear we estimate
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semi-parametric specifications, as described in Yatchew (1998).
A. Evidence from New York City Public Schools
The New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) data contain student-level administrative information
on approximately 1.1 million students across the five boroughs of the NYC metropolitan area. The
data include student race, gender, free and reduced-price lunch eligibility, behavior, attendance,
and matriculation with course grades for all students, as well as state math and English/Language
Arts (ELA) test scores for students in grades three through eight. We have NYCPS data spanning
the 2003/04 to 2008/09 school years. Summary statistics for the variables we use in our core
specifications are displayed in Table 3.1.
Using the NYCPS data, we estimate models of the form
∆yi = f (∆xi) + X
′
iβ+ Schooli +Yeari + ǫi, (3.13)
restricting our attention to the set of students who change schools in the transition from elementary
to middle school. Our behavioral measure, yi, in each year is an indicator equal to one if a student
has at least one reported behavioral incident from that year and zero otherwise; ∆yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
The three most common behavioral incidents in our data are “engaging in an altercation or
physically aggressive behavior with other student(s),” “behaving in a manner that disrupts
the educational process (horseplay),” or “engaging in verbally rude or disrespectful behavior /
insubordination.”
A student’s rank in fifth grade is the student’s percentile ranking based on achievement on
the New York State exam relative to other students who are in the same school in fifth grade.25
We also compute each student’s position relative to peers in her sixth grade school using the fifth
25The state math and ELA tests, developed by McGraw-Hill, are high-stakes exams conducted in the winters of
third through eighth grade. Students in third, fifth, and seventh grades must score level 2 or above (out of 4) on both
tests to advance to the next grade without attending summer school. The math test includes questions on number
sense and operations, algebra, geometry, measurement, and statistics. Tests in the earlier grades emphasize more basic
content such as number sense and operations, while later tests focus on advanced topics such as algebra and geometry.
The ELA test is designed to assess students on three learning standards—information and understanding, literary
response and expression, critical analysis and evaluation—and includes multiple-choice and short-response sections
based on a reading and listening section, along with a brief editing task. Content breakdown by grade and additional
exam information is currently available at
http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/osa/pub/reports.shtml.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for NYCPS Data
Mean SD N
Change in behavioral incident indicator .042 .318 256,168
Change in rank (English/Language Arts) -.156 24.556 241,742
Change in rank (math) -.215 22.711 253,504
Previous year test score (English/Language Arts) 661.372 36.948 241,742
Previous year test score (math) 668.141 41.627 253,504
White .149 .356 256,159
Black .314 .464 256,159
Hispanic .394 .489 256,159
Asian .139 .346 256,159
Other race .004 .063 256,159
Male .507 .500 256,160
Female .493 .500 256,160
Free lunch .830 .376 210,290
English Language Learner .093 .290 253,641
Special education .087 .282 253,641
Behavioral incident indicator .089 .285 256,168
Previous year behavioral incidents .083 .531 256,168
Observation from 2004-05 school year .206 .405 256,168
Observation from 2005-06 school year .194 .395 256,168
Observation from 2006-07 school year .194 .396 256,168
Observation from 2007-08 school year .201 .401 256,168
Observation from 2008-09 school year .205 .403 256,168
Missing race .000 .006 256,168
Missing sex .000 .006 256,168
Missing free lunch status .179 .383 256,168
Missing English Language Learner status .010 .099 256,168
Missing special education status .010 .099 256,168
Missing previous year behavioral incidents .000 .000 256,168
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations together with the number of valid
observations for each variable we use in the NYCPS data. For further details about the
NYCPS data see Appendix B.1.
116
grade test scores. This captures the student’s ranking in the new school at the beginning of the
school year; ∆xi denotes the difference between these two rankings. We report results using both
math and ELA scores to compute the change in percentile. Finally, we include school fixed effects
(for both a student’s elementary and middle school), year fixed effects, and a standard set of
covariates that includes the test score in the same subject from the previous year, an exhaustive set
of race dummies, sex, free lunch eligibility, English Language Learner (ELL) status, and special
education designation. By including these covariates we attempt to control for factors which
plausibly influence changes in behavior and might be correlated with rank.
Our estimates of the link between changes in rank and changes in behavior are displayed in
Figure 3.9. Independent of whether we calculate rank based on ELA or math scores, the behavior
of students whose rank decreases in going from elementary to middle school worsens significantly
compared to students whose relative standing improves. A student experiencing a 50 percentile
decline in rank is approximately five percentage points more likely to have a behavioral incident
on record than a student whose rank improves by 50 percentiles—with the estimated effect being
slightly larger if we calculate rank based on math scores than if we do so based on ELA scores.
Given sample means (and standard deviations) of .087 (.282) for sixth grade and .049 (.215) in fifth
grade, our estimates indicate a 60–100% increase in the probability of a behavioral problem.
Although the NYCPS data allow us control for a students’ natural proclivities to cause trouble
by relating changes in behavior to changes in rank induced by the transition to middle school,
there exists the possibility that our results are driven by systematic school choice. That is, students
who chose an academically less challenging environment might have experienced less of an
increase in behavioral problems, even if their rank had not improved.
To address the concern of systematic sorting into schools, we instrument for a student’s change
in rank with their predicted change in rank based on the school they were zoned to attend
(given their residential address).26 More specifically, we estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS)
specifications corresponding to:
∆yi = α∆xi + X
′
iβ+ Schooli +Yeari + ǫi , (3.14)
26For more information on New York’s school choice plan, see http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/default.htm.
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Figure 3.9: Evidence from New York City Public Schools
Notes: Panels show non-parametric estimates and the associated 95%-confidence intervals of the effect 
of a change in a student's class rank (in going from elementary to middle school) on the change in an 
indicator variable for whether she was involved in a behavioral incident, cf. equation (12). The top 
panel constructs rank based on English/Language Arts (ELA) test scores, whereas the lower one uses 
math test scores. Estimates are obtained using the differencing procedure in Yatchew (1998) and local-
mean smoothing with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 10.
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where the first stage is given by
∆xi = δ∆̂xi + X
′
iγ+ Schooli +Yeari + νi,
and ∆̂xi denotes student i’s counterfactual change in rank at the beginning of sixth grade had
all students attended the schools for which they were zoned. More specifically, let xi,t−1 denote
student i’s test score in fifth grade and let rank I (xi,t−1) be the percentile ranking of a student with
score xi,t−1 among the set of students I, given their respective test scores at t− 1. Then,
∆̂xi ≡ rankSi,t (xi,t−1)− rankSi,t−1 (xi,t−1) ,
where Si,t−1 and Si,t are the sets of students who are zoned for the same elementary and middle
school as i, respectively.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3presents 2SLS estimates of the partial correlation between school rank and
behavior, as well as the corresponding OLS estimates for comparison. In Table 3.2 we use ELA
scores to construct rank, whereas math scores are used in Table 3.3. Based on the OLS point
estimates one would expect a student experiencing a 50 percentile decline in rank to be about
3.5 (panel A) or 5–6 (panel B) percentage points more likely to have a behavioral incident on
record than a student whose rank improves by 50 percentiles—consistent with our previous
semi-parametric results.
Due to the large number of observations, our OLS estimates are very precise. Unfortunately,
this is not the case when we estimate equation (3.14) by 2SLS. Although the first stage F-statistic
is well above conventional critical values (Stock and Yogo (2002)), our instrument explains very
little residual variation in the excluded variable, as evidenced by small values of Shea’s R2 (Shea
(1997)). One potential explanation for this is that only 46.0% (53.6%) of students attend the middle
(elementary) school for which they are zoned.
Nevertheless, not including school fixed effects, the 2SLS estimates are remarkably similar to
their OLS counterparts; and statistically significant at 1%-level. If, however, we include school
fixed effects, the point estimates shrink by more than half and are statistically indistinguishable
from zero, though still negative. Given that our instrument, ∆̂xi, explains less than one percent
of the residual variation in ∆xi when school fixed effects are included, we strongly urge caution
when interpreting the results presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In order to better account for the
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Table 3.2: Estimates of the Relationship between Individuals’ Rank and Behavior: ELA
∆ Behavioral Incident ∆ Behavioral Incident
Independent Variable OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆Rank (÷100) -.033 -.036 -.047 -.022
(.003) (.003) (.017) (.041)
Test Score at Previous School (÷100) -.030 -.031 -.034 -.028
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.010)
Male .019 .019 .018 .019
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Black .007 .025 .006 .024
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Hispanic -.005 .005 -.006 .005
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Asian -.021 -.014 -.021 -.014
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Other Race .001 .022 -.004 .018
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Free Lunch .012 .011 .011 .011
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
English Language Learner -.010 -.009 -.011 -.009
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Special Education .010 .005 .006 .005
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.006)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
First Stage F-Stat — — 5,117 1,224
Shea’s Partial R-Squared — — .027 .006
R-Squared .005 .062 .005 .062
Number of Observations 241,734 241,734 233,247 233,247
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the linear model,
equation (13), by ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares, i.e. equation. The
dependent variables is listed at the top of each column. The instrument for ∆ Rank is the
predicted change in rank based on school zoning regulations, as explained in the text and
Appendix B.1. Student rank is calclulated based on ELA test scores. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables included in
the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the
regressions. See Appendix B.1 for the precise definition and source of each variable.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the Relationship between Individuals’ Rank and Behavior: Math
∆Behavioral Incident ∆Behavioral Incident
Independent Variable OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆Rank (÷100) -.051 -.060 -.051 -.019
(.003) (.003) (.016) (.036)
Test Score at Previous School (÷100) -.027 -.030 -.027 -.023
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.006)
Male .022 .021 .021 .021
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Black .007 .024 .006 .024
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Hispanic -.005 .004 -.005 .004
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Asian -.017 -.010 -.017 -.012
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Other Race .003 .024 -.000 .021
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.012)
Free Lunch .013 .011 .013 .011
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
English Language Learner -.007 -.007 -.006 -.006
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Special Education .006 .001 .005 .003
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
First Stage F-Stat — — 7,155 1,903
Shea’s Partial R-Squared — — .036 .009
R-Squared .006 .061 .006 .060
Number of Observations 253,496 253,496 245,298 245,298
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the linear model,
equation (13), by ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares, i.e. equation. The
dependent variables is listed at the top of each column. The instrument for ∆ Rank is the
predicted change in rank based on school zoning regulations, as explained in the text and
Appendix B.1. Student rank is calclulated based on Math test scores. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables included in
the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the
regressions. See Appendix B.1 for the precise definition and source of each variable.
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possibility of bias due systematic sorting of students into schools, we turn the National Education
Longitudinal Study.
B. Evidence From the National Educational Longitudinal Study
The National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) was initiated in 1988 with a cohort of
24,599 eighth graders, who were then resurveyed through four follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and
2000. The available information on these students covers a wide range of topics including: school,
work, and home experiences; educational resources and support; the role in education of their
parents and peers; neighborhood characteristics; educational and occupational aspirations; as
well as other student perceptions. For the first three waves, students also completed achievement
tests in reading, social studies, mathematics and science. In addition to collecting information
on students’ course work and grades in high school as well as postsecondary transcripts, their
teachers, parents, and school administrators were also surveyed. Table 3.4 displays summary
statistics for all variables we use in our analysis.
We examine NELS data from 1988 and 1990, when students were in eighth and tenth grade.
An important limitation of the NELS data is that only 25 students per school were surveyed,
yielding a noisy measure of rank. To lessen the impact of measurement error, we limit our sample
to students in classrooms with at least five observations.27 Yet, NELS allows us take advantage
of the fact that the data include teacher reports on behavior and student self-reported grades
from exactly two subjects in the same year. By using a model that relates changes in a student’s
behavior across classrooms to changes in her rank we can implicitly account for students’ natural
tendencies to cause trouble and rule out that systematic sorting into schools drives our results.28
More specifically, we estimate a model of the form
∆yi,t = f (∆xi,t) + X
′
i,tβ+ Gradei + ǫi,t (3.15)
where yi,s is an indicator for whether a teacher in subject s reports that student i had any behavioral
problems, and ∆yi,t refers to the difference in this indicator across subjects (Math/Science minus
27We obtain qualitatively identical results for alternative threshold levels of ten and zero.
28Students strategically sorting into classrooms based on other unobservables is still a potential concern.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for NELS Data
Mean SD N
Difference in behavioral incident dummy (eighth grade) .007 .519 19,782
Difference in behavioral incident dummy (tenth grade) .008 .548 10,506
Behavioral incident dummy (eighth grade) .387 .487 19,782
Behavioral incident dummy (tenth grade) .557 .497 10,523
Difference in behavioral incident factor (eighth grade) .003 .951 19,709
Difference in behavioral incident factor (tenth grade) .016 .938 10,399
Behavioral incident factor (eighth grade) -.024 .983 19,761
Behavioral incident factor (tenth grade) -.020 .978 10,485
Difference in class rank (eighth grade) -.652 33.960 19,782
Difference in class rank (tenth grade) -.980 35.599 10,523
Mean test score (eighth grade) .060 .868 19,213
Mean test score (tenth grade) .093 .870 10,241
Male .497 .500 21,297
White .694 .461 21,297
Black .111 .314 21,297
Hispanic .118 .322 21,297
Asian .058 .233 21,297
English Language Learner .027 .163 21,297
Parents married .721 .449 21,297
Parents’ education: less than high school .096 .295 21,145
Parents’ education: high school graduate .192 .394 21,145
Parents’ education: some college .403 .490 21,145
Parents’ education: college graduate .153 .360 21,145
Parents’ education: M.A. .096 .295 21,145
Parents’ education: Ph.D., M.D., other .060 .238 21,145
Public school (eighth grade) .792 .406 21,297
Catholic school (eighth grade) .102 .303 21,297
Independent/other private school (eighth grade) .106 .308 21,297
School in urban area .289 .453 21,297
School in rural area .290 .454 21,297
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations together with the number of
valid observations for each variable we use in the NELS data. For further details
about the NELS data see Appendix B.2, or the NELS website currently located at
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88
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English/History) within the same year. Teachers were asked whether the student had a problem
in any of six different categories: the student performed below his ability, the student did not
complete homework, the student was frequently absent, the student was frequently tardy, the
student was inattentive, or the student was disruptive. Our indicator variable is equal to one if
the teacher reported that the student had at least one of these behavioral problems. It is important
to note that the NELS measure of behavioral problems encompasses a far more benign set of
‘offenses’ than those typically reported in NYCPS. We use student self-reported grades to compute
subject-specific rank xi,s,t, and let ∆xi,t denote the difference in these ranks across subjects within
the same year. Moreover, Xi,t includes: the mean score across subjects from the same year and its
square, race, sex, English Language Learner status, indicator variables for parents’ marital status,
indicator variables for parents’ education, indicator variables for school type (public, Catholic,
or other private), indicator variables for school location (urban, suburban, or rural), indicator
variables for socioeconomic status quartiles, birth year indicators, and birth month indicators;
Gradei marks a grade level fixed effect.
As was the case in the NYCPS data, we find that changes in a student’s rank within a social
market are related to changes in her behavior (see Figure 3.10). For instance, students whose rank
is 50 percentiles lower in English class than in Math class are estimated to be approximately ten
percentage points more likely to act out in the former than the latter. Taken at face value rank
appears to have a substantial influence on behavior.29
Broadly summarizing, the results presented in this section suggest that students’ behavior
deteriorates as their academic rank declines—whether across schools, or across subjects. By
controlling for both prior test score levels and school fixed effects, this evidence suggests that
students’ behavior is being determined in part by their comparative advantage in these activities
relative to that of their peers.
29In NELS the sample mean (and standard deviation) of our indicator for having at least on behavioral incident
is .427 (.495) in math, .402 (.490) in history, .426 (.495) in science, and .429 (.495) in English class. Every student has
information on at most two of these subjects. See also Table 3.4 and the description of NELS in Appendix B.2. Instead
of using an indicator variable for whether the teacher reports any behavioral incidents, we have also constructed a
summary index of children’s behavior by factor analyzing different teacher reported behaviors. For both outcomes our
results are qualitatively identical.
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Figure 3.10: Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Study
Notes: The figure shows non-parametric estimates and the associated 95%-confidence intervals 
of the effect of differences in a student's course-specific rank on the difference in two course-
specific behavioral outcomes, cf. equation (14). Estimates are obtained using the differencing 
procedure in Yatchew (1998) and local-mean smoothing with a Gaussian kernel and a 
bandwidth of 7.5. 
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
While social scientists have long been concerned with the influence of social interactions, empirical
estimates of peer effects vary widely in the literature. Using different sources of (plausibly)
exogenous variation some studies find negligible effects, others find effects that are positive and
linear in mean peer characteristics, and occassionally peer effects have been found to be negative.
We develop a Roy model of social interactions which, through comparative advantage, has the
potential to provide a parsimonous explanation for the disparate empirical evidence. In our
model ‘peer effects’ arise endogenously due to the sorting of individuals within narrowly defined
social settings, such as neighborhoods or classrooms. Consequently, the comparative advantage
approach has important implications for the (non)identification of peer effects—even if individuals
are randomly assigned to social markets. In addition, since an unobserved wage is the critical
determinant of selection, assigning students to an environment with higher academic abilities is
no guarantee that they will face higher wages for academic effort. This places severe constraints
on the external validity of any randomized trial.
Our data exercise provides suggestive evidence that the key prediction distinguishing our
model from traditional approaches is borne out in two datasets. However, it is important to note
that other models which predict both positive and negative peer effects, might also be able to
reconcile our empirical evidence as well as the existing literature.
At its core, our theory builds upon impressive literatures designed to understand the evolution
of earnings, the (hedonic) pricing of skills, and the assignment of workers to firms. The novelty
in our approach lies in the application of these classic methods to develop a theory of social
interactions to characterize equilibria in different social markets. The insights emerging from this
approach may also be useful in understanding a variety of other social phenomena, one particular
example being identity choice.
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Appendix A
Data Appendix for Chapters 1 and 2
Data on Divestitures
Data on divestitures is compiled from the “Electric Utility Plants Sold/Transferred and Reclassified
as Non-utility Plants” Tables across various years of the March Issue of EIA’s “Electric Power
Monthly” report. It is also possible to identify month of divestiture prior to 2002 because plants
cease reporting fuel costs at that time. A third source of divestiture date is a change in regulatory
status reported on Form EIA-906, “Power Plant Report.” In the relatively uncommon case that
these dates disagree, I rely first on the cost data (a signal of operational changes at the plant), then
the sale data, and finally the “Power Plant Report” data.
Table A.1 breaks down this history of coal-fired plant divestitures by state. Divestiture of
utility-owned plants in a state was usually complete following passage of passing restructuring
laws. Not all states that restructured have coal-fired plants to use in this study. Although California
restructured its electricity markets, its IOUs did not own any coal-fired capacity. Washington, DC
was also restructured but its two coal-fired plants are used sufficiently little to avoid fuel delivery
reporting requirements. All New England states except Vermont restructured their electricity
markets, but Maine and Rhode Island do not have coal-fired generating assets. New Hampshire
did not require divestiture of the two coal-fired plants owned by Public Service of New Hampshire,
and these plants continue to report costs after the introduction of retail competition.
There have also been a number of divestitures in states that remain otherwise rate-regulated.
The plants divested in Indiana, and Virginia were owned by IOUs based in restructured states,
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Table A.1: Summary of Coal Plant Divestitures by State
Fraction of Fraction of
State Plants (Divested) IOU Divested Capacity Divested Mean Sale Date [s.d.]
Texas 17 ( 9 ) 0.69 0.60 8/2002 [13.69]
Connecticut 1 ( 1 ) 1.00 1.00 5/1999 [ .]
Delaware 2 ( 2 ) 1.00 1.00 7/2001 [ 0.00]
Maryland 7 ( 7 ) 1.00 1.00 10/2000 [ 3.09]
Illinois 22 ( 19 ) 1.00 0.95 10/2000 [18.57]
Indiana 24 ( 1 ) 0.05 0.02 9/2001 [23.14]
Massachusetts 4 ( 4 ) 1.00 1.00 12/2000 [47.45]
Montana 3 ( 2 ) 0.67 0.98 1/2000 [ 0.00]
New Jersey 5 ( 4 ) 1.00 0.99 9/2002 [38.19]
New York 10 ( 8 ) 0.89 0.92 8/1999 [ 6.46]
Ohio 25 ( 8 ) 0.38 0.26 2/2002 [29.28]
Pennsylvania 21 ( 21 ) 1.00 1.00 7/2000 [14.09]
Virginia 9 ( 1 ) 0.11 0.10 2/2002 [29.41]
Washington 2 ( 1 ) 1.00 0.97 5/2000 [ 0.00]
Divest States Total 152 ( 88 ) 0.65 0.33 7/2001 [23.71]
Notes: Coal-fired cogeneration plants in CA were not affected by restructuring
legislation (4 plants). Other restructured states without reporting coal plants
include ME, VT, RI, and DC. NH did not require divestiture (2 plants) Sources:
"Electric Power Monthly" (March, various years), EIA-423/923 and EIA-906.
and were forced to sell for this reason. Montana has suspended restructuring, but Montana Power
Company assets were divested in 2000 after its failed telecom investments during the dot-com
bust led the company in to bankruptcy. The Centralia station in Washington state was sold amidst
conflict among the plant’s eight co-owners.
Divestiture status in Ohio and Texas varies by utility service area. The only IOU plants in Texas
that remain to be divested belong to Southwestern Electric Power Company, which is connected
to a separate grid from the rest of the state. The lack of markets available in this service area has
delayed divestiture. In Ohio, two Duquesne Light Co. coal-fired plants were divested in 2000 as
part of Pennsylvania’s restructuring program. Although Ohio implemented retail choice in 2000,
FirstEnergy’s plants in Ohio would not be divested until 2005. Plans to divest of the remaining
IOU plants in Ohio have been tied up between the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO)
and the courts since that time. The owners of these plants remain rate-regulated and require
approval PUCO approval to change electricity prices.
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Coal Prices
This study uses detailed data on coal deliveries to power plants from the Energy Information
Administration (Forms EIA-423, “Monthly Report of Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Plants,”
and EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report”) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Form FERC-423, “Monthly Report of Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Plants”). This is
shipment-level data, reported monthly for nearly all of the coal burned for the production of
electricity in the United States (all facilities with a combined capacity greater than 50MW are
required to report). The data records the county or mine of origin, whether purchased on the
spot market or long-term contract, characteristics of the coal (heat, sulfur and ash content), rank
(bituminous, etc.), and the price per million British thermal units (MMBTU). Although data on
prices is redacted from public release for non-utilities, restricted-access data on prices was made
available for this study under a non-disclosure agreement with EIA.
One critical caveat is that plants were no longer required to report to FERC upon divestiture,
and EIA did not assert their authority under the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 to
resume collection from non-utility plants until 2002.1 Plants that were sold before 2002 therefore
have a gap in reporting following divestiture. With most divestitures occurring between 1999 and
2001, this results in a two year gap on average. An exception is for the six FirstEnergy plants in
Ohio that stopped reporting once retail competition began in June of 2000, but did not resume
reporting until actual divestiture at the end of 2005. All results are robust to the exclusion of these
plants.
Coal delivered to combined heat and power plants (4% of reported coal deliveries after 2002)
is not included in any of the analysis. These are plants that also sell steam, either for heating or
industrial processes. One reason is practical: 36 of 49 coal-fired co-generation plants were not
required to report until 2002, so they lack data in the pre-divestiture baseline period. The second
is that it is unclear how to categorize the regulatory structure these plants face: a plant owned
by an IOU may be free to privately contract for steam to nearby industrial plants. In addition,
four small (typically produced <50MWh/month) facilities that were divested, but never report
1When switching to Form 923 in 2008, the EIA began collecting monthly data from a sample of plants, and a census
annually. Monthly data is estimated by EIA from plants that only submitted the annual form. This change applied
more significantly to gas-based generators, as more than 97% of coal deliveries continued monthly reporting.
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Figure A.1: Total Heat Content and Cost of Coal Deliveries by Rank, 1990-2009
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Note: Vertical lines denote the year in which divestitures begin (1998), and when reporting for non-utilities
commences (2002). Source: Forms EIA-423,923 and FERC 423.
post-divestiture are also dropped. They are the Hickling and Jennison plants in NY, Grand Tower
in IL, and Edgewater in OH.
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Figure A.1a shows the total heat content of coal deliveries reported to FERC/EIA from 1990-
2009. The vertical lines represent the points at which divestitures begin in 1998, and when
reporting for divested plants resumes in January 2002. There is clearly a substantial amount of
non-reporting induced by divestiture. Aside from this dip, there is a 15-25% increase in coal
delivered over this 20 year period.2 It is important to note that nearly all of this came from an
increase in production at existing facilities, not entry of new plants.
Another feature of Figure A.1a worthy of note is the expansion of sub-bituminous coal, both
in levels and as a share of coal consumed for electric power. The Clean Air Act of 1990 created a
cap-and-trade program to reduce sulfur emissions from electricity generating and large industrial
units. Putting a price on sulfur increased the relative value of low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal
(95% of sub-bituminous coal mined in the United States in 2009 was from the Powder River Basin
(PRB) in Wyoming). Switching to PRB coal provided an alternative to building capital-intensive
scrubbers to reduce sulfur emissions. Technological improvements as demand for PRB coal
expanded further reduced the price of extraction, making PRB coal a potentially economical
choice regardless of environmental compliance considerations. Shipments of PRB coal more than
doubled over the twenty year period of study, accounting for about 40% of the coal heat delivered
in 2009.
Plant-Level Data
Data on generator nameplate capacity and vintage comes from Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric
Generator Report,” while data on installed abatement equipment is from Form EIA-767, “Annual
Steam-Electric Plant Operation and Design Data” and EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations Report.”
Annual capacity factor is the annual net generation reported on FormEIA-906/759, “Power Plant
Report” divided by maximum potential output as determined by facility nameplate rating. This
form is also the source for analysis on changes in output at the facility-level. Utility-specific
implementations of Incentive Regulation programs is from Sappington and Pfeifenberger (2001)
with updates from Guerriero (2010). This is linked to the plant-level data by the utility identifiers
in the “Power Plant Report” data.
2The drop-off in 2009 is the combined effect of the economic downturn and displaced generation due to the fall in
natural gas prices.
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Data on geographic coordinates of power plants is from the Environmental Protection Agency’s
eGrid database.
Unit-Level Data
Unit-specific characteristics are assembled using the crosswalks between unit components provided
in Form EIA-767, “Annual Steam-Electric Plant Operation and Design Data” available from 1990-
2005. The data on this form was later compiled on Form EIA-923, “Power Plant Operations
Report” after a gap in reporting for 2006.3 The effects of this gap can be mitigated by the fact that
scrubber installation date is collected, so status in the missing year can be inferred from prior
and subsequent years. Power generating stations have been required to file these forms with EIA
regardless of regulatory status,4 so this series does not suffer from the intermittent non-reporting
present in the fuel price data. Unit-level generator nameplate capacity and vintage comes from
Form EIA-860, “Annual Electric Generator Report.”
As with the generating facilities themselves, there has also been limited entry and attrition at
the unit level. As a fraction of nameplate capacity, 92% of units reporting in 2009 also reported
when the series began in 1990 (85% of units). These numbers increase to 95% and 93% respectively
when accounting for the expanded coverage among combined heat and power units in 2002.
Attrition was similarly rare, with 96% of capacity and 87% of units reporting in 1990 continuing
to report in 2009.
It is worth noting that is that it is not uncommon for facilities to have both scrubbed and
un-scrubbed units operating at the same plant. This can be seen by comparing the number for
any scrubber present at the facility in Table 1.1, and the unit-level statistics in Table 1.3.5 The
differences between divested and non-divested units are otherwise similar to those found at the
plant level, and largely eliminated in the matched sample.
3Plants with a combined nameplate capacity less than 50 MW are not required to report fuel prices (Form EIA-
423/923), while all facilities with a capacity greater than 10 MW are required to report generating unit configurations
and operations (Form EIA-767/923). The discrepancy amounts to an infinitesimal share of production and capacity.
4Form EIA-767 expanded coverage to a handful of combined heat and power plants in 2002.
5While scrubbers had only been installed on a small fraction of generating units in 1997, these units were
disproportionately large. In 1997 28% of U.S. coal-fired capacity was scrubbed for sulfur emissions. This has grown to
nearly half by 2009.
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Mine-Level Data
Data on mine labor productivity is from the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s “Quarterly
Mine Employment and Coal Production Report” (MSHA-7000-2). Figure A.2 shows the trends in
production and labor hours over the sample period. The main development over the last twenty
years has been the explosion of production from the Powder River Basin (PRB) in Wyoming. This
has more than offset the decline of output elsewhere, so that there has been a modest increase in
coal production overall. The shift in output has been accompanied with a sharp decline in mining
employment, which has only rebounded slightly since 2005. The 1990’s saw sharp increases in
labor productivity all around–from expanding output faster than employment in the PRB, and by
reducing employment faster than output in the East. It requires about seven times less labor to
extract a ton of coal in the PRB.
Wages are calculated by adding up the quarterly hours reported in the MSHA data by FIPS
county, and merging this data with the quarterly wage bill in the coal mining sector as reported in
the “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages” from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.6 Wage
rates are calculated at the county level by dividing the total county wage bill by total hours.
The thickness of coal seams is from MSHA’s “Mine Dataset,” which contains descriptive data
on all mines under MSHA’s jurisdiction since 1970. To calculate the depth of mine seams, I used a
Perl script to collect the universe of stratigraphic data from the U.S. Geological Survey’s “National
Coal Resources Data System.” The combined USTRAT and COALQUAL databases consist of
over 200,000 geo-coded core samples taken by federal and state geologists in order to map U.S.
coal deposits. Among the many parameters collected from these core samples is the depth of
coal deposits. I use these points to create a surface of estimated seam depth using a spline to
interpolate between points using the geoprocessing toolkit of ArcGIS 10.0. I then intersect the
coordinates of mines with this surface to estimate the depth of coal deposits at each mining site.
The EIA only began collecting source mine identifiers (MSHA ID) on the fuel delivery data
in 2008. From 1990-2001, I link deliveries to the name of the supplier listed in EIA’s Coal
Transportation Rate Database (CTRD) based on facility, county of coal origin, and the characteristics
of the coal reported in both the CTRD and EIA-423 data. The name of the supplier is explicitly
6Coal mining employment is reported under the four-digit NAICS code, “2121.”
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Figure A.2: U.S. Coal Production and Labor Demand, 1990-2009
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listed in the EIA-423 data beginning in 2002. Deliveries and mine characteristics are therefore
connected at the county-supplier level.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 New York City Public Schools Data
Demographic Variables
Demographic variables that should not vary from year to year (race, gender) were pulled from
New York City enrollment files from 2003/04 through 2008/09, with precedence given to the most
recent files. Race consisted of the following categories: black, Hispanic, white, Asian, and other
race. These categories were considered mutually exclusive. The “other race” category consisted of
students who were coded as “American Indian.” Gender was coded as male, female, or missing.
Demographic variables that may vary from year to year (free lunch status, English Language
Learner status, and special education designation) were only pulled from the enrollment file
corresponding to the same year as the observation. A student was considered eligible for free
lunch if he was coded as “A” or “1” in the raw data, which corresponds to free lunch, or “2”,
which corresponds to reduced-price lunch. A student was considered non-free lunch if the student
was coded as a “3” in the NYC enrollment file, which corresponds to full price lunch. All other
values, including blanks, were coded as missing. For English Language Learner status, a student
was given a value of one if he was coded as “Y” for the limited English proficiency variable. All
other students in the NYC data were coded as zero for English Language Learner status. Special
education was coded similarly.
New York State Test Scores
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NYC state test scores were constructed from the NYC test score files for 2003/04 through
2008/09 for English/Language Arts (ELA) and math. School-wide rankings were constructed
based on these test scores.
Behavior
The number of behavioral incidents for each student was determined from NYC files listing
all recorded behavioral incidents from 2004/05 through 2008/09. Students not listed in this file
but with a valid test score from the same year were assumed to have zero behavioral incidents.
We constructed a behavioral incident indicator with a value of one if the student was listed for
a behavioral incident in the file from the relevant year, zero if the student had a valid test score
from the same year, and missing otherwise.
B.2 National Educational Longitudinal Study Data
Demographic Variables
Demographic variables were taken from the baseline year of the survey. These included: race,
sex, English Language Learner status, parents’ marital status, parents’ education, school type
(public, Catholic, or other private), school location (urban, suburban, rural), socioeconomic status,
birth month, and birth year.
Behavior
Behavior variables were constructed using data from teacher reports on individual students.
Teachers were asked to indicate whether the student had problems in each of the following areas:
the student performs below his ability, the student does not complete homework, the student
is frequently absent, the student is frequently tardy, the student is inattentive, or the student is
disruptive. In the baseline year (eighth grade), each student had one teacher report from either
Math or Science and another from either English or History, for a total of two teacher reports.
Similarly, each student had two reports from the first follow-up year (tenth grade). Teacher reports
were also administered in the second follow-up year (twelfth grade) but only in one subject, so
these reports are excluded from our analysis, which takes advantage of within-year across-subject
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variation. For each student, we constructed an indicator that is equal to one if the student’s teacher
reports that the student has a problem in at least one of the six categories and zero otherwise. The
outcomes used for our analysis are the within-year differences across subjects in the behavioral
indicator.
Grades
The dataset contains self-reported grades for the baseline, first follow-up, second follow-up
years. In the baseline year, students were asked to report for each subject (Math, Science, English,
and History) whether their grades since sixth grade had been “mostly A’s (90-100),” “mostly B’s
(80-89),” “mostly C’s (70-79),” “mostly D’s (60-69),” or “mostly below D (below 60).” Similarly, in
the first follow-up year, students were asked to report for each subject whether their grades from
ninth grade until now were “mostly A’s,” “about half A’s and half B’s,” “mostly B’s,” “about half
B’s and half C’s,” “mostly C’s,” “about half C’s and half D’s,” “mostly D’s,” or “mostly below D.”
These responses were converted to the average of the corresponding grade point values on a 4.0
scale, where 1.0 corresponds to D, 2.0 corresponds to C, 3.0 corresponds to B, and 4.0 corresponds
to A. These grade values were used to compute a student’s percentile rank within each class.
Test Scores
The dataset contains test scores for each student from Math, Science, English, and History
for each year. We construct a test score control that is the mean of the test scores from the two
subjects for which there are teacher reports in the baseline year and first follow-up year. We also
construct its square and use both as controls in our estimates.
B.3 Embedding the Roy Model in a Social Multiplier Framework
In this subsection, we cast our Roy model of social interaction into a general model of social
interactions. Let there be a continuum of agents with unit mass. Every agent is endowed with
one unit of (non-transferable) time. In the canonical model of social multipliers (see Becker and
Murphy 2000, for example), agents derive utility from two different kinds of activities, social
and asocial. Our principal departure from the usual framework is that we assume that there
are two activities in which agents can engage with their peers: studying or mischief. These
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activities are exclusive and undertaken by separate social groups in one of two sectors: ‘nerds’
and ‘troublemakers’. The utility derived from participating in a social activity depends on the
total effective labor supplied to that sector only, Lj indexed by j ∈ {N, T}, as well as another input
we label ‘capital’, Kj. We allow capital to broadly represent any non-human input into groups’
production (e.g., school quality, diligence of adult supervision, etc.).
Agents are heterogenous along two dimensions. Their varying size and strength yield differ-
ences in the ability to cause trouble, whereas heterogeneity in cognitive ability implies differences
in their ability to be a true nerd. Let the continuous function σN(i) : [0, 1] → R+ denote the
effective units of ‘nerdiness’ that agent i is capable of contributing to the group (e.g., expertise in
differential geometry). Analogously, agent i’s troublemaking ability is given by σT(i) : [0, 1] → R+.
To emphasize the importance of social activity selection in the estimation of peer effects, we
model the effective utility from time spent with nerds or troublemakers as perfect substitutes
s(i) = tN(i)σN(i)wN(LN ,KN) + tT(i)σT(i)wT(LT,KT) (B.1)
We can then nest utility from social activities in a quasiconcave utility function that depends
on an individual’s social ‘production’ s(i) as defined in (B.1), asocial activities ta(i), and atomistic
agents take aggregate labor and capital conditions (L,K) as given.
U(i) = U(ta(i), s(i);L,K) (B.2)
s.t. ta(i) + tN(i) + tT(i) = 1
With this formulation, we think of the marginal return to spending an additional effective unit of
time with a social group as a ‘wage’ that is determined by aggregate social market conditions. In
the absence of a second activity, this is the standard framework for analyzing social interactions.
The ‘social multiplier’ is generated the assumption that
∂wj
∂Lj
> 0.1
1To see this, suppose studying were the only social activity, and we were interested in the effect of additional school
resources KN on effective time spent studying LN =
´ 1
0 σN(i)tN [i,w(LN ,KN)]. Taking the total derivative,
dLN = [
∂wN
∂LN
dLN +
∂wN
∂KN
dKN ]
ˆ 1
0
σN(i)
∂tN(i)
∂wN
di
dLN
dKN
=
∂wN
∂KN
´ 1
0 σN(i)
∂tN(i)
∂wN
di
1− ∂wN∂LN
´ 1
0 σN(i)
∂tN(i)
∂wN
di
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With perfect substitutability between social activities, utility maximization implies a simple
cutoff rule that separates individuals between social sectors in a manner analogous to a classical
Roy (1951) model. Let σ (i) ≡ σN(i)σT(i) denote agent i’s skill as a nerd relative to that as a troublemaker,
and order agents such that σ′(i) ≥ 0. Equilibrium ‘labor supply’ is determined by the set of agents
whose comparative advantage determines the sector of their social activity, and the marginal rate
of substitution between social and asocial activities. Utility maximization implies the first order
condition of B.2
Ua
Uj
= σj(i)wj(Lj,Kj) (B.3)
Diminishing marginal utility implies that more skilled agents are more socially active within
their respective sector as their opportunity cost of asocial activity is higher. The agent indifferent
between the two sectors, i∗(not necessarily unique, see below) has a skill ratio of
σ (i∗) =
wT(LT,KT)
wN(LN ,KN)
. (B.4)
For any given equilibrium wage ratio, all individuals with index i ≥ i∗ join forces with the nerds,
and individuals with i < i∗ become troublemakers. In our price theory of social interactions,
comparative (rather than absolute) advantage determines an individual’s choice of sector. Total
effective labor supply to each sector is determined by
L∗N =
ˆ 1
i∗
σN (s) tN [s,wN(L∗N ,KN)]ds (B.5)
L∗T =
ˆ i∗
0
σT (s) tT[s,wT(L∗T,KT)]ds. (B.6)
Equations (B.5) and (B.6) characterize the supply side in the market for peers. A labor demand
schedule with respect to i∗ can be characterized as a curve that traces the marginal return per
unit of effective time as the measure of the sector increases–taking the labor supply decisions
of inframarginal agents into consideration. The relationship between total labor supply in the
troublemaking sector and the position of the marginal agent is derived by taking the derivative of
While the numerator measures the average direct effect of the additional resources on time spent studying, when
∂wN
∂LN
> 0, this amount is amplified by the additional increase in the return to studying induced by the ‘social multiplier’:
∂wN
∂LN
´ 1
0 σN(i)
∂tN(i)
∂wN
di.
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B.6 with respect to i∗
∂L∗T
∂i∗
= σT (i
∗) tT[i
∗,wT(L∗T,KT)] +
∂wT
∂L∗T
∂L∗T
∂i∗
ˆ i∗
0
σT (s)
∂t∗[s,wT(L∗T,KT)]
wT
ds
=
σT (i
∗) tT[i
∗,wT(L∗T,KT)]
1− ∂wT∂L∗T
´ i∗
0 σT (s)
∂t∗[s,wT(L∗T ,KT)]
wT
ds
(B.7)
The expression for the nerd sector is identical, but with a negative numerator to account for
the opposite effect moving i∗ has on the measure of the group. The numerator is the mechanical
effect of adding a new member to the sector, and the denominator accounts for the labor supply
adjustment of inframarginal members in response to the change in group size. ∂t
∗[s,wT(L∗T ,KT)]
wT
is
always positive by the first order condition (B.3). While effective labor supply always increases
with the measure of the sector, whether the mechanical effect is dampened or amplified depends
on whether the social wage increases or decreases with effective labor in the sector. We turn to
each case in turn.
Diminishing Marginal Social Product of Labor in Both Sectors
In contrast with the ‘social multiplier’ approach in which it is assumed
∂wj
∂Lj
> 0, we begin with
the assumption that additional labor supply in a social sector reduces the marginal product of
participation,
∂wj
∂Lj
< 0–a common assumption for the theory of the firm. In our setting this would
correspond to a game–of math problems or bullying, for example–becoming less fun as the activity
has to be shared with more participants.2 As part of our analysis we introduce the ‘relative labor
demand curve’, δ (i) : [0, 1] → R+, a schedule that traces the relative marginal return of a unit of
effective labor in social activity when index i is the marginal agent between sectors
δ (i) ≡
wT(LT(i),KT)
wN(LN(i),KN)
(B.8)
The assumption of diminishing marginal product in both sectors guarantees that the relative
labor demand curve will be (weakly) downward sloping, as increasing the measure of the
troublemaking sector with lower the numerator, which raising the denominator of (B.8).
2This holds for effective units, regardless of the number of participants. A brilliant student answering all of the
questions or a talented athlete hogging the ball is an example of many effective units concentrated in a single person
diminishing the social utility of participation for others.
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Increasing Marginal Social Product of Labor in Both Sectors
As discussed above, the assumption that
∂wj
∂Lj
> 0 in a single social sector has been the focus of
much of the work on social interactions. Study groups allow students to benefit from division
of labor on a lab project, and ensure individual students do not waste time stuck on a question
to which someone else in the group knows the answer. More troublemakers at a school can
divert teachers’ attention and thereby reduce others’ probability of punishment. We now consider
the nature of equilibria when there are two social sectors characterized by increasing marginal
product.
Equation B.7 shows that when
∂wj
∂Lj
> 0, the mechanical increase in labor supply from increasing
i∗ is amplified by an increased labor supply from inframarginal agents due to the increased
marginal product of making trouble. Conversely, the accompanying decrease in labor in the nerd
sector yields an amplified decrease in the return to being a nerd. The relative demand schedule
is therefore upward sloping. This creates the potential for multiple equilibria along the lines of
Becker (1991) and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998).
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